Journal of Philosophical Investigations by Asgahri, M.

 
                                                                         
                                                                           ISSN (print): 2251-7960 
ISSN (online): 2423-4419 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 
 
UNIVERSITY OF TABRIZ 
 
 
 
 
Fall & Winter 2015 
No. 17/ Year 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
In The Name of 
GOD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Journal of Philosophical Investigations  
 Tabriz University 
No.17/ Year 9 
Founder: University of Tabriz 
General Manager: Vice Chancellor(Research & Thechnology) 
Editor in chief: Dr. Mohammad Asghari 
Editorial board: 
1. Dr. S. Y. Yasrebi Professor of islamic philosophy of Allameh Tabatabai University 
2. Dr. A. Ahmadi Professor of western philosophy of Tehran University 
3. Dr. M. V. D. Bossche Professor of western philosophy of Vrije University Brussel 
4. Dr. R. J. Dostal Professor of western philosophy of Bryn Mawr College 
5. Dr. H. Fathi Associate Professor of western philosophy of Tabriz University 
6. Dr. M. HaajHosseini Associate Professor of western philosophy of Isfahan University 
7. Dr. A. R. Hessamifar Associate Professor of western philosophy of Imam Khomeini University 
8. Dr. M. Imanpoor Associate Professor of islamic philosophy of Shahid Madani University 
9. Dr. M. Navali Professor of western philosophy of Tabriz University 
10. Dr. Y. Nouzohoor Associate Professor of western philosophy of Tabriz University 
11. Dr. R. Palmer Professor of western philosophy of MacMurray College 
12. Dr. M. Saneii Darebidi Professor of islamic philosophy of Shahid Beheshti University 
13. Dr. M. Shajari Associate Professor of islamic philosophy of Tabriz University 
English Papers Editor: Dr. Alireza Azadi  
Internal manager: Dr. Mahmoud Soufiani 
Editor: Salva Kazemipour 
Technical affair: Masoumeh Abazari 
Printed by: Tabriz University Press 
Date of Publication: Winter 2016 
Address: Faculty of Persian literature & Foreign lanugages, University 
of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran. 
Tel: 041-33392131  Fax: 041-33342490 
Website: http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir 
E_mail: philosophy@tabrizu.ac.ir 
Indexing Databases: 
* Directory of Open access Journals (http://doaj.org)  
* Scientific World Index (http://www.sciwindex.com) 
* Islamic World Science Citation Center (http://www.isc.gov.ir)  
* Scientific Information Database (http://sid.ir) 
* Scientific Indexing Service (http://www.sindexs.org) 
* http://www.noormags.ir  * http://www.Magiran.com 
* http://www.civilika.com  * http://www.ensani.ir 
Contents 
Metaphysics of Logical Realism/ Mohammadreza 
Abdollahnejad …………………………………………….…... 1 
The Need for the Dualist View to Combat Extremism/ Alistair 
J. Sinclair ……………………………………………………… 23 
Has Richard Rorty a moral philosophy?/ Mohammad Asghari 55 
Lakatos and Hersh on Mathematical Proof/ Hossein Bayat ...  75 
Dose the Conceptual Interdependency of Belief and Desire 
Undermine the Normativity of Content?/ Seyed Ali Kalantari   95 
Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology and Religious 
Extremism: Some Historical Evidences/ Jalal Peykani, 
Meisam Sadeghpour…………………………………….……... 105 
The Ethics (Ethos) of History/ James Risser ……………..……. 117 
Relativism: Protagoras and Nelson Goodman/ Esmaeil 
Saadati Khamseh ………………………………………….…...  137 
Making Sense of Cartesian Modality/ Beth Seacord ………… 153 
Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-brain Relationship…/ Mahdi 
Soleimani Khourmouji ………………………………………... 173 
The Humanisti Heritage of Muhammad Arkoun/ Katharina 
Völker …………………………………………………………. 203 
 
  چكيدة مقالات
  
 
University of Tabriz 
Philosophical Investigations 
Fall & Winter 2015/ Vol. 9/ No. 17  
Metaphysics of Logical Realism* 
Mohammadreza Abdollahnejad** 
Assistant Professor in Pilosophy, 
Tabriz University, Iran 
Abstract  
Despite the often false impression that the analytic philosophy as an anti-
metaphysical movement has nothing to do with metaphysics, there can be found 
good reasons to grant the metaphysical dispositions of analytic philosophers, and 
thereby, to minimize the anti-metaphysical nature of analytic philosophy in its all 
phases. Since analytic philosophy is a historical movement the main nature of which 
developed through several stages, the very kinds of metaphysical dispositions within 
each one of its various stages can be easily portrayed. In the meantime, logical 
realism as the early stage of analytic philosophy contains plenty of metaphysical 
dispositions. Undoubtedly, one cannot say that analytic philosophy in this period 
was not committed to metaphysical theses about the plurality of entities, the ultimate 
nature of reality and the logical structure of the world. In this paper, then, after 
giving a relatively complete explanation of the logical realism, we claimed that 
although logical realists rejected the traditional speculative metaphysics of their 
predecessors, they also replaced it by the metaphysics of logic that pursues the 
metaphysical aims, this time, by logical means. So, we portrayed this kind of 
metaphysics as Bolzano’s Semantic Platonism, Frege’s and Russell’s Pluralistic 
Platonism, Russell’s Pluralistic Atomism, and Wittgenstein’s logical atomism. 
Keywords: logical realism, metaphysics of logic, semantic Platonism, 
pluralist Platonism, logical atomism.                                    
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Introdoction 
Analytic philosophy is a philosophical movement whose main 
activities have developed in several stages. Its first stage began with 
the Logical Realism. Logical realism as a general name for the first 
phase of analytic philosophy includes Bolzano’s semantic Platonism 
and pluralistic Platonism of Frege and the early Russell as well as 
logical atomism of middle Russell and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 
According to Smith, “logical realism is characterized by a Platonic 
theory of universals, direct realism in perceptual theory, and 
intuitionism in ethics” (Smith, 1997: 3). Likewise, “insisting upon the 
independence of the object of knowledge from the knower, defending 
a correspondence theory of truth, rejecting the doctrine of the 
internality of all relations and affirming the reality and objectivity of 
relations” (Hacker, 1998: 15)  are all the characteristics that Hacker 
ascribed to logical realism. But it seems that not both definitions are 
comprehensive and, thus, that is not the case that all logical realists 
(for instance, Frege, Russell and early Wittgenstein) have consensus 
on all parts of both definitions. My proposal is that if we define logical 
realism as a thesis which asserts that we can represent reality through 
logical analysis of language, then the problem will be solved. 
To give an explanation for our demonstration, it should be said that 
although logical realists agree with other streams (or stages) of 
analytic philosophy on the idea that “language misleads us” (Hylton, 
1998: 53), there are also three essential features that distinguish them 
from other movements of analytic philosophy, and we can present 
them as fellow:  
(1) Logical realists make use of (formal) logic which is the best 
instrument for analysis of language. 
(2) Logical realists believe that merely by using formal logic (i.e. 
the very formal logic that have been used by logical analysis) 
they can manifest and overcome all perplexities of language. 
(3) Logical realists have a realist (metaphysical) conception of 
logical analysis. 
The notable thing about (1) and (2) is that analytic philosophers in 
the face of misleadingness of language are divided into two groups: 
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(a) Ideal language philosophers, and (b) Ordinary language 
philosophers. In this regard, logical realists and logical positivists 
have some sympathy with (1) and (2), because both of them as Ideal 
language philosophers make use of formal logic as the best instrument 
for analysis of language and believe that by appealing to logical 
analysis they can manifest and remove complexities of language. 
Undoubtedly, analytic philosophy in the stage of logical realism 
was committed to metaphysical theses about the ultimate nature of 
reality and the logical structure of the world. Although logical realists 
rejected the traditional speculative metaphysics (specifically, that of 
the absolute idealism), their aims, unlike logical positivists, were not 
anti-metaphysical. In fact, by using a new method and tool (i.e. formal 
logic), they intended to replace traditional speculative metaphysics by 
various forms of putatively analytic metaphysics of facts and their 
constituents; the very analytic metaphysics that is concerned with 
abstract entities which are, like Plato’s Ideas, mind-independent, non 
spatio-temporal, imperceptible and yet objective (Frege, 1964: xvi), or 
with facts and their constituents (Russell, 1918: 112). Furthermore, if 
we see that Tractatus denied metaphysical propositions and insisted 
that any attempt to state metaphysical truths would necessarily result 
in nonsense, it does not denote that Wittgenstein has not believed in 
the existence of metaphysical truths; on the contrary, most parts of 
Tractatus attempt to state such truths, no matter how strictly they can 
be shown (Wittgenstein, 1922: 4.121). Even now, Tractatus and its 
ineffable metaphysics (i.e. propositions which show or display the 
logical form of reality) belong to the very analytic metaphysics that 
we can find in Frege and Russell. Therefore, it is not unreasonable that 
after entitling this kind of analytic metaphysics as the metaphysics of 
logic, Hacker stipulates that “it {Tractatus} also brought to full 
fruition the metaphysics of logic that had flowered at the hands of 
Frege and Russell” (Hacker, 1998: 17). 
There are, in fact, various fragments on the part of logical realists 
which are compatible with these criteria. In this paper, therefore, after 
pointing out these fragments and tracing the mode of the formation of 
logical realism, we illustrate the metaphysics of logic in logical 
realism.                                                                                                     
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Beginning of Logicism 
To detail the three-mentioned properties of logical realism, we must 
start with Logicism. Logicism, according to Glock, “is the project of 
providing mathematics with secure foundations by deriving it from 
logic” (Glock, 2008: 28). Then, its aim is to define the concepts of 
mathematics in purely logical terms (including that of a set), and to 
derive its propositions from self-evident logical principles. Although 
Frege’s Begriffsschrift (1897) was watershed in this regard, several 
ancestors of logical realism had a share in its development. And we 
will show it by representing the mutual relationship between 
mathematics and logic. 
It is well known that sciences, during the nineteenth century, were 
under the influence of mathematics. But, in the late 19th century, the 
emergence of new disciplines (like psychology) and the appearance of 
essential changes within mathematics (including arithmetizing the 
mathematics and algebra, deriving theorems not from intuitive truths 
but from axioms and definitions, interest in the nature of natural 
numbers, and finally introducing the non-Euclidean geometries) cast 
doubt on the certainty of mathematics, and a fundamental crisis 
ensued. As the crisis appeared, the mathematicians and then 
philosophers were inclined to propound the interaction between logic 
and mathematics in order to establish a new formal language (or logic) 
by means of which they could increase the formal rigour of 
mathematics, secure its foundations, and remove the crisis. This is the 
main task of a project that entitled Logicism and, as we shall see, it 
was founded by Bolzano and Boole, established by Frege, and 
culminated by Russell and Wittgenstein. Therefore, we must start our 
investigation from this point; here is the point from which logical 
realism and its metaphysics of logic have originated. 
Bolzano’s Semantic Platonism 
Bolzano’s philosophy of mathematics is reminiscence of Leibnizian 
project of unifying human knowledge through purely mathematical 
rules. But, unlike Leibniz, he resumes this project in order to unify 
human knowledge (especially, mathematics) through purely logical 
rules (Shea, 1983: 292). Bolzano’s most important innovation in this 
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regard is his method of variation. Its main aim is to understand what 
happens to truth-value of a complex proposition when we change one 
of its components (i.e. a concept or another proposition).This method 
allows him to provide precise definitions of a large range of logical 
concepts, and to apply them to mathematics (Simons, 1999: 109-136). 
By using this method in logic, he took considerable steps to diminish 
the crisis; he first saved mathematics from intuitionism, then proved 
the objectivity of logical truths, and finally established anti-
psychologism in logic. According to Bolzano’s philosophy of 
mathematics, logical rigour is achieved by purely analytical methods, 
which do not require recourse to subjective intuitions and pictorial 
ideas. So, he is the first one who saved mathematics from Kantian 
intuitionism and opened the way for objective and anti-psychological 
attitudes in logic. Bolzano’s attitudes in this regard, for the same 
reason, are “entitled semantic Platonism” (Centrone, 2010: vii). 
According to his view, logical rules are not produced by our mental 
and linguistic processes, rather, like Plato’s Ideas, they are true as 
such independent of whether anyone ever calls or judges them as true. 
Then, we can take Bolzano as one of the forerunners of logicism who 
believes in objectivity of logical truths; a belief which can be found in 
Frege and Russell.                                                        
Boole’s Symbolic Logic 
The most important innovation of Boole’s formal logic is his symbolic 
logic. Its advantage over Bolzano’s formal logic is that it has never 
insisted that all propositions divide into subject and predicate. In fact, 
he was the first to apply mathematical concepts to logic and he opened 
the way for his successors (for instance, Frege and Russell) to make 
use of symbolic logic. According to Boole, mathematics is not the 
science of number and quantity; rather, it is a kind of formal language 
which everyone can employ in different kinds of utterances (Boole, 
1854: 20). Thereby, he revived Aristotelian syllogistic logic by 
reducing it into algebra. Strictly speaking, by putting stress on analogy 
between the disjunction/conjunction of concepts and the 
addition/multiplication of numbers, he mathematized logic in terms of 
algebraic operation on set, and thereby reduced it to a set of self-
sufficient rules and symbols whose scientific rigours are the same as 
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those of mathematics. In the meantime, we must remember that 
although Bool’s name must not be placed alongside the logical 
realists, he has provided a new platform for logical realists by 
following reasons: he first taught logical realists the proper way of 
criticizing Aristotelian logic, and then, by mathematizing logic took 
an important step toward logicism.                                                          
Frege’s Pluralistic Platonism 
Although Frege’s logical system was much benefited by Bolzano and 
Boole, it also abandoned their defects. On the one hand, Like Bolzano, 
he has purified mathematics of intuitionism and insisted on anti-
psychologism in logic. However, he has never grounded his logic on 
Aristotelian syllogistic logic. On the other hand, like Boole, he has 
criticized Aristotelian syllogistic logic and mathematized the logic. 
But, he has not mathematized the logic in order to display it as a 
branch of mathematics; rather, he mathematized the logic in order to 
secure the foundations of mathematics by deriving it from logic, that 
is, “in order to reduce the whole of mathematics into logic” (Frege, 
1979: 205). Moreover, he has founded his logic not (like Boole) on 
algebra but on function and argument.                                                     
For these reasons and for the sake of Aristotelian logic’s inability 
for securing foundations of mathematics, Frege decided to establish 
new formal logic which could rigorously formalize mathematical 
reasoning and pursue the connection of its inferences in order to 
overcome the imperfections and misleadingness of mathematical 
language. in this context, natural language does not work, for “every 
many of the mistakes that occur in reasoning have their source in the 
logical imperfections of {natural} language” (Frege, 1979: 143). 
Indeed, one might think that “language would first have to be freed 
from all logical imperfections before it was employed in mathematical 
investigations” (Frege, 1979: 266). This great task has been 
undertaken by his Begriffsschrift in 1897. According to Begriffsschrift, 
subject/predicate distinction belongs to natural language and since we 
are easily misled by natural language, we ought to see our task as that 
of freeing us from the surface level of natural language and 
penetrating to its deep level in order to establish the priority of thought 
(Frege, 1972: 112-113). If we go beyond surface level of natural 
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language, we will see the priority of thoughts; because the rules of 
logic have their real place not in language but in pure thought (Frege, 
1979: 270). Although the sentences of natural language are necessary, 
they are imperfect tools for expressing the thoughts. So, we should be 
cautious. For,                                                                                       
We should not overlook the deep gulf that yet separates 
the {surface} level of language from that of the thought …. 
To be sure, we distinguish the sentence as the expression 
of a thought from the thought itself. We know we can have 
various expressions for the same thought. The connection 
of a thought with one particular sentence is not a 
necessary one; but that a thought of which we are 
conscious is connected in our mind with same sentence or 
other is for us men necessary (Frege, 1979: 259, 269).        
As we will see below, the most important characteristic of 
Begriffsschrift is that it allowed Frege to establish logicism by 
introducing new terms (including set, function, argument, thought, 
sense, etc.) to logic. The results are very advantageous: it not only 
makes it possible for Frege to provide the first complete 
axiomatization of first-order logic (propositional-and predicate-
calculus) and even to exhibit the logical content of signs, but it also 
allows Frege to pursue his metaphysical dispositions; the very 
dispositions some of which are, for some reasons, Platonistic in tune. 
Therefore, our task is to see the way Frege pursued his metaphysical 
dispositions through his formal logic and its specialized terms.                                                                          
The key terms, in this respect, are thought (Gedanke) and sense 
(Sinn). Concerning thoughts, Frege speaks as if they are made up of 
parts, so that a philosophical analysis would presumably be a process 
of decomposing a thought into its constituent parts. That is why he 
says: “thoughts have parts out of which they are built up. These parts, 
{as} building blocks, correspond to groups of sounds, out of which the 
sentence expressing the thought is built up” (Frege, 1979: 225). 
Moreover, in Basic Laws of Arithmatic he says that “if a name is part 
of the name of a truth-value, then the sense of the former name is part 
of the thought expressed by the latter name” (Frege, 1964: 90). Here 
Frege’s citation means that the meaning (Bedeutung) of a sentence is 
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its truth-value; its sense is the thought it expresses. On the one hand, 
by speaking about the constituent parts or the logical structure of 
thought, he insisted that we can distinguish parts in the thought 
corresponding to parts of a sentence, so that the structure of the 
sentence can serve as a picture of the structure of the thought (Frege, 
1984: 390). On the other hand, he took language as a mirror that can 
represent the logical structure of the world. On the whole, however, 
his main idea about these constituent parts of thought and sentence 
compels him to yield to some kind of semantics the acceptance of 
which is equal to accepting some kind of ontology. We can clarify 
Frege’s assertion that “every sentence expresses a thought and every 
thought can be divided into two parts” as so: our sentences are about 
sets of objects in the world, and each one of these objects has 
properties which are expressed by concepts, they also have some 
positions with each other which are expressed by relations. That is 
why, as we observed, he emphatically remarked that “we can 
distinguish parts in the thought corresponding to parts of a sentence, 
so that the structure of the sentence can serve as a picture of the 
structure of the thought”. Then, there is a correspondance between the 
constituent parts of thought (including object, concept, and relation), 
and the constituent parts of sentence (including proper names, one-
place predicate, and multi-place predicate) out of which the sentence 
expressing the thought and even the constituent parts of mathematics 
(i.e. argument and function) represent the logical structure of the 
world (Mendelsohn, 2005: chapter 5).                                                                                                 
In “On Sense and Meaning” (1892) by distinguishing between 
sense (Sinn), meaning (Bedeutung) and ideas (Vorstellungen), Frege 
offers further analysis of these concepts (and more specially the 
concept of sense). Thereby, being concerned with logical content of 
signs, he introduces their meaning as the object they refer to, their 
sense as the mode of representation of that referent, and their ideas as 
the subjective association of individuals. Therefore, by doing so, he 
opens the way to objective interpretation of senses. Here, as we see, 
Frege’s remarks are similar to what he presented about thought in his 
earlier works. Just as a sense is grasped by any person who 
understands the sign and yet it exists independently of being grasped, 
so a thought can be communicated between different persons and yet 
                                                            Metaphysics of Logical Realism   /9  
 
 
it is true or false independently of someone grasping or believing it 
(Frege, 1984: 157-177).                                                                                                          
Now, one can see the advantages of Frege’s logical analysis, 
especially when it serves as a proper tool for satisfying his 
metaphysical dispositions. One can see, indeed, how Frege pursued 
his metaphysical dispositions through his formal logic and its 
specialized terms (including thoughts and senses). But, as we will see 
in the conclusion, it does not mean that logic produces metaphysics, it 
only implies that logic is a proper instrument (or a method) for 
achieving metaphysical thesis; in fact Frege and other logical realists 
pursued metaphysical aims by logical means. Therefore, it is worth to 
consider the utilities of this means.                                                          
The first utility of such means (i.e. Frege’s logical analysis) is its 
anti-psychologistic attitude in logic. This attitude is a necessary 
condition of objective interpretation of thoughts and senses, or, 
exactly speaking, it helps Frege to pursue metaphysical dispositions 
without involving the mental complexities like those of traditional 
speculative metaphysics. It allows Frege to assert that thoughts and 
senses, if true, are not only true independently of our recognizing 
them to be so, but that they are independent of our thinking as such. A 
thought or a sense does not belong to the person who thinks about it, 
as nor does an idea to the person who has it. Everybody who grasps a 
thought or a sense encounters it in the same way, as the same thought. 
Otherwise two people would never attach the same thought (or same 
sense) to the same sentence (or same word), but each would have his 
own thought (or sense) (Frege, 1979: 133). It is for this reason that 
Kenny, following Dummett, remarks that:                                                           
Frege disentangled logic from psychology, and gave it the 
place in the forefront of philosophy which had hitherto 
been occupied by epistemology. It is this fact which, more 
than any other, allows Frege to be regarded as the 
founding father of modern analytic philosophy (Kenny, 
1995: 210).                                                                            
The second utility manifests itself when Frege, by criticizing 
psychologism, paves the way for objective interpretation of logical 
concepts. This objective attitude in logic is what helps Frege to realize 
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his metaphysical dispositions. As a matter of fact, Frege’s main aim of 
providing these concepts is not merely to criticize psychologism in 
logic, but he seeks to constitute the three-world ontology, like that of 
Plato, by logical means. Indeed, Frege’s ideography by introducing 
thoughts and senses attempts to establish that thoughts and senses are 
not produced by our mental operations, since “they are objective and 
existing independent of any one’s in fact having grasped it” (Frege, 
1964: xvi):                                                                                                
Thoughts are not mental entities, and thinking is not an 
inner generation of such entities but the grasping of 
thoughts which are already present objectively (Frege, 
1980: 67).                                                                              
Therefore, Frege’s philosophy of logic and mathematics not only 
combats psychologism, but also erects the three world ontology of 
Plato. It must be said that, in his view, thoughts and senses are 
abstract entities which are non-spatio-temporal and imperceptible, yet 
objective. Indeed, like Plato’s ideas, they belong to a third realm that 
contrasts with the subjective realm of private ideas, and material realm 
of spatio-temporal things. The point is that we see how Frege, like 
Plato, commits himself to weighty metaphysical claims about the third 
realm (i.e. mind-independent abstract entities).                                       
Russell’s Pluralism 
Like Frege, Russell took his formal logic as an ideal language which 
avoids the apparent logical defects of natural languages. But his use of 
new formal logic was wider than Frege, since he applied the new 
logical techniques more than Frege at the service of metaphysical (and 
even epistemological) dispositions. It is well known that when 
Russell, at first, entered Cambridge, the prevailing thought was the 
same which was propagated by McTaggart; the same version of 
German idealism which held sway in Britain between the 1870s and 
the 1920s (Soames, 2003: 94). Though towards the end of 1898 he 
rebelled against the idealism, Russel also gets steeped in a 
philosophical system which was vindicated by the idealists. In other 
words, although he was interested to make a philosophical system like 
that of the idealists; his favorite conception of system was quite 
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different from that which they had presumed: his conception of system 
was not monistic; but it was pluralistic.                                                   
For this reason, Russell combated the idealists because of their 
denial of a plurality of entities (Monk, 1996: 114). Hereafter, he 
embraces an exuberantly pluralistic realism, and, in place of the 
synthesis characteristic of the neo-Hegelian idealism, he espouses 
analysis (Hacker, 1998: 15). That is why he describes analysis as the 
identification of the simple parts of mind-independent, non-linguistic 
complexes (Russell, 1992b: xv). He conceives of the matter of 
analysis as objective and non-linguistic (Hacker, 1998: 15), one which 
Hylton called the realist conception of philosophical analysis (Hylton, 
1998: 42). He seeks to establish his pluralistic realism through logical 
analysis of language; one which Hacker called metaphysics of logic 
(Hacker, 1998: 17).                                                
This kind of logical analysis which serves as his pluralistic realism 
developed in two phases. The first phase which began with The 
Principles of Mathematics (1903) continued until 1905. In this period, 
he pursued his pluralistic realism by adopting a luxuriant ontology 
similar to that of Plato. For this reason, it is entitled Russell’s 
Pluralistic Platonism. In the second phase, which began with “On 
Denoting” (1905), Russell renounced the Platonist luxuriant ontology 
of The Principles of Mathematics, and pursued his pluralistic realism 
by resorting to some kind of reductive atomism; one which Strawson 
entitled “reductive atomistic analysis” (Strawson, 1992: 
20).Therefore, in this paper, we will discuss Russell’s pluralism under 
the titles of “Russell’s Pluralistic Platonism” and “Russell’s Pluralistic 
Atomism”.                                                                                                
1. Russell’s Pluralistic Platonism  
Before 1905, Russell did not emphasize the analysis of propositions so 
much as the analysis of concepts of which a proposition is made up. 
As is remarked before, Russell described this kind of analysis (i.e. 
logical analysis of concepts) as the identification of the simple parts of 
mind-independent, non-linguistic complexes, and conceived of the 
matter of analysis as objective. Therefore, this kind of analysis, which 
Russell often called definition, consisted of “the analysis of complex 
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ideas into their simple constituents” (Russell, 1992a: 18), or “the 
analysis of an idea into its constituents” (Russell, 1992b: 111). For 
this reason, he adopted a pluralistic ontology similar to those of Plato 
and Frege, and thereby, took everything that we seem to be able to 
name (including chimeras, numbers, Homeric gods…) as real 
(Russell, 1992b: 466):                                                                
Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in 
any true or false proposition, or may be counted as one, I 
call a term… every term has being, i.e. is in some sense. A 
man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimera, 
or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a 
term; and to deny that such and such a thing is a term 
must always be false (Russell, 1992b: 44-45).                               
Then, Russell’s metaphysical dispositions rooted in his pluralistic 
Platonism. It is true that after 1905, he keeps his pluralistic project 
away from Platonism and fills its place in reductive atomism, but he 
insists on advancing his pluralistic project (and its metaphysical 
dispositions), this time, through logical analysis of propositions. So, 
The Principles of Mathematics is undertaken to satisfy the first phase 
of this project.                                                                                                      
In The Principles of Mathematics, Russell’s more important 
mission was to resolve Frege’s paradox of sets, and even to protect 
logicism from the paradox by means of a theory of type which is 
entirely supported by his pluralist Platonism (Russell, 1992b: xi). 
Having relied upon this theory, he prohibited say of a set X what can 
only be said of X’s members, notably that X is or is not a member of 
X itself as a meaningless formula. The reason for it, according to 
Russell, was that at once we ascribe to a set what cannot be ascribed 
to it. Then, by proposing the theory of type, which is entirely 
supported by his pluralist Platonism, he assumed that there are infinite 
sets (or sets of numbers) for mathematical operations. It implied that 
there are infinite things in the world, since numbers in sets have the 
same role as things or names in sentences. As we observe, this form of 
speaking has a metaphysical nature; it reminisces of Plato’s 
metaphysics. Any kind of discussion concerning entities belongs to 
the scope of ontology and metaphysics. So Russell also adopted a 
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pluralistic system and discussed a plurality of entities in order to 
satisfy his metaphysical dispositions. The notable point is that he did 
so by logical means.                   
2. Russell’s Pluralistic Atomism 
One of the revolutionary changes brought about by “On Denoting” 
(1905) was the idea that shifted the emphasis from the analysis of 
concepts to the analysis of propositions. Although Russell’s pluralistic 
project was not by any means put aside in this period, it kept away his 
early Platonism and sustained some kind of reductionism. Its main 
idea was that the form of the sentence will not in general be a good 
guide to the formation of the propositions (i.e. the underlying logical 
form), since a sentence with an expression like “The present king of 
France” in spite of its outward meaning does not really denote 
anything (Russell, 1905: 483-484). He assumed that the structure (or 
form) of a sentence does not generally correspond to the structure of 
the proposition expressing it (i.e. its underlying logical form). Just as 
all of the sentences containing definite descriptions or proper names 
express a proposition whose logical form is that of an existential 
quantification, one can lay aside the existence of dubious entities by 
logical analysis of propositions. Then, in “On Denoting”, by adopting 
some kind of reductionism (or cautious constructivism), Russell 
analyzed such troublesome sentences as “the present king of France is 
bald” into a quantified conjunction, viz, “there is one and only one 
thing which is a present king of France, and everything which is a 
present king of France is bald”, and thereby asserted that the 
troublesome expressions such as “the present king of France”, 
“chimera” and “square circle” are incomplete symbols. Although they 
have no meaning and do not stand for anything by their own, they can 
be paraphrased in the context of the meaningful sentences in which 
they occur. By doing so, briefly, he uncovers the true logical structure 
of propositions and facts; a structure which can differ essentially from 
the misleading grammatical structures of the original sentences 
expressing the facts (Russell, 1905:479-493).                                         
One can overtly grasp the prologation of this project in 
“Knowledge by Description and Knowledge by Acquaintance” 
(1912), and even in our Knowledge of External World (1914). 
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Russell’s main objective in both writings was to reinforce the project 
of “On Denoting” by furnishing it with the theory of acquaintance 
(and its Ocam’s razor). His aim was to find the true logical form of 
propositions and facts in terms of such an analysis; a form which can 
differ substantially from the misleading grammatical form of the 
sentences of natural language expressing those facts (Russell, 2012: 
31-40). In this sense, logic is concerned with the analysis of logical 
forms (i.e. with the kinds of propositions, with the various types of 
facts, and with the classification of the constituents of facts (Russell, 
1990: 67). Then, if one analyzed the sentences properly, he or she will 
find that they correspond with the facts they express. That is, the 
process of analysis is complete when one has found the ultimate 
components and structures of reality. In such a case, as Hylton 
mentioned it, one knows that he has done this because the final list of 
constituents of reality is all objects of sensory acquaintance (Hylton, 
1998: 45; 1990: ch.6). So, it implies that it is no longer necessary to 
suppose that every object of discourse stands for a reality.                     
This project culminated in Russell’s logical atomism, where he 
pursued his metaphysical dispositions more eagerly. In “The 
philosophy of logical atomism”, he considered his logical system as a 
certain philosophical position on the basis of which a certain kind of 
metaphysics emerges (Russell, 1956: 178). Having pursued a 
pluralistic metaphysical aim by his logical system, he described it as 
below:                                                                                                       
The logic which I shall advocate is atomistic, as opposed 
to the monistic logic of the people who more or less follow 
Hegel. When I say that my logic is atomistic, I mean that I 
share the common-sense belief that there are many 
separate things: I do not regard the apparent multiplicity 
of the world as consisting merely in phases and unreal 
divisions of a single indivisible Reality (Russell, 1956: 
178).                                                             
Russell used the term “atomism” in contrast to the idealists in order 
to prove that there are discrete facts composed of particular things. 
Such particular things are the atoms which form the basic units in his 
philosophy. Hence, logical atomism is a metaphysical theory which, 
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like many other philosophical systems (including those of the 
idealists) seeks to give a synoptic account of reality. But, unlike many 
others, Russell’s system is completely consistent with the actual or 
potential findings of science, since “it seems that science has much 
greater likelihood of being true than any philosophy… {And it} shall 
be wise to build philosophy upon science, because the risk of error in 
philosophy is pretty sure to be greater than science” (Russell, 1956: 
340). Although philosophy depends on scientific findings, it can 
suggest general hypotheses as to the fundamental features of the world 
(i.e. hypotheses about facts and their ultimate constituents) by means 
of logical analysis; those which science is not yet in a position to 
confirm or confute (Russell, 1956: 341).                                                 
In Russell’s philosophy, this great task was undertaken by his 
logical system, while the sciences only presuppose them, logical 
analysis can reveal the fundamental structural features of the world. 
So, the first obvious thing to which logic draws our attention is that 
“the world contains facts, which are what they are whatever we may 
choose to think about them, and that there are also beliefs, which have 
reference to facts, and by reference to facts are either true or false” 
(Russell, 1956: 182). In “the philosophy of logical atomism” he 
exposes facts as bellow:                                                                           
When I speak of a fact- I do not propose an exact 
definition, but an explanation so you will know what I am 
thinking about- I mean the kind of thing that makes a 
proposition true or false. If I say “It is raining”, what I 
say is true in a certain condition of weather and is false in 
other condition of weather. The condition of weather that 
makes my statement true (or false as the case may be) is 
what I should call a “fact” (Russell, 1956: 182).                  
It is clear from the passage that Russell’s logical atomism seeks to 
depict the relationship between the objective world of facts and our 
linguistic capacity to access it. By appealing to his logical system, he 
suggests that “the words in a proposition would correspond one by 
one with the components of the corresponding fact, with the exception 
of such words as “or”, “not”, “if”, and “then”, which have a different 
function” (Russell, 1956: 197). He seeks to reveal the correspondence 
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of propositions with facts and also the correspondence of names in 
propositions with the constituent components of fact. Therefore, 
propositions are true when there is a one-to-one correlation between 
the way its linguistic constituents are arranged and the particulars that 
hang together in the world.                                                                       
In “The philosophy of logical atomism”, while depicting the 
isomorphic relation between propositions and fact, he divides all 
propositions into atomic propositions and molecular propositions, and 
then concludes that the world does not contain facts that correspond to 
molecular propositions (Russell, 1956: 188). In his mathematical 
logic, by analyzing the complex and misleading sentences of natural 
language, he uncovers the true logical structure of propositions and 
their corresponding fact. The result is that the world is made up of 
ultimate ingredients from which more complex structures such as facts 
are composed. These are the ultimate atoms arrived at through logical 
analysis.                                                                                                    
Thus, logical analysis is a metaphysical theory which claims that 
new formal logic can mirror the structure of reality. As mentioned 
before, the two theories of descriptions and acquaintance are key 
components in the theory. It must be said that if all sentences were 
complex (or molecular), then there would be no direct way of hooking 
them up with the world of fact (viz. there would be no fact in the 
reality corresponding with the molecular sentences), and logic could 
not be said to be a discipline concerned with truth. That logic is so 
concerned with truth means that there must be singular (or atomic) 
sentences. Furthermore, if these are to be true (i.e. correspond with the 
world of fact), their denoting constituents must be meaningful (i.e. 
denotes to the object which we are acquainted with in the world of 
fact).      
Equipping logical atomism with two theories of descriptions and 
acquaintance, he asserts that:                                                                     
We do accept, in ordinary daily life, as particulars all 
sorts of things that really are no so. The names that we 
commonly use, like “Socrates”, are really abbreviations 
for descriptions; not only that, but what they describe are 
not particulars but complicated systems of classes or 
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series. A name, in the narrow logical sense of a word 
whose meaning is a particular, can only be applied to a 
particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because 
you cannot name anything you are not acquainted 
with…{Therefore} the only words one does use as names 
in the logical sense are words like “this” or “that” 
(Russell, 1956: 200-201).                                                      
 According to this passage, if a sentence contains a description, it 
will never mirror those fundamental features of the world that Russell 
labels atomistic facts. Those facts are reflected only in the atomic 
sentences of his logical system, and they are all singular sentences 
containing proper names. Therefore, Russell’s logical atomism is a 
pluralistic metaphysical system concerning an isomorphic relationship 
between language, meaning and the world of fact.                                  
Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism 
The metaphysics of logic that had flowered at the hands of Bolzano, 
Frege, and finally, Russell’s logical atomism has been brought to full 
fruition by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1922). Evidently, Wittgenstein’s 
logical atomism, at least in some senses, is similar to that of Russell. 
Although both of them have some sympathy with the conviction that 
philosophy is identical with the logical analysis of propositions into 
their ultimate constituents and that this would also reveal the ultimate 
constituents of reality, they can be distinguished from each other due 
to the fact that they suggest different views on the nature of logic.                                                      
What helps Wittgenstein in constructing the metaphysical system 
of his logical atomism is the picture theory of language which asserts 
that “the proposition is a picture of reality” (Wittgenstein, 1922: 4.01). 
One cannot deny that it is largely Kantian in tone. While Russell was 
affected by the empiricist idea that the constituent parts of reality 
should be objects of sensory acquaintance, Wittgenstein intended a 
Kantian project of establishing the condition for the possibility of 
linguistic expression of reality. His main aim was not to establish the 
precise nature of objects, because propositions of logic as tautologies 
do not make claims the truth-value of which depends on how things 
actually are, they only “show that they say nothing” (Wittgenstein, 
1922: 4.461). His concern was to show that the existence of objects 
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and atomic states are the main condition of the possibility of the 
linguistic expression of thought of reality. Thus, the aim of Tractatus, 
like Kant’s Critique, was “to draw a limit to thought, or rather {for the 
sake of its giving linguistic twist to the Kantian enterprise}, not to 
thought, but to the expression of thoughts” (Wittgenstein, 1922: Pref). 
Thoughts are neither mental processes nor abstract entities; they are 
meaningful propositions and sentences which draw the limits of the 
world, since “the limits of language (which alone I understand) mean 
the limits of my world” (Wittgenstein, 1922: 5.62). Also, thoughts can 
be completely expressed in language, since “it will only be in 
language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of 
the limit will simply be nonsense” (Wittgenstein, 1922: Pref). So, by 
determining the limits of the linguistic expression of thought, 
philosophy can display the limits of thought: it is by logical analysis 
of language (and only in language) that we can show that some 
combinations of signs are nonsense (Wittgenstein, 1922: 4.466). There 
are, indeed, things that cannot be thought or put into words. They 
manifest themselves; “they are what is mystical” (Wittgenstein, 1922: 
6.522). And “what cannot speak {or thought} about we must pass over 
in silence” (Wittgenstein, 1922: 7). Although any attempt to state such 
mystical truths as metaphysics, theology, ethics and mysticism would 
necessarily result in nonsense, it does not imply that Wittgenstein has 
never believed in such truths. In fact, most parts of Tractatus were 
attempts on the side of Wittgenstein to state them, even though, 
strictly speaking, they can only be shown. Therefore, Hacker is quite 
right to compare Wittgenstein and Kant as so:               
Just as Kant had drawn the bounds of knowledge in order 
to make room for faith, so too the young Wittgenstein drew 
the limits of language in order to make room for ineffable 
metaphysics (Hacker, 1998: 13).                           
Conclusion 
We began this article by defining the logical realism as a thesis which 
asserts that “we can represent reality through logical analysis of 
language”. In this regard, having referred to the logical realists’ 
common assumption that “language is misleading” and their assertion 
that “logic can eliminate the misleadingness of language”, we 
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portrayed their metaphysics of logic which pursues metaphysical aims 
by logical means. So, our main aim was to show that although logical 
realists rejected the traditional speculative metaphysics of their 
predecessors, it did not imply that they were not interested in 
metaphysics. It must be mentioned that not only good reasons can be 
found to grant the logical realists’ metaphysical dispositions and 
theses, but also we can show that there is a common course only 
within which all metaphysical (traditional metaphysics as well as 
analytic metaphysics) activities are possible. In other words, there is 
the four-stages-course which must be traversed by anybody who is 
engaged in metaphysics: every metaphysician begins with a general 
question about the facts, and then makes use of a particular hypothesis 
in connection with that question; furthermore he enjoys a special 
method or tool in order to prove his hypothesis, and finally takes for 
granted the existence of some of the basic metaphysical entities and 
concepts. In this respect, we cannot exclude logical realists from the 
metaphysical circle. Like all metaphysicians, they begin with a 
general question about the reality (i.e. they seek to give a general 
explanation of the world), though they do so not by considering the 
relationship between thought and reality but by considering the 
relationship between language and reality. They also make use of a 
particular hypothesis in connection with that question, though the 
nature of their hypothesis is different from that of traditional 
metaphysicians. For example, when logical realists make use of this 
hypothesis that “language is misleading”, their work is like Plato’s 
hypothesis that “the sensible world is shadow”. Furthermore, like all 
metaphysicians, they enjoy a particular method in order to prove their 
hypothesis, though they replaced the traditional methods (for example, 
Plato’s dialectic) by their new method (i.e. mathematical logic). And 
finally, their ultimate results are like those of traditional 
metaphysicians, though the content of their metaphysical theses 
manifests itself not in the form of Plato’s ideas or Descartes’ 
substances but in the form of Frege’s ideas and thoughts, Russell’s 
pluralistic atomism and Wittgenstein’s ineffable metaphysics.                                                                                                      
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Introduction  
The dualist view is about seeing both sides of an argument and the 
merits and demerits of both sides. The monist view concentrates on one 
side of the argument to the absolute detriment of the other side. Thus, 
extremists generally adopt a monist view and do their best to eliminate 
the other side as if it had no merits whatsoever. They think that their 
view is the absolute truth and any argument opposing it must ipso facto 
be false and ultimately evil and despicable.  
It is argued in this paper that the dualist view needs to be adopted 
universally before the extremist mentality can be brought under control 
instead of being an enduring source of enmity and conflict among 
humanity. Unless this dualist view is taught as a part of the educational 
system, people will continue to go to extremes in their thinking without 
being critical of the thought processes that lead them to such extremes. 
Learning the dualist view requires at least the following:  
1. A self-referential attitude that enables individuals to refer back to 
their views and view them critically instead of applying them absolutely 
as if they represent ultimate and irrevocable truths.  
2. The ability to distance themselves from their views so that they 
are seen for what they are. Extremists typically take their views 
personally so that any opposition to them is taken personally.  
War is nearly always the result of extremist views of some kind 
being pursued to their logical conclusion. Thus, the unyielding pursuit 
of nationalist interests was the underlying cause of the World War One, 
and the aggressive, militaristic policies of fascist governments caused 
World War Two. The warmongering mind is one of inflexible 
dogmatism. There is a story told of Napoleon Bonaparte that before he 
imprudently invaded Russia, he was presented with a pamphlet which 
argued very persuasively against such an invasion. He summoned the 
author and told him that he had read the pamphlet but nevertheless the 
invasion would go ahead as he had already committed himself to it. The 
unfortunate consequences of his inflexibility are well-known. Thus, the 
dualist view may involve changing one’s mind in the face of 
inconvenient facts.  
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Democracy depends on the dualist view which allows opposing 
views to be voiced without being suppressed or forbidden. The 
suppression of opposing views can lead to authoritarian government 
and ultimately to tyranny. In Great Britain a dualist way of thinking 
arose out of the civil war of the 17th century CE. Instead of the forces 
of the King and Parliament fighting each other on the battlefield, they 
began to oppose each other in the House of Commons. To this day, HM 
Government sits across from HM Opposition with more than two 
swords’ width between them. This kind of rivalry permeates the two 
party systems which are fundamentally dualist in nature. It allows the 
conservative and progressive sectors of society to present their 
opposing views to the public so that an overall consensus can be 
reached concerning the best course of action. When one sector seeks to 
impose its views in a draconian way over the whole population, the 
government becomes extremist and authoritarian. Thus, when the 
progressives used the French Revolution to enforce their views, they 
ended up executing the aristocracy which in their view stood in the way 
of progress. Similarly, right-wing fascist regimes imprison or execute 
dangerous radicals who threaten the established order.  
The dualist view leads ultimately to a holist position in which all 
opinions, beliefs and points of view have their place. Wisdom consists 
in viewing the whole picture and not being tied down by narrow 
parochial interests dictated by race, religion, nationality, culture, 
commercial interests and so on. Humanity has already wasted countless 
time, effort and manpower in futile wars and disputes that amount to 
little or nothing in the grand scale of things. What matters in the end is 
the welfare and future of the whole human race and the dualist view is 
concerned to promote that view above all others. 
2. The nature of the dualist view 
The dualist view is about being interactive with our beliefs and 
opinions. We hold them at arm’s length so that they do not possess us. 
It is about self-reference in which we refer back to our beliefs to criticise 
them. The monist view on the other hand sees everything in terms of 
one thing which is thought to be the ultimate, absolute solution to 
complex problems. An obvious example of a monist solution is the view 
that capitalism is the one and only solution to all economic problems as 
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opposed to any alternative that favours state intervention. The opposing 
communist view that promotes state intervention is equally a monist 
view that fails to take account of the capitalist one. Nowadays, there are 
few economies in the world that are not a mixture of these two 
approaches between which a balance is sought through monetary and 
fiscal policies.  
Reality is not so simple that one ‘ism’ alone can encompass 
everything about it but monist thinkers consistently behave as if their 
‘ism’ can do so. Monist solutions to our problems are static, monolithic 
and inviolable to criticism. They are applied absolutely and without 
alteration so that they lead inevitably to dogmatic extremism in which 
the opposing view is demonised. If we interact dualistically with our 
views we can then deal with them objectively and do not take them to 
heart as being the ultimate solution.  
Thus, the dualist view itself is treated monistically when it is applied 
as if it is the one and only way of looking at things. Like any ‘ism’ 
dualism has its limitations and dualist theory aims to clarify these 
limitations as well as its areas of applicability. It is self-referential and 
is open to all kinds of interpretation. To that extent it is more like a 
science than a doctrine or dogma. The point is that we can choose to 
interact or not to interact in a dualist way and therein lies the reality of 
freewill. For example, we can stop doing things if we put our minds to 
it. Dualism is about building up the inner strength to resist and desist 
when we need to do so. It is about knowing when to stop and think on 
the one hand and when to get things done on the other hand.  
When the dualist view is applied, it usually means interacting 
between two points of view. But the resolution between these points of 
view is variable. It does not necessarily mean taking the middle path 
between extremes, or some kind of compromise between them. The 
resolution may mean correcting an imbalance in which one behavioural 
extreme has been taken too far. For example, the world is currently 
weighed down with increasing debt that threatens the future stability of 
the world’s economy. If nothing is done about this trend, a catastrophic 
collapse in the financial markets seems inevitable. The dualist view 
means recognising the extent to which such extremes of behaviour need 
to be corrected to ensure that future progress is balanced and 
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productive. Thus, applying the dualist view demands intuitive insight 
and foresight since there is no simple dualist formula that can be applied 
to all circumstances. 
In the physical world, dualist interaction is ubiquitous and it consists 
in one-to-one interactions in which an exchange between disparate 
processes produces something different. There is no logical equivalence 
between the one and the other because complex processes are involved, 
especially with regard to biological entities. Living processes are 
complexes of dualist interactions. They have their roots in chemical 
interactions such as that between sodium and chlorine producing an 
entirely different substance – salt. 
We are dualist beings because of our biological nature. We have 
internal workings that interact on a one-to-one basis with our external 
environment to keep us in harmony with it. We breathe in air and expel 
carbon dioxide. We imbibe food and drink and expel liquid and matter 
accordingly. The metabolic processes inside us involve dualist 
interactions that are markedly different from the activity in inorganic 
matter such as liquid and metal. As social beings we constantly interact 
with each other and with society and its institutions. Our thoughts are 
influenced by such interactions, and other people’s thoughts are 
changed as a result of our interaction with them. What is inside us 
changes when we interrelate with what is outside us. This contrast 
between the internal and the external is inherently dualist.  
Being human means being in two minds about many matters. When 
we are all of one mind, we may be blinded to other ways of doing things 
and can harm ourselves, other life-forms and the planet in general 
because we are collectively stupid, and create bubbles, bottle-necks and 
other excesses which led to the world-wide financial crisis of 2008. 
Crowds are not always wise since they can be driven into riotous 
anarchy by fashionable excesses to which over-clever people drive 
them with their specious rhetorical arguments. 
However, we are also a self-correcting species that realises its 
mistakes and can do something about them. Humanity’s activities are 
not entirely unconscious or random like the swervings of bird flocks or 
the stampedes of animal herds. Our activities are constantly being 
observed, monitored and commented upon by self-appointed experts, 
28   /  Philosophical Investigations, Fall & Winter 2015/ Vol. 9/ No. 17    
 
journalists, pundits, academics and the like. By examining the 
consequences of our actions, we can rectify our mistakes, and this is 
done by interacting dualistically with our problems. As dualists, we do 
not expect to get everything right all at once but may hope to do so in 
the long run.  
Single-minded persons often commit atrocities, like Nazi officers 
who plead that they are only following orders when they slaughter 
people mindlessly. Man’s inhumanity to man often results from the 
voice of authority being pursued single-mindedly and inhumanely. 
Single-mindedness is fine in moderation and within reasonable limits. 
We often need it to get things done. But it is taken to extremes by 
absolute monists (as mentioned below) who know no limits in pursuing 
their ends. The dualist view draws attention to our limitations in that 
regard because it reminds us of the need to be self-critical. We can stop 
ourselves and think again and be less sure of our own reasonings. The 
interactive aspect of dualism reinforces this critical self-reference.  
We are capable of being self-conscious, self-corrective beings who 
examine what we are doing and thinking and correct ourselves when 
necessary. In interacting with ourselves, we figuratively loop back into 
our former thinking and correct it accordingly. This is basically what 
self-consciousness involves when we are aware of what we should or 
should not be doing or thinking. The dualist view thus refers to self-
conscious activity that involves trial-and-error; a common sense 
procedure that also underlies the scientific method and has ensured the 
remarkable success of science in transforming our society largely for 
the better. Dualist thinking therefore moves forward recursively in a 
dynamic and flexible way. It embraces opposing points of view instead 
of being stuck unyieldingly in one extreme viewpoint. This dynamic 
view is not completely realist or idealist, empiricist or rationalist, 
logical or intuitive. It embraces all of these in an interactive manner, 
that is to say, it moves from one viewpoint to the other and vice versa, 
according to what needs to be done in the real world in correcting 
imbalances, redressing injustices, and loosening rigid points of view. 
We should regard opposing positions, such as left-wing/right-wing 
and empiricism/rationalism, as dualist challenges rather than 
irreconcilable paradoxes. These positions constantly challenge us to 
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make sense of them and we live our lives confronting them and dealing 
with them. To take one side to the exclusion of the other side is the easy 
monist solution which invariably amounts to an extreme point of view. 
It is more intellectually and morally satisfying to accept the dualist 
challenge and to make the most of it to be best of one’s abilities. 
Perhaps the ultimate dualist challenge is to live as if one is going to 
live forever and also as if this is the last day of our lives. Resolving this 
paradox requires us to actively find the most important and lasting 
things to do, and the resolution demands our constant attention. If we 
regard it as nothing more than an irreconcilable paradox then we have 
no incentive to make anything of it. Thus, paradoxes should be regarded 
as dualist challenges to be overcome rather than dismissed because they 
are paradoxical. We overcome them by constantly doing things to get 
beyond them and to make better sense of life as a result.  
As human beings we are both unique individuals distinct from 
society and collective units intimately involved in society. These 
incompatible positions must be constantly reconciled and this is best 
achieved when we are in a dualist frame of mind. As individuals we are 
not so unique that we can live entirely to ourselves. Extreme 
individuality makes no more sense than extreme conformity. We can 
learn to balance the two in a dualist manner. Our word ‘idiot’ comes 
from the ancient Greek word meaning those who live for themselves 
alone and do not participate in society at large. To make the most of 
ourselves we need to conform and to find our rightful place in society. 
But this conformity is taken to extremes by those who obey authority 
single-mindedly. They are in a monist frame of mind and may lose their 
humanity by being in thrall to ideas, beliefs or opinions that are 
regarded as real and inviolable. They become pawns in the nefarious 
activities of the state or of some organisation whose activities are 
divorced from the interests of humanity as a whole.  
We all have this problem of balancing individual self-expression 
with the social conformity that is needed to make the most of ourselves, 
and this balancing involves what is here called ‘dualist interaction’. We 
interact with opposing ideas in a genuine effort to seek the best way 
forward instead of being stuck in the rut of one way of thinking. There 
is always another way of looking at things, and this is the essence of 
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open-mindedness. We obey the laws of society because we have good 
reason to do so but we are not above breaking the law if only because 
we are human and not mindless automatons. If we are sufficiently 
moved by the injustice of certain laws, we may purposefully break 
them. Thus, we interact with these laws when we think about them 
critically and do not just obey them mindlessly.  
The dualist view recognises the fragility of our humanity and is 
therefore the default position for human beings. Other animals may be 
driven by instinct and impulse but we always have the choice of doing 
or not doing what we feel like doing. We need to be fully aware of our 
potential for wicked and evil acts to avoid actually doing them. This is 
what self-control is all about. It is based on knowing what we can do 
and what we should not do. This two-minded duality makes us dynamic 
and uncertain animals that are always trying to do things better in the 
future – every day being ‘Groundhog Day’ as in the outstanding feature 
film of that name. We are all hoping to experience the perfect day in 
which everything goes according to plan, though we might never 
achieve it.  
However, many philosophers avoid this obvious duality in favour of 
a monist view of ourselves and the universe. They wish to see us as 
purely material beings or in the contrary view as purely spiritual beings. 
The dualist view is too untidy and illogical as it gives us a very complex 
interactive account whereas their inclination is to reduce everything to 
one thing or idea. Their thinking is discrete and categorical, and the 
truth is often conceived to be static, unyielding and eternal. But in the 
dualist view, truth is something we are constantly striving for by 
interacting with our environment. It is a process of continuous 
advancement and enlightenment rather than a fixed goal to be arrived at. 
2. The importance of the dualist view 
The words ‘dualism’ and ‘duality’ are often used pejoratively to refer 
to contradictory and confusing behaviour: for example, the duality of 
behaving with sympathy at one moment and with hostility at the next 
moment. The dualist view itself is avoided and often dismissed without 
further examination. It is considered too indefinite and flawed to be 
seriously considered. 
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However, a better understanding of dualism is a tool that we can use 
to cope with conflict and uncertainty in our daily lives. Conflicting 
opinions are a necessary dynamic which can make or break an 
organisation. When people take sides and regard their opinions are more 
certain and truthful than those of the opposing side, the dualist view 
helps us to resolve the matter one way or the other. It may be uncertain 
as to which side is correct, beneficial, or whatever, but dualist thinking 
is about dealing with uncertainty rather than shying away from it. 
Uncertainty is a necessary aspect of the human condition. Life would 
be boring if everything is predictable and reliable. If the outcome of a 
football game is certain beyond doubt, there would little point in paying 
to watch it. A football team that could win all its matches without fail 
would be promoted to a league of its own.1 Similarly, there would be 
no need for leaders, politicians or managers if every situation pans out 
predictably and there are no doubts about how to deal with it. 
Computers and other machines are used when routines, processes and 
procedures can be worked out mechanically or algorithmically. When 
machines can deal with unpredictable situations as we do all the time, 
they will be the equal of us. (Turing’s test is not rigorous enough to 
determine when computers are truly indistinguishable from human 
beings. The computer would think for itself and show that is thinking 
for itself without referring to anything else.2)  
Whatever is discrete and measurable can be analysed by logic and 
mathematics. But when we think ahead and make choices between 
alternatives, the process is often intuitive and qualitative. Decisions 
made on logical grounds can be as extreme as those made by intuition. 
If the bankers had thought dualistically instead of logically they might 
have recognised the extremes to which their behaviour was tending. The 
bankers’ and financiers’ activities before the credit crunch of 2008 were 
doubtless backed up by a whole array of reasonable arguments. The fact 
is that they were too rational and failed to think outside the box. It was 
not so much collective insanity that led to the credit crunch as too much 
trust in the rationality of their actions. Only a leader imbued with a 
flexible, dualist outlook could have broken the mould and shown them 
that they were going to absurd extremes in their reasonings. Obviously 
such a leader never emerged at the right time.  
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Success in life is a black-and-white matter. Either we are successful 
at getting the job done or we are not – as a matter of fact. But how that 
success is achieved is not so clear-cut. In practical terms, we are 
concerned here with the means by which we may or may not achieve 
success through dualist thinking. A successful person is usually not just 
a lucky person but also one who takes account of both sides of any 
argument and also of the extremes to which each side may be taken by 
those who are prone to such extremes. In that way, they are able to take 
a balanced view of any situation and make realistic decisions which 
bear fruit. 
The dualist view does not make us any less decisive in our actions. 
Indeed, it gives a rational basis for decisiveness. Systematic dualism (as 
discussed below) considers the extremes to which our thinking can go. 
By so doing, it clarifies situations by revealing imbalances, 
imperfections, injustices, bottlenecks, and distortions which can be 
addressed and rectified. It clearly shows the direction in which action 
must be taken to achieve harmony, redress imbalances, perfect 
imperfections, remedy injustices, and relieve bottlenecks and 
distortions. We can only hope to avoid taking an extreme view in 
politics by carefully considering the opposing view and evaluating its 
merits in a dualist fashion. The resulting view is more balanced when it 
enables us to act more justly having taken account of all factors 
involved in the situation.  
Dualism is part of the human condition as we are alternately active 
and passive beings. It is in our nature to alternate between self-assertion 
and self-denial. We may assert ourselves boldly and then retract into 
our respective shells when things go wrong as a result. This alternation 
is at the root of the contrast between dogmatism and scepticism. We 
may be over-confident of our beliefs or have no confidence in them at 
all. The history of philosophy may be viewed dualistically as an 
oscillation between dogmatism and scepticism, between the confident 
assertion of belief and the diffident doubt of it.3 Evidently, philosophy 
is undergoing a sceptical phase at present. Perhaps it is now the time for 
some dogmatic, one-sided dualism to help us control our obsessions so 
that they do not control us. As correcting such imbalances is part of the 
dualist view, it can be used to extremes to re-establish a balance by 
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which things can move forward in a rational and controlled way. It is 
an imbalance when we have lost control of aspects of our lives. Our 
interests are a part of our life and not the be-all and end-all of it. The 
dualist view helps us to keep them in their place. We learn to externalise 
them by interacting with them dualistically. Conflicts can then be 
considered objectively to ensure that we deal with them in a balanced 
and systematic way. Kipling’s well known ‘If’ poem also advocates the 
avoidance of extreme reactions to the ‘imposters’ of ‘triumph and 
disaster’ which in the cold light of day may not be as alluring or as 
depressing as they seem at the time.  
Thus, the dualistic view is not simply about moderation in all things. 
It is about recognising the complications involved in a situation and, if 
necessary, going to opposite extremes to rectify an imbalance. For 
example, the prevalence of intolerance in some sectors of the 
community may itself be intolerable and require extreme measures to 
rectify it, as Karl Popper recognised in his ‘Principle of Toleration’ 
(Popper, 1945:. 265). 
We cannot tolerate all forms of behaviour without question as is 
implied by extreme multiculturalism. A limit to tolerable behaviour 
must be set in the interests of social harmony.  
Another example is Aristotle’s ‘golden mean’ between two extremes 
(Aristotle, 1987: 104). This is a static and artificial division that does 
not reflect the complexity of the real world. Thus, thinking of courage 
as a mid-point between rashness and cowardice is of no help in practical 
situations where something must be done or not be done, as the case 
may be. The courageous person does not deliberate between two 
extremes but acts intuitively because something must be done. Intelligent 
decisiveness comes from taking account all the circumstances involved 
in a situation. Thus, seeking a fixed balance between two extremes is 
naïve dualism if it does not result from a systematic view of the whole 
and of all the possibilities, as is argued below. 
3. Avoiding the muddled middle   
In Charles Dickens’ novel, Hard Times, there is a character called 
Stephen Blackpool whose catchphrase is “’tis aw a muddle”. He is a 
mill worker in the industrial north of England who cannot bring himself 
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either to side with his fellow employees in their dispute with the mill 
owners or to take the protection offered by the latter. The employees 
wish to change their working conditions for the better whereas the 
employers want to preserve the status quo and protect their company’s 
profitability and position in the market. The employees take a 
progressive view and the employers a conservative one. Blackpool sees 
the merits of both sides and refuses to identify with one extreme or the 
other. Inevitably, he is despised and shunned by both sides and leaves 
the town. When he is falsely accused of a bank robbery, he returns to 
the town to clear his name but falls down a mineshaft on his way there. 
Eventually he is found and in his dying words says it is a muddle from 
first to last. If things had not been so muddled, he would not have 
needed to come back. If the workers had not been in a muddle among 
themselves, they would not have misunderstood him, and so on 
(Dickens, 1854: 267-8). Stephen Blackpool is one of Dickens’ many 
exaggerated characters who nevertheless gives us an insight into the 
human condition. We can interpret him as a naïve dualist who is mired 
in the muddled middle. He sees that the truth is never as black and white 
as the clear thinkers make it out to be. The truth lies within the two 
extremes and it is easier to take sides than work out what should be 
done. The problem is to maintain a dualist view while avoiding 
uncertainty and indecision. Blackpool lacks the mental equipment to 
see his way forward, and therefore everything seems incorrigibly 
muddled to him. In short, he sits uncomfortably on the fence because 
he is not a systematic dualist who understands the nature of his position 
and is confident of its superiority over the extreme positions which it 
abhors.  
The systematic dualist recognises that there are only two clear 
responses to a confusing situation in which people take sides against 
each other. One can join one side or the other or one can work towards 
a resolution, reconciliation or synthesis which will take the situation 
forward and make progress possible. Taking the first alternative, the 
systematic dualist would join one side or the other and work hard to 
moderate the views of that side and achieve a reconciliation of some 
kind. Taking the second alternative, he or she would be confident 
enough to persuade both sides that conflict and confrontation cannot 
achieve their ends. In Blackpool’s case, the first alternative is more 
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likely to be successful than the second one, given the passions of both 
sides in such 19th century conditions. However, Blackpool clearly 
lacked the leadership qualities required to take the dynamic and 
purposeful action that the situation demanded. It is arguable that 
successful leadership depends on the use of systematic dualism to a 
greater or lesser extent.  
Dualism is often associated with shiftiness, prevarication, hypocrisy 
and even immorality. But systematic dualists by virtue of being 
systematic in their thinking are also being consistent, reliable and moral 
in their behaviour. They are no longer being systematic when their 
behaviour lacks integrity. If they acquire the depth in philosophy that 
systematic dualism demands then they are more in touch with 
themselves and are less inclined to misbehave. Their conduct can be 
consistent with the highest standards of honour and respectability 
though being human means that they may fall from grace as readily as 
anyone. The moral lapses of the eminent persons in sport and 
entertainment (for example, the professional golfer, Tiger Woods) 
come to mind in that regard. Sooner or later, insincere, immature or 
malign personalities reveal their inadequacies as they are deficient in 
the self-criticism that the dualist view demands. They no longer see 
themselves as others see them and are therefore incapable of behaving 
themselves.  
4. The relationship between dualism and monism 
At one extreme, the monist view is uncompromisingly focused on one 
viewpoint whereas in the dualist view there are no fixed either/or, 
black/white alternatives as far as our beliefs and opinions are 
concerned. Opposing alternatives are always up for consideration. The 
moderate or systematic dualist never excludes entirely any opposing 
view, and this includes even the monist view. Extreme monism in this 
context is a single-minded and exclusive devotion to ideas, ways of 
thinking, ideas, hobbies, lifestyles, and so on. Monism is not an absolute 
alternative to dualism as it has its place in human affairs just as dualism 
has, and indeed it forms part of the dualist view. There is therefore a 
spectrum of monist and dualist views such that there is no clear dividing 
line between them. We can all be monists and dualists to some degree 
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or other. But we must never lose touch with our inner dualist and 
become absolute or extreme monists. 
Absolute monists who give no credence to opposing views can be a 
menace to society, especially when they know no bounds to their 
fanaticism and enthusiasm. Terrorists, extremists and hot-headed 
fanatics are typically absolutist in their thinking. Less extreme monists 
are simply bores when they systematically interpret everything in 
relation to one thing. These include those whom the essayist William 
Hazlitt graphically describes as ‘people with one idea.’ (Hazlitt, 1824: 
59-69). Having one idea means that every conversation is brought round 
to it as if it were sine qua non of their existence.  
However, we are all moderate monists in our everyday pre-
occupations with hobbies, football teams, shopping or whatever grabs 
and interests us most in life. Moderate monists are amateur enthusiasts 
who may be fanatical about their interests but only within limits. Their 
interests are always balanced by other interests and responsibilities such 
as earning a living, pursuing a career, raising a family, political activity 
and so on. We can therefore distinguish absolute, extreme and moderate 
monists along a spectrum that includes the dualist view at its moderate 
end. The full spectrum between monism and dualism may be 
represented as follows: 
Absolute Monists - Extreme Monists - Moderate 
Monists/Systematic Dualists - Naïve Dualists - Absolute Dualists 
The spectrum ranges from absolute clarity to absolute obscurity, as 
absolute monists have absolutely no doubt about their beliefs as much 
as absolute dualists doubt absolutely everything as a matter of policy. 
Absolute dualists have no views of their own and are true sceptics. They 
apply their scepticism single-mindedly so that paradoxically they are 
absolutely monistic in that regard. The same kind of paradox arises 
when dogmatic left wingers become fascists in enforcing their views, 
or when extremely conservative people are notoriously lax and 
permissive in their moral behaviour. In other words, absolutists end up 
chasing their tails and confirming that which they deny. These 
distinctions are summarised as follows: 
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 Absolute Monists despise moderation and give no credence to 
opposing views. They know no bounds to their fanaticism and 
enthusiasm and are often a menace to society. Terrorists, extremists and 
hot-headed fanatics are typically absolutist in their thinking. In absolute 
dualism, the world is divided absolutely into black and white, good and 
evil, matter and spirit, mind and body and so on. The thinking of 
absolute monists is dominated by categorical thinking in which the 
world is divided into rigid categories. You are either for them or against 
them. 
 Extreme Monists systematically interpret everything in relation 
to one thing without using violence to enforce their views. Having one 
idea means that every conversation is brought round to it as if it were 
sine qua non of their existence. To be obsessed about one’s hobbies, 
about losing weight or about any number of such fixations is to be an 
extreme monist. Thus, those suffering from obsessive compulsive 
disorder (OCD) are invariably extreme monists. 
 Moderate Monists are what we all are in our everyday pre-
occupations with hobbies, football teams, shopping or whatever grabs 
and interests us most in life. As moderate monists we are amateur 
enthusiasts who are fanatical about our interests but only within limits. 
We are not obsessive about them to a fault, as such interests are always 
balanced by other interests and responsibilities such as earning a living, 
pursuing a career, raising a family, political activity and so on. But 
moderate monists are also systematic dualists by the very fact of being 
moderate in their monist indulgences. 
 Systematic Dualists recognise when faced with opposing sides 
that there are only two clear responses to a confusing situation in which 
people take sides against each other. One can join one side or the other 
or one can work towards a resolution, reconciliation or synthesis which 
will take the situation forward and make progress possible. Taking the 
first alternative, the systematic dualist would join one side or the other 
and work hard to moderate the views of that side and achieve a 
reconciliation of some kind. Taking the second alternative, he or she 
would be confident enough to persuade both sides that conflict and 
confrontation cannot achieve their ends. Thus, systematic dualists work 
hard to reconcile extremes and may even resort to extremes in their 
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dualism if the end justifies the means, that is to say, the end of achieving 
moderation and good sense.  
 Naïve Dualists are without any systematic approach by which 
to cope with their dualist views. They have the muddle-headed, fence-
sitting kind of dualism in which one is unable to make up one’s mind. 
They are like Buridan’s ass that had equal piles of hay on either side of 
it. As it was unable to make up its mind which pile to eat, it starved to 
death. Such dualists clearly lack the internal nous and the leadership 
qualities required to take the dynamic and purposeful action that the 
situation demands.  
 Absolute Dualists are sceptical of all beliefs whatsoever. They 
tend to divide the world absolutely into good and evil, matter and spirit, 
mind and body and so on. They lack a stable belief system by which to 
relate one side to the other. The Manicheans were absolute dualists as 
was Descartes with his mind/body dualism which lacked a coherent 
interaction between these extremes. These views are also absolute in 
that they interpret the world from one sceptical point of view. Like all 
absolutists you are either for them or against them from their point of 
view. 
In everyday life, we can be both moderate monists and systematic 
dualists. When we want to get things done, we are generally single-
minded about it and have no doubts about it. When we are faced with 
problematic situations then the dualist within us comes to the fore. We 
need to take account of opposing views and perhaps carefully consider 
both sides of the argument. We have to be open-minded when we want 
to reach a clear view of things. But when it is clear that things have gone 
to extremes and a serious imbalance has occurred than the moderate 
monist will find plenty of reasons to do what needs to be done.  
We also incorporate both dualist and monist ways of thinking 
without being aware of it. The latter means being moderate in our 
prejudices and pre-occupations, and the former means recognising the 
alternatives that are always possible. We must judge when to be 
carefully doubtful and when to be cautiously certain. Great and 
successful leaders are usually adept in combining moderate monism 
with systematic dualism. They are generally dualist in their thinking 
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and are invariably flexible and creative in their behaviour while also 
being certain and sure-footed in their decision-making. An outstanding 
example of this is Oliver Cromwell whose conversation could be 
baffling and hard to understand but whose actions and battle strategy 
were decisive and effective.4 This duality is often called ‘common 
sense’ but dualist theory goes much further than Thomas Reid and the 
Scottish Common Sense School in elucidating what it is.5 
We can all identify with Robert Graves’ poem, “In Broken Images”.6 
We are “slow, thinking in broken images”, while others are “quick, 
thinking in clear images.” We reach a new understanding of our 
confusion while others experience a new confusion of their 
understanding. The systematic dualist view is that clarity resides with 
facts, things and events while confusion and uncertainty may justly 
reign in our views, opinions, beliefs, convictions which are peculiar to 
ourselves. Formal linear logic is needed for the former but a dualist, 
dynamic logic is required for the latter. We may be certain, reasonable 
and logical about facts that we all share but we often have to suspend 
judgment about our own opinions. A different logic is required in which 
the middle view is not excluded. Thus, dualist logic is not the same as 
formal logic. Changes of mind may lead us to contradict ourselves. We 
must be more inclusive in our thinking. Being open-minded and 
forward thinking means that we hold our opinions at arm’s length and 
with some doubt and uncertainty. In contrast, the absolute monist errs 
in attributing absolute truth and clarity to his or her beliefs and in 
attempting to eliminate doubt in matters in which doubt is more often a 
virtue than a hindrance. It is nearly always the case that “much might 
be said on both sides”.7 
Nevertheless, decisiveness is not incompatible with dualist thinking. 
In daily life, it is often necessary to be decisive and sure-footed. 
Systematic dualists must necessarily hone their judgments to ensure 
that decisive action is taken when required. They will thrive on 
opposing arguments and on the pleasure of reconciling them to achieve 
worthy ends which are otherwise defeated by the acrimony aroused by 
such oppositions. They will seek unity and unanimity in relation to the 
aims of society. Effective leadership can always inspire and motivate 
people so that they fight for common causes rather than against each 
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other. But it is successful only when it eschews the extremes and shows 
clearly the benefits of the middle way. When left wingers and right 
wingers make enemies of each other then the middle way is lost and 
society can lose its sense of direction.  
5. The fundamental nature of dualist interaction 
When the dualist view is systematically developed in dualist studies, 
the importance of the dualist interaction emerges. The dualist 
interaction is a one-to-one relationship between two things which is 
fundamental to the universe from the quantum area of existence up to 
gravitational relationships between galaxies, stars and planets. It is 
entirely material, entirely a part of the physical world, and is always 
amenable to causal explanation. The development of this notion in 
dualist studies gets rid, once and for all, of occult, supernatural entities 
in the brain and the universe in general. However the availability of 
causal explanation is limited by the extent of our scientific knowledge. 
At the moment, it is clear that our knowledge is insufficiently advanced 
to account for all dualist interactions in the universe. But, from a 
philosophical point of view, dualist interaction can be used, figuratively 
speaking, as an Occam’s razor to severe the Gordian Knot of tangled 
philosophical problems such as the following:  
The Mind/Body Problem. Dualism has been too closely associated 
with Cartesian dualism which posits the existence of a mental/physical 
divide that is too rigid and narrow to explain the complexities of brain 
activity. Descartes infamously distinguished rigidly between 
mind/body and mental/physical by making them distinct substances or 
things instead of continuous processes that are implied by dualist 
interaction (Descartes, 1986: 54). When we apply dualist interaction 
universally it becomes clear that notions such as immaterial, spirit, soul, 
and vital energy (élan vitale) are superfluous entities that ultimately 
cannot be defined. The continuous nature of dualist interaction means 
occult entities are not required to explain, for instance, self-
consciousness. Our self-consciousness may be thought of 
metaphorically as a turning of brain activity to make self-awareness 
possible. Exactly what interactions are required in physical terms 
depends on further understanding of brain activity. Subjectivity 
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therefore refers to the misfit between what is going on within our 
physical bodies and the environment in which they exist. We need to be 
constantly alert and attentive to overcoming that misfit. The problem of 
how the mind influences the body vanishes when we explain all our 
experiences in terms of dualist interactions. The word ‘mind’ becomes 
an empty notion. If it is uninformative to say that the brain moves the 
body, it is even more uninformative to say that the mind moves body. 
When we move our limbs, all kinds of dualist interactions are involved 
which are not yet fully understood. The processes involved are wholly 
physical and material and no spiritual or immaterial explanations are 
required. The unified activity of these dualist interactions is all that is 
required, and these might ultimately be explained in terms of neural 
networks and the like. The role of dualist studies is to show how this 
unified activity is sufficient to explain our ability to move our limbs at 
will, and that the unified activity is entirely material and not spiritual or 
occult in any way.  
The absolutism/ relativism problem. The only absolute that we 
require is the continuous existence of dualist interaction that links us to 
external reality. The ‘now’ or ‘nunc stans’ of present existence is a 
unified absolute that is only sustained by continuous dualist interaction 
between ourselves and our external environment. We can be absolutely 
sure of our relationship to external reality because of the work that we 
are constantly doing, both consciously and unconsciously, to stay in 
touch with it. Everything is relative to what we are doing. The same 
applies to the relativity of our beliefs and opinions. We have to work at 
keeping them down-to-earth. We also need to work constantly at 
relating our views to those of other people and ultimately to society as 
a whole. Dualist studies deals with this problem through 
contextualisation, that is to say, by putting things into context and by 
seeing things from different perspectives. In that way, we begin to see 
things as a whole instead of confining everything to one or more 
perspectives as if nothing else important existed in the world.  
The sceptical/Dogmatic problem. We can never be absolutely 
certain about anything. But at the same time, there is no need to be 
sceptical about everything. The problem of dealing with doubt and 
uncertainty still remains since the dualist view seems to put us 
perpetually on the fence. We are apparently prevented from making our 
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minds up altogether. However, by developing the dualist view we can 
fine tune our reasoning without lapsing into abject scepticism or rigid 
dogmatism. For example, the logical law of the excluded middle is 
confined to its proper place instead of being applied to all of our beliefs 
and opinions as well as to discrete objects in external reality. In other 
words, the ‘either/or’ distinction applies rightly to the existence of 
things and events in the real world. They either exist or they do not exist 
and there is no doubt about it. We may be totally certain that tables and 
chairs exist in the next room if this is factually the case. In such practical 
matters there is little doubt in the matter. But if we allow our beliefs and 
opinions about political and religious matters to be held with absolute 
certainty then we may be led down the path of extremism. We may feel 
honour bound to impose our views on other people willy nilly. The 
dualist view helps us to moderate such views and to take due account 
of the merits and demerits of opposing views. Thus, an understanding 
of the relationship between dualism and monism helps us here.  
 6. The social usefulness of the dualist view 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Application of Dualist Studies 
Dualist studies involve applying the dualist view to practical areas such 
as management, crime and punishment, education, future studies, and 
extreme ways of thinking. An outline follows the dualist approach to 
each of these areas: 
A dualist approach to management: The dualist view is essential to 
successful management. It consists in understanding the extremes of 
opinion and attitude to which both employers and employees are prone 
Some Aims of Dualist Studies 
 To train the mind to cope with extreme thought tendencies and to 
avoid complete scepticism on the one hand and complete dogmatism on 
the other hand; 
 To show that dualist thinking is not necessarily vague or indecisive 
and is in fact necessary for correct and productive thinking; 
 To show how new ideas can change society for the better; 
 To instil philosophy with renewed vigour; 
 To understand better what it is to be human, especially in contrast 
with what is considered to be inhuman, in thought and behaviour. 
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and which pervade every workplace. The dualist view can help 
managers deal with situations that demand intuitive insight more than 
incisive logic. The distinction between naïve and systematic dualism is 
useful here in which the former refers to confused and muddled thinking 
whereas the latter involves organised and purposeful thinking to deal 
systematically with confusing and conflicting situations. Such 
distinctions help us to understand conflicts between rival groups within 
the workplace and with leadership dilemmas such balancing 
friendliness with aloofness. The successful manager learns intuitively 
how to maintain a balance between being friendly with employees and 
keeping his distance from them and is thus behaving in a dualist manner 
in that respect. 8 
A dualist approach to crime and punishment: At present, crime is 
punished very unevenly and often ineffectively. Punishments are meted 
out in an unsystematic way that leads to the extremes of under and over 
punishment. Those who might be punished with leniency are often 
given custodial sentences that ruin their lives, while others who deserve 
very harsh punishment to put them on the right track are often treated 
too leniently. When dangerous people finish their term of ‘punishment’ 
they are let out into the community and may endanger the public. The 
conservative view is that criminals should be punished with longer jail 
sentences. The liberal view is that people should be rehabilitated and 
not merely punished by jail sentences. The dualist view is that the 
person should be punished, not the crime. In other words, law-breakers 
should be punished not by fixed, predetermined sentences but according 
to what is required to ‘cure’ them of their social deviance and hopefully 
make honest citizens of them. A social treatment system is therefore 
required to change our criminal justice system and to ensure that those 
who need lenient treatment are given it and those who need harsh 
treatment are also given it.9 
A dualist approach to education: In one respect, we need education 
to be thumped into us if we are to imbibe successfully such basic skills 
as reading, writing and arithmetic. But in another respect we need to 
absorb knowledge and understanding in our own way and in our own 
time. When these two contrasting approaches are insightfully 
combined, they interact to produce the best kind of education. The first 
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approach may be called ‘Mode 1’ and the second ‘Mode 2’. Mode 1 
emphasises the skills, knowledge and abilities that should be inculcated 
through education, whereas Mode 2 emphasises the cultivation of 
individuality and creativity. In the dualist view, both these approaches 
are combined in an imaginative way.10 Another way of putting it is that 
we must both ‘fill the vessel’ and ‘kindle the fire’ in our dualist 
educational approach. Plutarch is often quoted as saying that a child’s 
mind is not a vessel to be filled but a fire to be kindled.11 But children’s 
minds need also to be filled with facts, poems, stories, languages and 
all the skills needed to understand society and take their place in it. 
Their memories need to be developed just as much as their interests and 
passions kindled and promoted. Thus, a dualist approach to education 
involves as much disciplined learning as free learning.  
A dualist approach to future studies:  Though we live in the present 
we constantly look back to the past and forward to the future. Studying 
the past helps us to predict the future, and looking to the future helps us 
to anticipate things being better than they are at present. But we can be 
too pre-occupied with the past at the expense of the future and vice 
versa. These are monist views that look exclusively in either one 
direction or the other. It means that we dwell too much in the past or 
look too confidently to the future. The retrospective view looks to the 
past and prospective view to the future. The dualist view helps us to 
place equal value on both these views. We move in a dynamic way from 
one to the other without being stuck in the past or leaving everything to 
the future.12 
A dualist approach to eliminating extremes of thought: Systematic 
dualism is essential for creativity as it depends on our maintaining a 
balance between thinking too much or too little. It is arguable that those 
‘geniuses’ who perform extraordinary feats of creativity are only able 
to do so because they are systematic dualists who avoid self-defeating 
extremes in their thinking. They develop their mental powers in a 
purposeful fashion without taking themselves too seriously on the one 
hand or belittling themselves too much on the other hand. Often we are 
in doubt whether to think too much of ourselves or too little. Here are 
the extreme consequences of the opposing tendencies involved: 
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Thinking too much of oneself  Thinking too little of oneself 
May lead to                May lead to  
Hot-headed extremism              Empty-headed indifference 
Involving                           Involving 
Brazen overconfidence              Insipid lack of confidence 
And in extremis to                And in extremis to 
Homocidal sociopathy suicidal self-abnegation 
It appears that too many young people are prone to these extremes 
these days, leading to an outbreak of massacres and suicides, as reported 
in the mass media. Suicide bombers seem to incorporate both these 
strands in their thinking. Their unbalanced thinking twists these strands 
into a deadly double helix, the antithesis of DNA which gives life 
instead of taking it. They think too much of themselves and too little at 
the same time. They arrogantly think that their deaths can make a 
difference while by making out that their lives are worthless enough to 
be terminated instantly. They achieve nothing lasting by their senseless 
actions. A rational dualist interaction between these extremes is 
required to avoid being possessed by them beyond sense and reality. 
Thus, a greater understanding of our essential duality is the next big 
step forward for humanity.  
7. In praise of the middle way 
Our capacity for extremism. Perhaps our most admirable and our most 
dangerous trait is our capacity for excess. The seemingly limitless 
extremes to which we push ourselves bring out the best and worst in us. 
Our obsessions can lead us, for example, to climb the highest 
mountains, write huge novels, built bridges and buildings, and gain 
immense advances in scientific knowledge, while crippling ourselves 
with addictions, killing each other in the millions, and destroying the 
planet in our pursuit of the ‘good life’. From a moral standpoint, it is 
usually obvious which of these are beneficial and which are harmful. 
But it depends on our state of mind whether we adopt the first and avoid 
the second. In so far as we have personal insight and self-discipline we 
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can avoid harmful states of mind when we recognise them as such. We 
can choose not to do harm or to have negative thoughts in so far as we 
have control over our emotions. For example, we can stop being angry 
with someone when we realise that our anger is unfounded or 
unreasonable. People about to commit murder or suicide can be 
persuaded by others to desist. Potentially we can all change our minds 
if we choose to do so. Therefore, we have enough freewill to 
consciously avoid going to these extremes if we really want to. A clear 
method is needed to deal with these extremes, and the following 
distinctions hopefully help us to recognise extreme and harmful states 
of mind both within ourselves and in others, so that we can avoid them. 
A Schematic Depiction of the Middle Way 
 The Will to Power 
(Nietzsche) 
The Will to 
Understanding 
(Systematic Dualism) 
The Will to Belief 
 (William James) 
      
Features: Carnivorous (Wolves) Human Herbivorous (Sheep) 
Motivations: Seeking immediate fame, 
power or notoriety 
Seeking long-term 
personal development 
Seeking security 
within ‘herd/flock’ 
Traits:      
Relational Dominant Independent Dependent 
Prescriptive Commanding Questioning Unquestioning 
Doxastic Dogmatic Critical of belief Blind belief/faith 
Reactive Authoritarian Authoritative Credulous 
Predictive Deterministic Latitudinarian Fatalistic 
Attitudinal Absolute certainty Relative certainty Total conviction 
Judgmental Contempt Respect Uncritical 
Behavioural Demeaning Self-critical Subservient 
Effects:        
Social  Esoteric Inclusive Exclusive 
Heuristic Indoctrination Teaching Preaching 
Emotive Hypnotic induction Rational passions Mob mania 
Dispositional Them/us discrimination Tolerance of differences Indiscriminate 
love/hatred 
Goals:        
Epistemic Messianic knowledge Hypothetical knowledge Common knowledge 
Personal Adulation Truth Conformity 
       
Outcomes: Self-deception Insight Delusion 
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Introducing the middle way. The above three outlooks or ways of 
thinking characterise human nature from the dualist point of view. We 
have, on the one hand, the overly strong ‘will to power’14 and, on the 
other hand, the overly weak ‘will to believe’,15 between which the 
relatively moderate ‘will to understanding’ hovers uneasily. The former 
two ways represent relatively unreflective and uncivilised aspects of 
human nature which need to be supplemented by the middle way. Their 
unreflective and uncivilised aspects emerge when they are isolated from 
the middle way and are taken to extremes. All forms of political, 
religious and behavioural extremism result from such a loss of the 
middle way, as is argued below. This extremist potential persists within 
us all and we need constantly to guard ourselves against its reassertion 
and predominance. In so far as there is progress in civilisation, it 
consists in the middle way being progressively introduced until it forms 
part of everyone’s mindset and ultimately of the political and social 
fabric. Civilised behaviour requires the middle way to insinuate its way 
between these intimate extremes which feed on each other. This process 
has recurred several times in history when humanist attitudes have 
come to the fore. Equally, the simplicity and attraction of extreme views 
has all too often resulted in the loss of the middle way. Until the 
twentieth century, the appearance of the middle way has been cyclical 
and impermanent. It remains to be seen whether the twenty-first century 
will see its permanent institution if it ever becomes an integral part of 
the educational system. 
The Consequences of repudiating the middle way. It may be argued 
that excess is tolerable while it is related to the middle way wherein we 
remain human rather than inhuman. We can be a little wicked as long 
as we repent of that wickedness and resolve to do better. For we need 
to bear in mind the harm which excessive behaviour does to ourselves 
and others. We need the restraints of the middle way to function as 
sociable and rational beings. Repudiating the middle way entirely 
means losing one’s moral sense or social conscience. Psychopaths and 
sociopaths feel no shame or remorse because they have lost all restraints 
over their behaviour and have nothing within them to draw them back 
from doing their worst. In the same bracket, we may include terrorists, 
extremists, fanatics, zealots, criminals, rapists, gangsters, gurus, 
charlatans, and sectarian bigots of all kinds, who commonly scorn the 
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middle way between the will to power and the will to believe. They seek 
the nearest way to satisfy their ambitions, desires, compulsions and 
obsessions. In preying on the populace like wolves on sheep, they 
dehumanise themselves and demean their victims. They dominate 
people to achieve their self-serving ends. They are so sure of themselves 
that they become dogmatic and authoritarian in their behaviour towards 
others. In the case of religious and political bigots, they exert power 
over others by means of messianic knowledge which is usually a belief 
system specific to themselves or the organisation within which they 
operate. The belief system is often so esoteric and divorced from 
common life that they adopt a them/us discrimination policy. You are 
either in or out, for or against, and there is no middle way. 
No excuses for repudiating the middle way. Clarifying the middle 
way helps us to put such people in their place and treat them with the 
contempt and disapproval they deserve. Neither their genetic 
inheritance nor their social backgrounds are sufficient to excuse their 
opprobrious ways of thinking over which they potentially have as much 
self-control as the rest of us. Their freely adopted attitudes and frames 
of mind are primarily to blame for their deplorable behaviour. We need 
not respect or tolerate behaviour and attitudes which cannot be justified 
by reason or reference to the middle way.   
Without the middle way we lose our humanity. In the absence of 
any middle way, power-mongering and intimidation prevails, and the 
human race is composed of nothing but knaves and fools, or exploiters 
and victims. Knaves think too much of themselves and fools too little 
of themselves. Knaves quarrel among themselves and use fools to fight 
each other. This can happen in tribal and criminal set-ups that still recur 
even in developed nations. Such absolute divisions make relations 
between people problematic, and they erode trust, perpetuate enmity, 
make co-operation impossible, and prevent us from fulfilling our 
potential as human beings. Killing each other becomes a routine matter 
when we have no respect for others as human beings and regard them 
as dispensable vermin. It is Hobbes’s ‘state of nature’ in which there is 
“a time of War, where every man is Enemy to every man”.16 The highest 
human aspirations are thrown away in favour of the lowest and meanest 
ones, dictated by narrow, personal, group, sectarian, nationalist or 
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religious matters. Such are the conditions which prevailed under 
authoritarian regimes such as Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and Pol 
Pot’s Cambodia. 
Power and subservience go together. Just as sadism goes along with 
masochism and vice versa, so power-mongering goes along with 
submission and subservience to a stronger will or character. Power-
mongers will always have victims over whom they exert power and 
influence while their mind-slaves retain an uncritical will to believe in 
spite of all reason or common sense to the contrary. When people form 
a mobilised mob or a cowed crowd, they are susceptible to the 
wilfulness of dominant characters. It is easy to appeal to people’s 
emotions when they form a cohesive tribe that spurns the freethinking 
individual. Only when people are allowed to think things out as 
individuals, is it possible for reason and good sense to prevail over 
crowd-pulling emotion. Thus, the dualist view repudiates the 
polarisation of these positions in favour of the middle way towards 
which all positive and progressive movements must tend if humanity is 
to come together and ensure its collective future.  
5- Conclusion  
The ultimate truth for human beings lies not in settling for one 
viewpoint but in incorporating all viewpoints by interacting constantly 
with them to make as much of them as humanly possible. This is clearly 
the opposite of religious or ideological viewpoints that see only one way 
forward. It accords with an ongoing dualist view that is constantly 
interacting with the world and its contents. This whole-hearted position 
provides us with the open-minded outlook to work out for ourselves 
what we are to do with our lives. We manoeuvre our way through life 
on a trial-and-error basis and do not expect everything to be 
straightforward or made easy for us. In other words, our safety, security 
and internal well-being lies in constant interaction, in striving to better 
ourselves, and in taking account of everything in a spirit of open-
minded curiosity and vitality. Being open to all things promotes 
optimism whereas confining ourselves to one point of view or mindset 
depresses and stunts us as human beings. Dualism can be all things to 
all men but only by bringing all views into its omniscient fold. This is 
no easy task but we can all learn to work at it if we have the will to do 
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so. Thus, the task of dualist theory is to supply the reasons and rationale 
for doing so, and this is a beginning not an end. 
Notes 
1. Perhaps such an outstanding team might become an exhibition team 
that tours the world, like the basketball team, the Harlem Globetrotters, its 
members becoming celebrities in their own right. However, competitive sport 
usually involves an element of uncertainty and unpredictability to attract 
spectators and partisans. 
2. A. M. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind, 1950, 
Vol. LIX, No. 236. This famous paper is excerpted in Hofstadter and 
Dennett’s book, Mind’s I, Penguin Books, 1982, pp.53-68. However, the 
question of whether a machine is thinking or not may be resolved by 
observing how it is behaving to itself. Thus, self reference is more important 
than its reaction to people in the way suggested by Turing. Its inner life, 
consciousness and self-identity can give it feelings and thoughts of its own. 
We will react emotionally to their displays of emotion and will either 
empathise or not as the case may be. What we are actually feeling may be 
uncertain even to ourselves, and computers would need to behave likewise if 
they are to be likened to us.  
3. This dualist view of the history of philosophy is outlined in my book, 
What is Philosophy? (Edinburgh: Dunedin Academic Press, 2008). 
4. Cf. Sir Walter Scott’s extraordinary portrayal of Oliver Cromwell in 
his novel, Woodstock (1826). It seems convincingly true to life.   
5. Thomas Reid’s view of common sense consisted of a psychological 
examination of the five senses laid down by Aristotle plus a list of common 
sense principles that served only to stultify metaphysical discussion. See, for 
example, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay VI, Chs IV-VI in 
The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. Sir W. Hamilton, (Edinburgh: James Thin, 
1895), pp. 434-461.  
6. Robert Graves’ poem ‘In Broken Images’ is freely available online 
7. Joseph Addison (1672-1719), in his Roger de Coverely essays in The 
Spectator, no.122, July 20, 1711, (London: J.M. Dent, 1909), p.149. See also 
no. 117, July 14, 1711 (p.128): 
 “There are some Opinions in which a Man should stand Neuter, without 
engaging his Assent to one side or the other. Such a hovering Faith as this, 
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which refuses to settle upon any Determination, is absolutely necessary to a 
Mind that is careful to avoid Errors and Prepossessions.” 
8. This is the subject of my paper entitled “The Role of Dualist Thinking 
in Management” which was presented to the Seventh International Philosophy 
of Management Conference at St. Anne’s College, Oxford on Friday 23rd July 
2010. 
9. The ‘social treatment system’ is elaborated in my e-book entitled 
Punish the Person, not the Crime! Proposing a Social Treatment System to 
Punish Lawbreakers, (Amazon Kindle, 2013).  
10. Cf. The New Production of Knowledge, Michael Gibbons, C. 
Limoges, H. Nowotny, S. Schwartzman, P. Scott, and M. Trow. (London: 
Sage, 1994). 
11. The quotation is in fact a paraphrase from a passage in Plutarch’s 
Moralia, Vol. One, III ‘On Listening to Lectures’, (Περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν - De 
recta ratione audiendi), 48 C2–D4, trans. by Frank Cole Babbitt, (Loeb 
edition, London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1927). pp. 257-259. A fuller 
paraphrase might be as follows: ‘The mind is not to be filled like a vessel 
( ́ i  but requires kindling like wood to provide new illuminations 
and insights through speech and text.” 
12. There is more on these distinctions in my article, Posterity—An 
Eighteenth Century Answer to God and Religion, The Humanist, Vol. 71 (2), 
March/April 2011, pp. 39-40. It is also reprinted in my book, American 
Papers on Humanism and Religion, (Almostic Publications, 2014). 
13. As to be found in his Also Sprach Zarathustra and other works. For 
example, thus Spoke Zarathustra (London: Penguin Books, 1967), ‘Of Self-
Overcoming’ (Von der Selbst-Überwindung), p. 136: “That is your entire will, 
you wisest men, it is a will to power.” (Das ist euer ganzer Wille, ihr 
Weisesten, als ein Wille zur Macht.) 
14. Cf. William James (1897), The Will to Believe, (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1956), pp. 1-31. 
15. Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, Part I, Ch. 13, (1631 – London: 
Penguin Books, 1985), p. 186. 
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Introduction 
It is well known that Socrates was the first philosopher in the western 
tradition who attempted to use philosophical arguments to produce an 
ethics. He started the first systematic philosophical attitude to morality 
and moral concepts, while many western philosophers, after him (even 
some Islamic philosophers) continued his way. But, we do not consider 
the chronological study of moral theories in history of ethics. In the 20th 
century, usually, contemporary philosophers such as Levina1, Foucault2 
and other moral philosophers tend to pay more attention to moral issues. 
Richard Rorty is one famous philosopher from this century whose 
undoubtedly profound moral messages in his philosophy are not hidden 
from the eyes of his avid readers. However, many may be surprised at 
the title of this article which, of course, does not set out to offer 
complete answers to this question, because the critics will wonder 
whether Richard Rorty, like Kant, really has a philosophical account of 
moral thought and practice or not. It has to be allowed that Rorty has 
not engaged with moral philosophy in the systematic manner common 
among leading modern and contemporary moral philosophers. He has 
even been always hesitant to use or apply the label of "philosophy" to 
whatever it is he sees himself as doing. Therefore, we should be a little 
cautious about this subject. The issue of morality in his writings (from 
Philosophy and Mirror of Nature (1979) to An Ethics for Today (2010)) 
is sporadically expressed. 
This paper has two parts: the first part, briefly, is concerned with 
principles of his philosophy; the second part, is a long and detailed 
consideration of many moral themes in Rorty's thought such as the 
critique of Kantian morality, solidarity, moral progress, cruelty and the 
concept of the Other, etc. Subsequently, attempts will be made to 
answer the main question of the article: is Rorty a moral philosopher?  
Before going further, it is necessary to present certain explanations 
to better understand why one cannot say that Rorty is a moral 
philosopher. The hypothesis I put forward in this article is that when 
you carefully look at his philosophy, you will see in him a moral 
message for mankind: it is a morality for living in a liberal society. All 
his efforts have been directed towards this great goal. Of course, ethics 
or moral philosophy is the branch of philosophy that involves 
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metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. In other words, moral 
philosophy is the area of philosophy concerned with theories of ethics, 
with how we ought to live our lives. All moral philosophers from Plato 
to the present age have been considered moral act and value in the 
mentioned theories. Rorty criticizes all the above theories about ethics.  
Principles of Rorty's Philosophy 
At the outset, let us consider the principles of the pragmatist philosophy 
of Rorty. Our purpose is to show those principles form his moral 
philosophy. I do not want to get into details of the principles because a 
full explanation of those principles is outside the scope of this article. 
Here, I will try to explain those principles in brief. 
Anti-essentialism: This view is a critical reaction against 
essentialism3. Anti-essentialism in Rorty's philosophy is an objection to 
contemporary essentialism that attempts to look for hidden "reality" 
under all "appearance". Rorty completely denies it; from the Rortyan 
outlook, the reality-appearance distinction is a relic of our onto-
theological tradition which some contemporary philosophers (like M. 
Heidegger) have criticized. Rorty, in Truth and Progress, writes: “for 
we have learned (from Nietzsche and James, among others) to be 
suspicious of the appearance-reality distinction. We think that there are 
many ways to talk about what is going on, and that none of them gets 
closer to the way things are in themselves than any other. We have no 
idea what 'in itself' is supposed to mean in the phrase 'reality as it is in 
itself.' So we suggest that the appearance-reality distinction be dropped 
in favor of more useful ways of talking.”(Rorty 1998:1). For this reason, 
in connection with this distinction, he suggests another distinction that 
has a moral content: the distinction between morality and prudence. He 
says that the latter distinction forms the Kantian ethics that Nietzsche 
and Dewey strongly deny. Having been influenced by them, Rorty 
accepts the pragmatic approach to morality and in Philosophy and 
Social Hope attempts to explain his moral philosophy. 
Rorty clearly denies the human essence as one of the sources of 
moral laws. Dann in his After Rorty: The Possibilities for Ethics and 
Religious Belief (2010) writes: "Rorty's beginning point in his treatment 
of ethics, questioning the usefulness of extrinsic and intrinsic 
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definitions of human nature, is a good place to start in the critique of 
traditional ethical theory" (Dann 2010: 81). Rorty seems to replace 
traditional morality with a postmodern one. Traditional morality from 
Socrates to Levinas – in the Platonic-Aristotelian-Christian-Judeo 
traditions – tends to interpret morality as the means to the fulfillment of 
a fixed or unchanging human nature. According to this view, there is no 
fixed human essence. Rorty accepts this view and he becomes an anti-
essentialist philosopher. Therefore, Rorty's concept of self-creation 
begins with a rejection of the traditional idea of a fixed or essential 
human nature. That is, this neo-pragmatist philosopher begins with a 
radical sense of sociological and historical contingency of the self 
(Huang 2009: 229). In other words, he doesn't believe that all humans 
have a common nature.         
Darwinism: Through Dewey, Rorty became acquainted with 
Darwinism in philosophy. He says that "Dewey, in turn, was grateful to 
natural science, especially as represented by Darwin, for rescuing him 
from early Hegelianism" (Rorty 1991b: 63). In fact, it can be said that 
this is also true about Rorty himself because he is a new Dewey who, 
according to some interpreters, has attempted to combine the 
postmodern approaches with classic pragmatism in order to make his 
neo-pragmatism. For example, for Darwin, like Rorty and Dewey, the 
human nature is a part of material nature and the mind and the self a 
participant in the flux of events, not spectators. Also, according to 
Darwinism, there is no absolute, fixed, eternal, and immutable center 
for human existence. If we accept this view, no longer can the fixed 
essence of man be accepted, which, consequently leads to anti-
essentialism. The clearest descriptions of Darwinism are founded in 
Rorty's essay, "Dewey between Hegel and Darwin4". In addition, Rorty 
borrows historicism from Hegel and naturalism from Darwin. 
Therefore, there is no doubt that his neo-pragmatism is based on the 
Hegelianism and Darwinism. Rorty's approach to morality is closer to 
his Darwinism and Hegelianism. He, in "Dewey between Hegel and 
Darwin" says that "in this attitude towards morality, it seems to me, we 
get a genuine marriage of Darwin with de-absolutized Hegel" (Ibid: 13).  
Freudism: He speaks of him in his writings, especially in "Freud and 
Moral Reﬂection"5. Freud is a pivotal thinker for Rorty, serving as one 
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of the masters of re-description and decentering of the self. Freud denies 
a fixed nature for man, dividing it into three parts. It is important to bear 
in mind that Freud is displacing Kantian–Christian teaching about 
universal moral claims and dispositions. Freud, Rorty holds, has 
changed our picture of human nature and his picture is completely 
different form the pictures which Plato and Kant, even Nietzsche, 
represented. Rorty summarizes the point: "It has often seemed 
necessary to decide between Kant and Nietzsche, to make up one’s 
mind – at least to that extent – about the point of being human. But 
Freud gives us a way of looking at the human being which helps us 
evade the choice.... For Freud eschews the very idea of a paradigm 
human being.... By breaking with both Kant’s residual Platonism and 
Nietzsche’s inverted Platonism, he lets us see both Nietzsche’s 
superman and Kant’s moral consciousness as exemplifying two out of 
many forms of adaptation, two out of many strategies, for coping with 
the contingency of one’s upbringing" (Rorty 1989: 35). In his view, 
Freud and Nietzsche have ended all attempts to discover a common 
human nature or a fixed center for the self. In other words, Freud was 
to discredit the idea of the true human self, and thereby the idea of the 
search for a permanent and unchangeable self behind ever changing 
accidents.  
Historicism: As already mentioned, historicists like him, Rorty says, 
deny "that there is such a thing as "human nature" or the "deepest level 
of the self". Instead, they "insist that socialization goes all the way down 
– that there is nothing "beneath" socialization or prior to history." 
(Kuipers 2013: 86). Although Historicism of Rorty is similar to Hegel's 
but there are differences. It should be stressed, however, that the sort of 
historicism Rorty represents and describes is a nominalist, heroic, 
Romantic, existential, poetics, and narrativist historicism6.  Also, in 
Essays on Heidegger and others (of course in footnote 8, p55), Rorty 
explicitly says "Historicism is a special case of naturalism" (Rorty 
1991a: 55). So it can be concluded that the two (Historicism and 
naturalism) are intertwined and both of them have been included in his 
Darwinism. We should not forget that his view of morality is based on 
these principles. He believes that to accept non-representationalism is 
to require historicism. This marries up with his belief that "if one adopts 
a non-representationalist view of thought and language, one will move 
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away from Kant in the direction of Hegel’s historicism7." (Rorty 
2007:133). He proposes, for instance, putting a stop to providing 
justifications for different democratic institutions with an appeal to 
supra-historical reason. Therefore, according to him, Solidarity, as a 
core of moral philosophy, doesn’t need to be based on objective 
foundations and is actually rather a matter of contingency. Historical 
stories about social and spiritual movements are the best instrument for 
studying human beings, for they supply vocabularies for reflection on 
morality, by means of which the individual is able to tell coherent 
stories about his own life (Rorty 1989: 69).  
Critique of Kantian ethics 
We must first examine his critique of Kant’s moral philosophy and, by 
extension, his endorsement of John Dewey’s critique of Kant's 
morality. All above principles as already noted, Kant’s conception of 
distinct and discoverable moral principles in practical reason and, by 
extension, the conception of morality as being based upon a rational and 
universal human faculty for resolving moral dilemmas by referring to 
such principles is, for Rorty, simply metaphysical principles derived 
from religious teachings. Rorty uses the Darwinian attitude for 
considering Kantian ethics. He suggested that: 
 "All inquiry – in ethics as well as physics, in politics as 
well as logic – is a matter of reweaving our webs of 
beliefs and desires in such a way as to give ourselves 
more happiness and richer and freer lives. All our 
judgments are experimental and fallible. 
Unconditionality and absolutes are not things we should 
strive for ...Darwinians cannot be at ease with the 
Kantian idea of a distinctively moral motivation, or of a 
faculty called “reason” that issues commands. For 
them, rationality can only be the search for 
intersubjective agreement about how to carry out 
cooperative projects… To say that moral principles 
have no inherent nature is to imply that they have no 
distinctive source. They emerge from our encounters 
with our surroundings in the same way that hypotheses 
about planetary motion, codes of etiquette, epic poems, 
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and all our other patterns of linguistic behavior emerge. 
Like these other emergents, they are good insofar as they 
lead to good consequences, not because they stand in 
some special relation either to the universe or to the 
human mind" (Rorty 1989:188–90). 
This Deweyan or post-Darwinian view of morality fits well with 
Rorty’s conception of morality. Thus, Rorty, a strong recent critic of 
Kant, in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, writes: "Kant, acting from 
the best possible motives, sent moral philosophy off in a direction 
which has made it hard for moral philosophers to see the importance, 
for “moral progress”, of “detailed empirical descriptions”. Kant wanted 
to facilitate the sorts of developments which have in fact occurred since 
his time – the further developments of democratic institutions and a 
cosmopolitan political consciousness. But he thought that the way to do 
so was to emphasize not pity for pain and remorse for cruelty but, rather, 
rationality and obligation – specifically, moral obligation. He saw 
respect for “reason”, the common core of humanity, as the only motive 
that was not merely empirical – not dependent on the accidents of 
attention or of history. By contrasting “rational respect” with feelings 
of pity and benevolence, he made the latter seem dubious, second-rate 
motives for not being cruel. He made morality something distinct from 
the ability to notice, and identify with, pain and humiliation" (Rorty 
1989: 192-193). In  addition  to  this,  at odds with  Kantian  moral  
philosophy, Rorty denies  the universality  of  moral  principles  and  
human  nature.  And he insists that the progress of social morality is the 
extension of solidarity on the basis of 'we-intentions' and the destination 
of individual morality is a 'liberal ironist'.The "ironist", according to 
Rorty, is one who faces up to the contingency of his or her own most 
central beliefs and desires, namely his or her dependence on his or her 
cultural and social context and process of socialization. Therefore, 
"liberal ironists" are those people who include among their ungrounded 
desires their own hope that suffering will be diminished, that the 
humiliation of human beings by other human beings may cease (ibid.). 
The concept of solidarity is related with irony. 
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This solidarity is achieved by a perpetual extension of her concept 
of `we' or `one of us'. The liberal ironist's sense of solidarity does not 
result from trying to attain some putative human essence, but by 
cultivating her sensitivity to manifestations of suffering and cruelty, a 
sensitivity which increases with the assistance of literary criticism. 
This solidarity is achieved by a perpetual extension of her concept 
of `we' or `one of us'. The liberal ironist's sense of solidarity does not 
result from trying to attain some putative human essence, but by 
cultivating her sensitivity to manifestations of suffering and cruelty, a 
sensitivity which increases with the assistance of literary criticism. 
He takes most of his ideas from Dewey whom he adored as a 
philosophical hero, two others being Heidegger and Wittgenstein. 
Rorty, in Philosophy and Mirror of Nature (1979), holds Dewey as one 
of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century. In particular, 
Rorty finds in Dewey an anticipation of his own view of moral 
philosophy, taking himself as continuing the work of Dewey to criticize 
traditional metaphysics and its basic problems such as theory of Truth, 
concept of Experience and ethics. Rorty claims that Dewey tries to 
liberate our culture from supposed obstacles which hold up its further 
development and the realization of social hopes. Certainly, Kantian 
philosophy and especially his moral philosophy is an obstacle which 
holds up the realization of social hopes. Dewey and Rorty agree that 
philosophers should turn their attention toward the questions of a just 
society because democracy as a just society is the common search for 
justice. He is a liberal relying on democracy instead of philosophy; and 
he is a pragmatist comfortable with contingency and solidarity instead 
of theories. Finally, he follows his old teacher John Dewey. About 
Dewey on democracy, Rorty says that "he praised democracy as the 
only form of “moral and social faith” that does not “rest upon the idea 
that experience must be subjected at some point or other to some form 
of external control: to some ‘authority’ alleged to exist outside the 
process of experience” (Rorty 2007: 40). Of course, Rorty is an atheist 
philosopher and by no means can it be said that he has a theology, 
whatever it is, in his philosophy. The common point between both of 
them is the view that the essence of democracy is in moral values 
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expressed in societal procedures and human relationships, and in 
critical citizens who are committed to these values. 
Rorty introduces morality in Philosophy and Social Hope more than 
in his other writings. He is strongly influenced by Dewey's naturalistic 
and Darwinist pragmatism. He, like Dewey, does not accept the 
distinction between prudence and morality. "Dewey suggested", Rorty 
says "that we reconstruct the distinction between prudence and morality 
in terms of the distinction between routine and non-routine social 
relationships. He saw prudence as a member of the same family of 
concepts as 'habit' and 'custom'. All three words describe familiar and 
relatively uncontroversial ways in which individuals and groups adjust 
to the stresses and strains of their non-human and human environments. 
It is obviously prudent both to keep an eye out for poisonous snakes in 
the grass and to trust strangers less than members of one's own family. 
'Prudence', 'expediency' and 'efficiency' are all terms which describe 
such routine and uncontroversial adjustments to circumstances" (Rorty 
1999: 73). The distinction between prudence and morality compares 
with that of social custom and law.     
According to Rorty’s ‘philosophical hero’, John Dewey, this 
Kantian morality-prudence distinction and the Kantian notion of moral 
autonomy (autonomy “in the sense of obedience to reason’s 
unconditional command”) are irreconcilable with the Darwinian 
account of the origin of the human species. 
Rorty believes that the bases of ethics are neither a religion nor a 
moral law. He says: "as I read the history of philosophy, Kant is a 
transitional ﬁgure – somebody who helped us get away from the idea 
that morality is a matter of divine command, but who unfortunately 
retained the idea that morality is a matter of unconditional obligations. 
I would accept Elizabeth Anscombe’s suggestion that if you do not 
believe in God, you would do well to drop notions like “law” and 
“obligation” from the vocabulary you use when deciding what to do" 
(Rorty 2007:187). Moreover, it can be said that emotions are not reason 
and rational arguments do not play a role in Rorty's moral philosophy. 
In other words, Rorty attempts to re-establish the central role that 
emotions played in the early Enlightenment. While in Kant’s morality, 
there is a question of obedience to universal rules of pure practical 
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reason, for Hume the grounds and ultimate ends of morality should not 
rest on intellectual faculties but on sentiments. In Hume’s morality, 
emotions are not under the control of reason but within a web of 
sentiments that allow feelings to control themselves.  
The priority of solidarity to objectivity 
Perhaps, it can be said that the central core of the article is "solidarity", 
for it forms the spirit of his moral philosophy. I want to explain and 
elucidate what Rorty means by the two concepts of “solidarity” and 
“objectivity” and why he strongly advocates choosing the former over 
the latter. In other words, in Contingency, irony, and solidarity, he 
searches for forms of solidarity which are not determined by objectivity. 
He opposes attempts to anchor solidarity or responsibility for each other 
in human nature, a commonly shared humanity, or in natural human 
rights. Solidarity with others is a chance hit, a form of alliance with 
others which we have created and which is based on our ability to see 
others as members of a “we community.” 
In the process, I emphasize the moral messages of Rorty's 
philosophy, and show that Rorty himself admits that there is some sort 
of mysterious "moral foundation" which takes the place, or plays the 
role, of a metaphysical foundation. The moral philosophy that he has 
pursued since the publication of his famous book, that is, Philosophy 
and the Mirror of nature has not any similarity with current 
philosophies of ethics. In other words, it is neither deontological8 
morality nor a religious ethics but is a neo-pragmatic ethics. This ethics 
is different from other moral philosophies. First, it focuses on society, 
rather than on lone individuals, as the entity which achieves morality. 
For example, in Dewey's words, "all conduct is ... social." Or in Rorty's 
words, "imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers". 
In fact, his social hope as a substitute for Kantian or religious ethics 
plays a role in his neo-pragmatic ethics. Secondly, it does not hold any 
known moral criteria beyond the potential for revision. Third, 
pragmatic ethics may be misunderstood as relativist, as failing to be 
objective, but it is like suggesting that science fails to be objective. 
Ethical pragmatists, like scientists, can maintain that their endeavor is 
objective on the grounds that it converges towards something objective. 
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It allows that a moral judgment may be appropriate in one age of a given 
society, even though it will cease to be appropriate after that society 
progresses or may already be inappropriate in another society9. 
Now another point is that Rorty devotes parts one and two to 
exhaustively exposing the flaws in the traditional interpretations of the 
mind as a mirror of nature (for example, in Descartes and Kant), of 
knowledge as the perspicuous representation of or correspondence to a 
nonhuman and independent reality, (corresponding theory of truth) and 
of philosophy as the discipline which evaluates the claims to knowledge 
of the rest of our culture. In the process, he surveys the history of 
epistemology from its Greek origins to its recent demise. Then in part 
three, he sketches out an alternative picture of an "edifying" philosophy 
as opposed to a "systematic" philosophy. He portrays the picture of his 
moral philosophy within "edifying" philosophy and this picture 
becomes very clear in his last writings (such as Philosophy and Social 
Hope). Here, Rorty begins with the following proclamation:  
"There are two principal ways in which reflective 
human beings try, by placing their lives in a larger 
context, to give sense to those lives. The first is by telling 
the story of their contribution to a community. This 
community may be the actual historical one in which 
they live, or another actual one, distant in time and 
place, or a quite imaginary one, consisting perhaps of a 
dozen heroes and heroines selected from history or 
fiction or both. The second way is to describe themselves 
as standing in immediate relation to a nonhuman 
reality. This relation is immediate in the sense that it 
does not derive from a relation between such a reality 
and their tribe, or their nation, or their imagined band 
of comrades. I shall say that stories of the former kind 
exemplify the desire for solidarity, and that stories of the 
latter kind exemplify the desire for objectivity.   Insofar 
as a person is seeking solidarity, he or she does not ask 
about the relation between the practices of the chosen 
community and something outside that community. 
Insofar as he seeks objectivity, he distances himself from 
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the actual persons around him not by thinking of himself 
as a member of some other real or imaginary group,  but 
rather by attaching himself to something which can be 
described without reference to any particular human 
beings" (Rorty 1991b: 21).  
Pragmatism defends the solidarity against objectivity:  
"Pragmatists would like to replace the desire for 
objectivity – the desire to be in touch with a reality 
which is more than some community with which we 
identify ourselves – with the desire for solidarity with 
that community. They think that the habits of relying 
upon persuasion rather than force, of respect for the 
opinions of colleagues, of curiosity and eagerness for 
new data and ideas, are the only virtues scientists have. 
They do not think that there is an intellectual virtue 
called ‘rationality’ over and above these moral virtues" 
(Rorty 1991b:39).  
It can also be said that solidarity has particular relation with moral 
progress. For Rorty, we can even find some moral virtues in scientific 
developments. Thus, Rorty suggests that “we substitute for familiar 
discussions of scientific method an inclination to praise the sciences for 
their frequently exhibited moral virtues and for their contributions to 
human solidarity” (Guignon & Hiley 2003:91). 
Rorty, in fact, develops his notion of solidarity as the foundation of 
a liberal culture in direct confrontation with the main tenets of Kant’s 
moral philosophy. Although one possesses a skeptic attitude towards 
the existence of a common human nature, this does not, in Rorty’s 
opinion, remove the fact that we have a particular kind of “moral 
obligation to feel a sense of solidarity with all other human beings.” 
This is an important principle particularly for Rorty, because the liberal 
society outlined by him rests on its wide ranging recognition. 
Solidarity, according to him, is not something pre-existing that we 
can find outside in life-world, yet it is something that needs to be 
created by the "imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow 
sufferers" (Rorty 1996: xvi). Therefore, to Rorty, there is no solidarity 
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objectively in the world. He proposes that we can create it among our 
fellow sufferers. 
Rorty's solidarity is, by no means, achieved by philosophical inquiry 
or reflection, or by removing prejudice and achieving any supposed 
objectivity. Rather, it is actively created through using the imagination 
to see and describe others as fellow sufferers, sensitizing ourselves to 
the pain, and in particular humiliation, of other human beings. Then, for 
creating solidarity, there is no need for a lager shared power such as 
God, Truth, or rationality which has to be invoked in order to 
demonstrate that we all share something in common (Rorty 1996: 91). 
Rorty’s call for putting aside the quest for metaphysical foundations for 
solidarity comes not only from his pragmatist philosophy; it also builds 
on the practical ethos common to human beings. Rorty clearly denies 
the essence of human as one of the sources of moral laws. He seems to 
replace traditional morality with Nietzsche and Levinasian vision. 
Traditional morality from Socrates to Levinas – in the Platonic-
Aristotelian-Christian traditions – tends to interpret morality as the 
means to the fulfillment of a fixed or unchanged nature of human. 
According to this view, there is no fixed essence of human. Rorty 
accepts this view and he becomes an anti-essentialist philosopher. 
Therefore, Rorty's concept of self-creation begins with a rejection of the 
traditional idea of a fixed or essential human nature. That is, this neo-
pragmatist philosopher begins with a radical sense of sociological and 
historical contingency of the self (Huang 2009: 229). In other words, he 
doesn't believe that all humans have a common nature. In this area, he 
was inspired by criticisms provided by Hegel’s historicism, Nietzsche’s 
attack on metaphysics and Derrida’s deconstruction of logocentrism. 
Here, Rorty speaks of a ‘de-theologized and de-philosophized’ 
notion of solidarity, in which solidarity is not a characteristic of 
human’s fixed nature but the effect of a process of acculturation 
developed in specific historical circumstances. Imagination would also 
contribute to the cultivation of the ‘feeling’of solidarity as an 
‘expansive sense of solidarity’ would be the offspring of the 
‘imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers.’ In this 
context, Rorty defines ethics as ‘the ability to notice, and identify with 
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pain and humiliation’, and portrays a ‘greater human solidarity’ as the 
main path to moral progress. 
Moral progress 
Rorty holds that the task of moral education is not to overcome one's 
natural feelings and emotions, but to expand it. To create solidarity is 
to be sensitive to the pain and sufferings of other people. He claims that 
moral progress is a matter of ever-present sympathy with others. 
Increasing sympathy leads, Rorty claims, to creation of solidarity. Rorty 
suggests that “it is best to think of moral progress as a matter of 
increasing sensitivity, increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger 
and larger variety of people and things. Just as pragmatists see scientific 
progress not as the gradual attenuation of a veil of appearances which 
hides the intrinsic nature of reality from us, but as the increasing ability 
to respond to the concerns of larger groups of people… so they see 
moral progress as a matter of being able to respond to the needs of ever 
more inclusive groups of people” (Rorty, 1999:81). Is his view similar 
to a Benthamian utilitarianism? Obviously, Jeremy Bentham and the 
utilitarian program are obvious points of origin for Rorty's political and 
moral outlook. Utilitarianism, the ethics of the "greatest happiness 
principle", is probably the best known system of making decisions. 
Basically, according to the utilitarian, those actions are good which 
maximize happiness in our society and those actions are bad which 
minimize happiness and cause pain. In other words, Utilitarianism is 
the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by its 
contribution to overall utility: that is, its contribution to happiness or 
pleasure as summed among all persons. Rorty was quite aware of it: 
“utilitarians like me think that morality is the attempt to decrease the 
amount of suffering among human beings”10. 
Moral progress happens in history and that is why it is a historical 
contingency. Rorty says: "in the course of history, we clever animals 
have acquired new desires, and we have become quite different from 
our animal ancestors, for our cleverness has not only enabled us to 
adjust means to ends, it has enabled us to imagine new ends, to dream 
up new ideals. Nietzsche, when he described the effects of the cooling 
off of the sun, wrote: “And so the clever animals had to die.”" (Rorty 
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2010:13). Rorty’s approach to moral progress is upon our 
understanding of social and historical conditions which we can change 
some conditions. Also he holds that:  
"My position entails that feelings of solidarity are 
necessarily a matter of which similarities and 
dissimilarities strike us as salient, and that such 
salience is a function of a historically contingent final 
vocabulary… The view I am offering says that there is 
such a thing as moral progress, and that this progress 
is indeed in the direction of greater human solidarity. 
But the solidarity is not thought of as recognition of a 
core self, the human essence, in all human beings. 
Rather, it is thought of as the ability to see more and 
more traditional differences… as unimportant when 
compared with similarities with respect to pain and 
humiliation – the ability to think of people wildly 
different from ourselves as included in the range of 
“us”. That is why I said… that detailed descriptions of 
particular varieties of pain and humiliation (in, e.g., 
novels or ethnographies), rather than philosophical or 
religious treatises, were the modern intellectual’s 
principle contributions to moral progress" (Rorty 
1989:192). 
For Rorty, moral progress is not a matter of increasing moral 
knowledge whereas modern philosophers such as Kant, Rorty says, 
who see morals as resting on metaphysical questions like "but is there 
a God?" or "do human beings really have these rights?" presuppose that 
moral progress is at least in part a matter of increasing moral 
knowledge, knowledge about something independent of our social 
practices: something like the will of God or the nature of humanity 
(Rorty 1999: 84). Unlike Kant, Rorty is almost closer to Hume11 than 
other modern philosophers, because, for the latter, morality is a matter 
of sentiment not reason.  
Sentiment and imagination in moral progress are two interrelated 
concepts that Rorty has included in his view of moral philosophy. His 
point is that moral progress is not a matter of an increase in rationality, 
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nor does it involve developing what Dewey called intelligence. The 
crucial factor is sympathy, how widely one is willing to draw the limits 
of one’s moral community. Thus, moral progress for Rorty is a matter 
of increasing “sensitivity” and one’s responsiveness to “the concerns of 
ever larger groups of people” (Rorty 1999: 81). Moreover, Rorty 
repeatedly and strongly insists that our commitment to human rights 
and other fundamental moral principles (like justice) cannot be 
effectively justified by resorting to universal rationality and rational 
laws but instead depend on shared emotions and sentiments. What 
makes us moral is that we feel our common emotions like empathy, 
suffering, etc. Rorty clearly claims that moral progress is this progress 
of sentiments. For example, we can imaginatively feel ourselves "in the 
shoes of the despised and the oppressed" (Rorty 2001: 358). 
The most important message in moral progress, according to him, is 
that cruelty and suffering should not be existing in liberal democracy. 
Rorty believed that "a democracy is distinguished not only by its form 
of government, but also by the presence of institutions such as free 
press, free universities, and an independent judiciary. These intuitions 
help the nation come to grasp with the existence of previously 
unrecognized forms of cruelty and suffering: the cruelty of whites 
against blacks, for example, or the suffering of gays. In a fully 
democratic society, unnecessary suffering would not exist (Rorty 
2006:81-2). Of course, note that the condemnation of cruelty does not 
mean that liberal democracy will prevent the suffering, cruelty, and 
humiliation in democratic societies because suffering, cruelty, and 
humiliation cannot be eliminated from human life, but can be 
decreased. Therefore, it is clearly evident that suffering, cruelty, and 
humiliation cannot be totally ignored, playing important roles in Rorty's 
moral philosophy.  
Conclusion 
To put things in perspective building on the above, it can certainly not 
be said that Rorty, this neo-pragmatist thinker, is like Kant, a moral 
philosopher. Therefore, one can attest that the answer to this question 
will not be easy. Rorty has a special moral philosophy that does not 
refer to or correspond with any Kantian or Christian morality. Rorty is 
standing on Darwin’s and Dewey's shoulders. However, his moral 
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philosophy is based upon Darwinian-Deweyian ethics none of which 
has any metaphysical foundations. As already mentioned, Darwinism 
as one of his principles of Rorty's thought, manifests itself in moral 
topics. According to Rorty moral consciousness as a historical 
conditioned is a product of social and political consciousness. Of 
course, this does not mean that he is not a Marxist thinker because the 
grand narrative has no place in his philosophy. Two points arise here: 
obviously, Darwinism and historicism are both components of Rorty’s 
philosophy. Also moral progress and solidarity are interrelated concepts 
in his moral philosophy. Rorty’s assertion of the contingency of self and 
his appropriation of the Freudian conception of the self will serve as a 
basis for a discussion of Kantian versus Deweyan morality, moral 
deliberation and, finally, Rorty’s notions concerning cruelty and human 
solidarity. If anyone wants to know what pragmatic ethics is, he must 
directly listen to these among Rorty's words: "I don’t think pragmatists 
have a special ethics. They have, if you like, a special meta-ethics. That 
is, they’re dubious about the distinction between morality and 
prudence. Immanuel Kant is still the greatest influence on academic 
moral philosophy. If you read Kant, you think of morality as a very 
special, distinct phenomenon having little in common with anything 
else in culture. Dewey wrote book after book saying we don’t need a 
great big distinction between morality and everything else; we don’t 
even need a great big distinction between morality and prudence. It’s 
all a matter of solving the problems that arise in relations between 
human beings. When these problems become acute we call them moral 
problems, when they don’t become acute we call them prudential 
problems. It’s a matter of importance rather than, as Kant thought, a 
difference between reason and emotion, or reason and sentiment, or the 
a priori and the a posteriori, or the philosophical and the empirical, and 
so on. Basically what Dewey did for moral philosophy was just to help 
gets rid of Kant. I don’t think the pragmatists have any further 
contribution to make to ethics"12. I think that the question this paper 
raises is an open question and Rorty is a moral philosopher unlike 
Kantian or Christian or even utilitarian moral philosophers. He wants 
us to embrace social life back so that we can live in peace with others 
and in this life we do not resort to philosophical principles to make life 
better, but our motto is one thing, and that is solidarity with other 
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people, whether Muslims or Christians or Buddhists, etc. According to 
him, experiencing solidarity with others is the basis of a democratic 
society and should be strengthened so that moral life could improve, 
namely, the reduction of all forms of cruelty and suffering through 
strengthening our moral solidarity with others, which is the central aim 
of Rorty's moral philosophy. Despite Rorty’s pragmatist eschewal of a 
theory of the Good and a foundationalist morality, he can be seen as a 
moralist. Finally, it can be said that his morality is similar to a 
postmodern ethics. 
Notes 
1 . Both Rorty and Levinas are critics of a foundation-orientated metaphysics. 
Rorty plays down the question of the final foundation by showing that it is 
asked from a metaphysical tendency which is better resisted. Metaphysical 
foundations are not necessary and not desirable. Not necessary, because our 
actions do not change through their presence or absence.  
2 . Foucault, like Rorty, was an anti-representationalist and historicist thinker. 
See: Chandra Kumar, (2005) "Foucault and Rorty on Truth and Ideology : A 
Pragmatist View from the Left", in Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 2, No. 1 
(June 2005), 35–93  
3 . History of essentialism is long. We know that "essentialism originated from 
Parmenides, Plato, and specially Aristotle, but has declined since the criticism 
of British empiricism beginning in the seventeenth century. It was revived in 
the middle of the twentieth century and is represented in particular by Kripke. 
Contemporary essentialism claims that some properties of an object are 
essential to it and that so long as it exists, the object could not fail to have 
them." See also, Bunnin, Nicholas & Yu, Jiyuan (2008) The Blackwell 
Dictionary of Western Philosophy (John Wiley & Sons).      
4. See "Dewey between Hegel and Darwin" by Richard Rorty In Herman J. 
Saatkamp (ed.), Rorty & Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His 
Critics. Vanderbilt University Press (1995) 
5 . Look at: “Freud and Moral Reflection.” In Essays on Heidegger and 
Others.Vol. 2, Philosophical Papers, 143–163. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991 
6 . I think that the most clear description was found in the following book: 
Hall, David L.(1994) Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism, SUNY Press 
7 . Of course, he has raised the issue of holism 
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8 . Deontology is an approach to ethics that focuses on the rightness or 
wrongness of actions themselves, as opposed to the rightness or wrongness of 
the consequences of those actions. It argues that decisions should be made 
considering the factors of one's duties and other's rights (the Greek 'deon' 
means 'obligation' or 'duty'). 
9 . For more see:  LaFollette, Hugh (2000). "Pragmatic ethics". In LaFollette, 
Hugh. The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 400–419 
10 .Rorty, Richard (2012) "the moral purposes of the university: an 
exchange", http://www.iasc-
culture.org/THR/archives/University/2.3IRortyetal.pdf. 
11 . In making sentiment the primary constituent of a common moral identity, 
Rorty invokes the legacy of David Hume. That Hume's’s thought is a source 
of protopragmatist stirrings is nothing new; William James suggested as much 
in the 1898 essay credited with launching the pragmatist tradition. For further 
study, see: Rasmussen, Dennis. C (2013) The Pragmatic Enlightenment: 
Recovering the Liberalism of Hume, Smith, Montesquieu, and Voltaire 
(Cambridge University Press) 
12 . For more see: an interview with Richard Rorty in Philosophy Now 2016 
at https://philosophynow.org/issues/43/Richard_Rorty 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74/   Philosophical Investigations, Fall & Winter 2015/ Vol. 9/ No. 17    
 
References 
Guignon, Charles and Hiley, David R. (2003), Richard Rorty, 
(Cambridge University Press). 
Huang, Yong (2009), Rorty, Pragmatism, and Confucianism: With 
Responses by Richard Rorty, (SUNY Press).  
Kuipers, Ronald A. (2013), Richard Rorty, A&C Black. 
Kumar, Chandra (2005), "Foucault and Rorty on Truth and Ideology:  
A Pragmatist View from the Left", in Contemporary Pragmatism 
Vol. 2, No. 1 (June 2005), 35–93. 
Rorty, Richard (2010), An ethics for today: finding common ground 
between philosophy and religion, foreword by Jeffrey W. Robbins, 
introduction by Gianni Vattimo(Columbia University Press). 
--------------------- (1999), Philosophy and Social Hope (Penguin 
Publisher). 
--------------------- (1991a), Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: 
Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
--------------------- (1989), Contingency, irony, and solidarity. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
--------------------- (1998), Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers ،
Volume 3. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
--------------------- (1991b), Essays on Heidegger and others. 
Philosophical Papers Volume 2. (Camebridge University Press). 
------------------- (2007), Philosophy as Cultural Politics: Philosophical 
Papers Volume 4(Cambridge University Press). 
-------------------- (1999), Philosophy and Social Hope (Penguin, 1999). 
-------------------- (1996), "Responses." In Deconstruction and 
Pragmatism, ed. Chantal Mouffe. (London and New York: 
Routledge). 
"Dewey between Hegel and Darwin" by Richard Rorty In Herman J. 
Saatkamp (ed.), Rorty & Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to 
His Critics. Vanderbilt University Press (1995). 
  
  
 
 
 
University of Tabriz 
Philosophical Investigations 
Fall & Winter 2015/ Vol. 9/ No. 17  
Lakatos and Hersh on Mathematical Proof* 
Hossein Bayat** 
PhD in Pilosophy, Department of Philosophy of Science, Science and 
Research Branch of Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran. 
Abstract  
The concept of Mathematical Proof has been controversial for the past few 
decades. Different philosophers have offered different theories about the 
nature of Mathematical Proof, among which theories presented by Lakatos 
and Hersh have had significant similarities and differences with each other. 
It seems that a comparison and critical review of these two theories will lead 
to a better understanding of the concept of mathematical proof and will be a 
big step towards solving many related problems. Lakatos and Hersh argue 
that, firstly, “mathematical proof” has two different meanings, formal and 
informal; and, secondly, informal proofs are affected by human factors, such 
as individual decisions and collective agreements. I call these two thesis, 
respectively, “proof dualism” and “humanism”. But on the other hand, their 
theories have significant dissimilarities and are by no means equivalent. 
Lakatos is committed to linear proof dualism and methodological humanism, 
while Hersh’s theory involves some sort of parallel proof dualism and 
sociological humanism. According to linear proof dualism, the two main 
types of proofs are provided in order to achieve a common goal: incarnation 
of mathematical concepts and methods and truth. However, according to the 
parallel proof dualism, two main types of proofs are provided in order to 
achieve two different types of purposes: production of a valid sequence of 
signs (the goal of the formal proof) and persuasion of the audience (the goal 
of the informal proof). Hersh’s humanism is informative and indicates 
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A formalistic definition of "mathematical proof" which is frequently 
seen in various related courses and textbooks is something like: A 
finite sequence of sentences in a formal language, arranged by a 
certain set of rules (each sentence in the sequence is either an axiom 
or an assumption or follows from the preceding sentences in the 
sequence by a rule of inference). 
But this definition is neither inclusive nor exclusive. It’s not 
inclusive because mathematicians sometimes use the term “proof” to 
refer to arguments that do not satisfy the formalistic definition. There 
are visual proofs, computer-assisted proofs and heuristic proofs. On 
the other hand, the definition is not even exclusive for some 
mathematicians and philosophers. For example, intuitionists do not 
accept the validity of non-constructive proofs even though those 
proofs can still satisfy the criteria of the formal definition (some lines 
of the argument can be inferred directly from the principle of excluded 
middle without being constructed or inferred from preceding formulas 
in the sequence). As another example, social constructionists believe 
that an unpersuasive argument should not be called a “proof”; 
whereas, there is no such condition in the formal definition of proof. 
Such and similar problems have motivated theoreticians to look for 
better or less problematic definitions. One such attempt is to embrace 
dualism and use the disjunction of the formalistic definition and one 
or more other complementary definitions to craft a disjunctive 
definition of “proof”. A disjunctive definition of a concept C is the 
disjunction of a number of subdefinitions, each of which covers only a 
subset of the concept’s extension (whereas, the whole disjunction 
covers the complete extension). In this case, the disjunctive definition 
of proof will look like: “A finite sequence of sentences in a formal 
language, arranged by a certain set of rules OR …”. Using disjunctive 
definitions to define a concept is appropriate when the concept in 
question is not mononuclear. 
The definitions of mathematical proof independently developed by 
Lakatos and Hersh are both disjunctive definitions. By accepting the 
formalistic subdefinition as one part of their subjunctive definitions, in 
contrast to intuitionists, they acknowledge the validity of all classical 
arguments, including the non-constructive proofs. However, in 
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contrast to formalists and Platonists, by adding some humanistic 
subdefinition of proof, which takes either psychological or 
sociological parameters into account, they evidently highlight the role 
of human factors in any acceptable definition of proof. In their 
account, the inadequacy of the classical (formalistic) definition was 
mainly caused by neglecting such human factors. The purpose of this 
essay is to introduce Lakatos’ and Hersh’s definitions, to compare 
them with a critical approach and to show that despite having 
similarities in regard to their dualist and humanistic approaches, their 
definitions have significant dissimilarities and are by no means 
equivalent. 
It’s worth noting that the controversy over the definition of proof is 
conceptual. This kind of controversy can be solved (though never 
fully resolved or settled) by a critical comparison of rival theories and 
definitions or sometimes even by introducing new definitions. A 
solution in this case consists of clarifying the philosophical and logical 
implications of the controversial concept in question, eliminating 
misunderstandings and getting closer to a mutual understanding 
between the proponents of the rival theories. In this sense, it seems 
that a critical study and comparison of these two theories will help us 
achieve a better understanding of the concept of mathematical proof 
and mathematics (in general) and even make a big step towards 
solving some relevant problems (about proof) in Paramathematics1 
and computer sciences. 
Hersh’s Theory 
In “The Mathematical Experience” (1981) Ruben Hersh and Phillip 
Davis use a fictional dialogue between an ideal mathematician (I.M.) 
and a student (Student) to examine the concept of proof. Student asks 
I.M. what a mathematical proof consists of. 
I.M.: […] Anyhow, what you do is, you write down the 
axioms of your theory in a formal language with a given 
list of symbols or alphabet. Then you write down the 
hypothesis of your theorem in the same symbolism. Then 
you show that you can transform the hypothesis step by 
step, using the rules of logic, till you get the conclusion. 
That’s a proof. 
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Student: Really? That’s amazing!… I’ve never seen that done. 
I.M.: Oh! Of course no one ever really does it. It would 
take forever! You just show that you could do it, that’s 
sufficient (Davis &Hersh, 1990:39). 
But Student, who is not convinced with the answer, keeps asking 
for a definition of proof.  
I.M.: Well, it’s an argument that convinces someone who 
knows the subject. 
Student: someone who knows the subject? Then the 
definition of proof is subjective; it depends on particular 
persons. … 
I.M: No, no. there’s nothing subjective about it! 
Everybody knows what a proof is. Just read some books, 
take courses from a competent mathematician, and you’ll 
catch on. 
… 
Student: Then you decide what a proof is, and if I don’t 
learn to decide in the same way, you decide I don’t have 
any aptitude. 
I.M: If not me, then who? (Davis &Hersh, 1990:40) 
In this dialogue, IM implicitly admits that the formalistic definition 
of proof does not adequately describe the proofs we use in practice; 
meanwhile he fails to present an objective definition for it. In return, 
he offers a criterion (Persuasiveness and institutional legitimacy) to 
verify the validity of a given proof. 
In his “What Is Mathematics, Really?” (1997), Hersh takes a 
clearer stance: 
Mathematical proof” has two meanings. In practice, it’s 
one thing. In principle, it’s another. We show student what 
proof is in practice. We tell them what it is in principle. 
[…]. Meaning number 1, the practical meaning, is 
informal, imprecise. Practical mathematical proof is what 
we do to make each other believe our theorems. It’s 
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argument that convinces the qualified, skeptical expert. 
[…] meaning number 2, theoretical mathematical proof is 
formal. […] it’s transformation of certain symbol 
sequences (formal sentences) according to certain rules of 
logic (modus ponens, etc.). (Hersh, 1997:49) 
Olsker adds the following explanation to clarify Hersh’s standpoint 
on the subject: 
The practical meaning implies that proof has a subjective 
side; the goal of a proof is to convince the mathematical 
community of the truth of a theorem.  That is, mathematics 
is a human endeavor, since proofs are written, read, 
understood, verified, and used by humans.(Olsker, 2011:36) 
There are three points that need to be taken into consideration: 
First, we should not think that the informal and imprecise nature of 
practical proofs makes them non-rigorous as well. Hersh has 
repeatedly emphasized that the meaning of rigorous proof needs to be 
refined to include proofs adequately supported with machine 
computations or numerical evidences as well as those with strong 
probabilistic algorithms (Hersh, 1997:58). 
In his “Proof: Its Nature and Significance” (2008), Detlefsen offers 
a better understanding of rigor. First of all, he emphasizes that 
formalization and rigor are mutually independent. “The prevailing 
view of proof sees rigor as a necessary feature of proof and 
formalizability as a necessary condition of rigor.” (Detlefsen, 
2008:16) “Rigorous proof, on this view, is reasoning all of whose 
inferences track purely logical relations between concepts. (Detlefsen, 
2008:17) 
This can explain the traditional and common misbelief that rigor 
and precision of a mathematical proof should necessitate its 
independence of empirical experiences as well as intuition, natural 
language and common sense (and consequently, the belief that 
“rigorous” and “formal” are co-extensional). Detlefsen holds that the 
traditional belief mentioned above stemmed from the dominance of 
formalism and syntacticalism during the late 19 and early 20th 
centuries. He then offers an alternate account of mathematical 
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precision by disconnecting it from formalization and explaining it in 
terms of explanatory content. He argues that a similar viewpoint exists 
even in the traditional approach according to which a mathematical 
argument is considered to be of the highest precision only when it has 
the highest explanatory potential. In fact, while avoiding the possible 
gaps in an argument, we achieve the highest level of certainty only 
when the premises of the argument can explain its results successfully. 
In Detlefsen’s account, the precision of an argument is tied with its 
explanatory potential. The more precise and rigorous an argument can 
be, the better its premises can explain the result. When the explanatory 
potential becomes more transparent, we are more content to add 
missing information to close the gaps between premises and the result; 
while on the other hand, adding more formalization to the argument 
will decrease the level of transparency and precision along with it. 
Hence: “A reexamination of the commonly presumed connection(s) 
between rigor and formalization would thus seem to be in order.” 
(Detlefsen, 2008:19) 
It can now be seen that practical proofs, for their high transparency, 
can be of such a great and unmatchable help for understanding and 
developing mathematics in its generality as well as specific 
procedures like hypothesizing, finding contradictions, creative 
reasoning and conceptualizing. Understanding something is nothing 
but explaining it in a successful and efficient way. This result leads us 
to the second important point: We should not think of practical proofs 
as “pseudo-proofs”, “immature proofs”, “fake”, “second class” or anything 
of the sort. On the contrary, practical proofs make mathematics 
progress. They are what mathematicians call “proof”. Formal proofs 
should be actually called “logical proofs” rather than “mathematical 
proofs”: “Real-life proof is informal” (Hersh, 1997:57) Therefore, 
practical proofs, despite being informal, are rigorous and explanatory. 
They play an unmatchable role in the progress of mathematics and 
they are what mathematicians refer to as “proof” in practice. 
The third point in understanding Hersh’s theory is that proofs in 
addition to their logical and lingual aspects have mental aspects as 
well. Hersh uses the terms “convince”, “convincing” and “being 
convinced” to highlight this aspect of the debate. Olsker has also 
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correctly emphasized on the same point. In addition to these all, it also 
seems that we need to emphasize on the social aspects of proofs. The 
fourth important point is a proof’s institutional legitimacy as distinct 
from the mental persuasiveness or convincing power. Olsker though 
seems to have neglected this distinction and mixed the mental and 
social (and institutional) aspects of the debate together: 
As pointed  out  by Davis and Hersh above, and by others, 
when  a  mathematician reads  a  proof to  determine  its  
validity,  he or  she makes that  determination based on 
whether or not he or she finds the proof to  be convincing. 
That is, the mathematician makes a judgment based on 
subjective criteria. The Clay Mathematics Institute, which 
offers a one million dollar prize for a proof of any one of 
seven mathematical conjectures, stipulates that any proof 
must be published and accepted by the community of 
mathematicians for two years before a prize will be 
awarded. Because the validity of a proof depends on 
acceptance by mathematicians, that validity is inherently 
subjective. (Olsker, 2011:37) 
For a proof to be qualified to win a million dollar prize it has to 
have been published for two years. In a more general sense, a proof 
can be identifiable and referable among mathematician only if it is 
published (it won’t have objective existence if it’s not published). 
Unlike Olsker (above), it seems to us that the validity of proofs is not 
“inherently subjective” if it’s a matter of social and institutional 
credibility. 
In Hersh’s account, not only proofs, but also every mathematical 
entity is a socially constructed concept. For example, if a singular 
term in Geometry refers to something objective and abstract for a 
Platonist and refers to basically nothing for a formalist, for Hersh, it 
refers to something in “the social - conceptual world” (Davis &Hersh, 
1990:19) or “the shared conceptual world” (Davis &Hersh, 1990:163). 
He adheres to the Kuhnian belief that scientific change is a change in 
what scientists do in practice, rather than a mere change of theories. 
Hersh sympathizes with Kitcher in generalizing and extending the 
idea into mathematics. He emphasizes that Kuhnian approach is 
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powerful and convincing when applied to the history of mathematics. 
(Hersh, 1997, 225) 
In the scope of what we learned so far about Hersh, we can now 
more easily understand and formulate his disjunctive definition of 
proof. In Hersh’s account, a “proof” should satisfy one of the 
following two conditions:  
- There is a sequence of logically arranged well-formed formulas in a 
formal system (= formal subdefinition); or  
- There is a successfully accomplished practice to convince the 
community of mathematicians (= practical subdefinition). 
In other words, there are two parallel types of proofs: 
- Formal proof: A finite sequence of well-formed formulas each of 
which is either an axiom or an assumption or the product of applying a 
rule of inference to a preceding formula in the sequence. 
- Practical proof: A successful practical attempt or endeavor to 
convince the community of mathematicians to accept the truth of a claim. 
If we label these two subdefinitions with P and Q, the complete 
definition of proof will be “P or Q” and this is what a disjunctive 
definition should look like. It’s needless to add that Hersh can rely on 
the second part of his disjunctive definition for justifying or 
explaining any kind of controversial proofs. 
Lakatos’ theory 
About three decades before Hersh, the Hungarian philosopher, Imre 
Lakatos made similar claims in his book, “Proofs and refutations: the 
logic of mathematical discovery” (1957) and his article, “what does 
mathematical proof prove?” (written between 1959 and 1961). 
Lakatos uses a fictional dialogue as well, though unlike Hersh who 
used various historical examples in his imaginary dialogue between S 
and IM, Lakatos composes a dialogue between a teacher and students 
which particularly concentrates on the heuristic proofs for two 
theorems of Euler and Cauchy. 
At the beginning, the teacher mentions a conjecture he had 
discussed with students earlier (Euler’s conjecture: For any given 
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polyhedron, if V is the number of vertices, E is the number of edges 
and F is the number of faces, the equation V-E+F=2 is always true). 
He says: “We tested it by various methods. But we haven't yet proved 
it.” (Lakatos, 1976:8) Then he presents some kind of heuristic proof 
for it, which he later calls pre-formal proof. 
Teacher: … I have one [(a proof for this theorem)]. It 
consists of the following thought-experiment. 
Step 1: Let us imagine the polyhedron to be hollow, with a 
surface made of thin rubber. If we cut out one of the faces, 
we can stretch the remaining surface flat on the 
blackboard, without tearing it. The faces and edges will be 
deformed, the edges may become curved, but V and E will 
not alter, so that if and only if V - E + F = 2 for the original 
polyhedron, V - E + F = 1 for this flat network … [(fig. 1)].  
Step 2: Now we triangulate our map — it does indeed look 
like a geographical map. We draw (possibly curvilinear) 
diagonals in those (possibly curvilinear) polygons which 
are not already (possibly curvilinear) triangles. By drawing 
each diagonal we increase both E and F by one, so that the 
total V-E+F will not be altered … [(fig. 2)]. 
 Step 3: From the triangulated network we now remove the 
triangles one by one. To remove a triangle we either 
remove an edge- upon which one face and one edge 
disappear, or we remove two edges and a vertex - upon 
which one face, two edges and one vertex disappear…  
[(fig. 3)]. 
 
 
T
       fig. 1                                                 fig. 2                                                   fig. 3 
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hus if V - E + F = 1 before a triangle is removed, it remains 
so after the triangle is removed. At the end of this 
procedure we get a single triangle. For this V - E + F = 1 
holds true. Thus we have proved our conjecture. 
DELTA: You should now call it a theorem. … . 
ALPHA: …, But how am I to know that it can be 
performed for any polyhedron? For instance, are you sure, 
Sir, that any polyhedron, after having a face removed, can 
be stretched flat on the blackboard? I am dubious about 
your first step. (Lakatos, 1976, pp.8-9) 
Students Beta and Gamma also shed doubts on second and third 
steps of the experiment. The teacher then admits that he is not sure of 
any of those steps and those doubts can be well-grounded. 
TEACHER: I admit that the traditional name 'proof' for 
this thought-experiment may rightly be considered a bit 
misleading. I do not think that it establishes the truth of the 
conjecture. 
DELTA: What does it do then? What do you think a 
mathematical proof proves? 
TEACHER: This is a subtle question which we shall try to 
answer later. Till then I propose to retain the time-honored 
technical term 'proof' for a thought-experiment - or 'quasi-
experiment' - which suggests a decomposition of the 
original conjecture into subconjectures or lemmas, thus 
embedded it in a possibly quite distant body of knowledge. 
Our ‘proof ‘, for instance, has embedded the original 
conjecture - about crystals, or, say, solids - in the theory of 
rubber sheets. Descartes or Euler, the fathers of the original 
conjecture, certainly did not even dream of this.” (Lakatos, 
1976:10) 
Lakatos repeats this proof in the formerly mentioned article (“what 
does mathematical proof prove?”) too and this time using a 
monologue discourse he takes a clear stance in regard to the nature of 
mathematical proof. In Lakatos account, mathematical proofs are 
basically of three different types: 
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- Pre-formal proofs (the first type): These are proofs presented before 
a formal system is fully developed, just like the proof of the Euler’s 
conjecture we observed above. Lakatos’ proof for the Euler’s 
conjecture may look artificial but he shows that this kind of proof is 
found in abundance in mathematics (another example is the proof for 
Cauchy’s theorem). 
- Formal proofs (the second type): These are proofs in a developed 
formal system. This type of proof fits well in the formalistic definition 
of proof. An example is the proof of the following equation in 
Zermelo’s formal system: A(BC) = (AB)(AC) 
- Post-formal proofs (the third type): These are proofs of meta-
theorems of a formal system in absence of any meta-theory or formal 
meta-system. Examples of this type of proof are the proofs of the 
undecidability theorems in logic and the principle of duality in 
projective geometry. 
Even though Lakatos says that mathematical proofs are essentially 
of three different types: pre-formal; formal and the post-formal, it is 
not hard to see that two of these three types - the pre-formal and post-
formal proofs - are both “informal” proofs, as distinct from the formal 
type of proofs. Lakatos holds that informal proofs render a lower level 
of certainty compared to formal ones, but they also prove statements 
and theorems that are clearer and more tangible. They prove things 
that mathematicians are really interested in. Formal proofs, on the 
other hand, are absolutely reliable; though sadly, it’s not always clear 
what their reliability is actually about. (Lakatos, 1978:69) 
We can summarize Lakatos’ theory here. There are two general 
types of proofs: Formal proofs and informal proofs. 
- Formal proof: a process that proves a sentence in a formal system 
using the system’s axioms and rules of inference in the form of a finite 
sequence of well-formed formulas starting with axioms or premises 
and ending with the desired result. 
- Informal proof: a process that shows the truth of a statement with 
heuristic reasoning. In other words, it uses a correct mental experience 
to analyze the main statement to simpler and more evident statements 
until counter examples (if any) appear, concepts are detected and 
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clarified and eventually an informal mathematical theory is shaped 
and finally, the desired statement shows up as an outcome of this 
theory. 
Somewhat similar to the points we made about Hersh’s theory, 
there are also three important points about Lakatos’ theory: 
First and foremost, the same point we made about the rigor and 
precision of Hersh’s practical proofs also hold about Lakatos’ 
informal proofs. If a proof is informal, it doesn’t mean that it is 
imprecise. In particular, if we take Detlefsen’s viewpoint about the 
relation between precision and explanatory power and transparency 
into account and compare Lakatos’ heuristic argument for Euler’s 
theorem with it, we can see that proof is reasonably precise. The 
cuttings, making triangles and then omitting those triangles one after 
another can explain the result (V-E+F=2) fairly well. However, in all 
such heuristic and informal proofs, there is always a chance that some 
hidden assumptions are neglected or remained unsaid (in this case, the 
assumption that the polyhedron has no cavity), but this level of 
fallibility doesn’t make it any less proof; it just makes it different from 
a formal proof and leads to the conclusion that informal proofs (unlike 
the formal ones) are falsifiable and that’s why they can be called 
“quasi-empirical”. Basically, we are facing some synthetic and “a 
posteriori” element in it, as opposed to something purely analytic and 
“a priori”. 
The second important point is that Lakatos has presented historical 
and empirical evidences for the existence of informal proofs. This is 
important because Lakatos’ proof for Euler theorem might look 
artificial at the first sight and generalizing the concept to the real 
world of mathematics might seem dubious. In fact, he uses his 
example to elaborate the difference between informal and formal 
proofs, but then he offers real and historical examples as well. In 
particular, he mentions and explains the heuristic proof for Cauchy’s 
theorem and the concept of uniform convergence. (Lakatos, 1976:144) 
The third important point about informal proofs is that in addition 
to be valid independent from the formal definition of validity, they 
even play an immensely important role to help mathematicians pick 
the right formal axioms to construct formal systems. From this point 
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of view, it can be said that informal proofs provide the base and 
foundation for validity of formal proofs. Lakatos holds that pre-formal 
proofs are an important part of the procedure to make informal 
mathematical theories, which are the main base and source for 
construction of formal systems. (Lakatos, 1978:62) 
Similarities and differences 
Hersh and Lakatos accept the formalistic definition of proof, though 
they don’t believe it to be adequate. Therefore, each of them adds an 
informal subdefinition to it and constructs a new definition in form of 
a disjunction. The idea behind this type of disjunctive definition is 
rooted in a more basic and fundamental doctrine in regard to the 
nature of any given concept (such as proof), which can be called 
“Dualism”. Dualism, in general, is any theory that recognizes two and 
only two independent and mutually irreducible principles or entities or 
meanings, which are sometimes complementary and sometimes in 
conflict. I am using the word “proof dualism” with the same 
considerations: “mathematical proof” has two and only tow 
independent and mutually irreducible meanings. We can see that 
Lakatos and Hersh are proof dualist. Had they believed that all proofs 
share a single and unique essence, they would have definitely 
formulated a new, but unique definition to replace the classical and 
traditional one. That’s actually what Kitcher does. He says: “Proofs 
are sequences of sentences which […] codify psychological 
processes which can produce a priori knowledge of the 
theorem proved.” (Kitcher, 1989:37) 
In addition to the structural similarity mentioned above, both Hersh 
and Lakatos share the idea that mathematics is a human activity. 
Lakatos emphasizes “mathematical activity is a human activity” 
(Lakatos, 1976:146). Hersh calls this understanding of mathematics 
“Humanism” and says: “I use "humanism" to include all philosophies 
that see mathematics as a human activity, a product, and a 
characteristic of human culture and society.” (Hersh, 1997: xi) He 
then presents a list of old and modern humanists in the history, which 
includes Lakatos as well: Aristotle, Locke, Hume, Mill, Peirce, 
Sellars, Wittgenstein, Popper, Lakatos, Tymoczko and Kitcher. Hersh 
is a humanist and calls his own approach “Social-historical approach” 
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(Hersh, 1997: 24) and says: “Mathematics is human. It's part of and 
fits into human culture.” (Hersh, 1997: 22) 
One of the most important implications of such as approach is that 
our cultural needs and values play an important role in convincing the 
community of mathematicians and that the study of the concept of 
proof cannot be fully accomplished without a cultural and historical 
study of mathematics. In other words, definition of proof requires 
historical and sociological elements beside logic and syntax. 
There are different versions of proof or rigor, depending 
on time, place, and other things. The use of computers in 
proofs is a nontraditional rigor. Empirical evidence, 
numerical experimentation, probabilistic proof all help us 
decide what to believe in mathematics. Aristotelian logic 
isn’t always the only way to decide. (Hersh, 1997: 22) 
That’s why (along with Kitcher) Hersh construes activities of 
mathematicians in a Kuhnian framework. Lakatos, on the other hand, 
considers the study of mathematicians’ methodological goals and 
decisions as complementary to logic and syntax. 
But mathematical activity produces mathematics. 
Mathematics, this product of human activity, ‘alienates 
itself’ from the human activity which has been producing 
it. It becomes a living, growing organism, that acquires a 
certain autonomy from the activity which has produced 
it; it develops its own autonomous laws of growth, its 
own dialectic. The genuine creative mathematician is just 
a personification, an incarnation of these laws which can 
only rely on human action. (Lakatos, 1976:146) 
Let us see how this personification and incarnation is to be 
rendered by mathematicians. We return to the dialogue between 
Teacher and Students and proceed from the point Student Gamma 
proposes a counter example in which the polyhedron has cavity and 
Euler’s conjecture doesn’t hold for it anymore and the theorem must 
surrender to the counter example. Student Delta, however, is not 
happy with this methodological decision: 
Lakatos and Hersh on Mathematical Proof   /89 
 
 
DELTA: But why accept the counter example? We 
proved our conjecture, now it is a theorem. I admit that it 
clashes with this so-called 'counterexample'. One of them 
has to give way. But why should the theorem give way, 
when it has been proved? It is the 'criticism' that should 
retreat. It is fake criticism. This pair of nested cubes is 
not a polyhedron at all. It is a monster a pathological 
case, not a counterexample. 
GAMMA: Why not? A polyhedron is a solid whose 
surface consists of polygonal faces. And my 
counterexample is a solid bounded by polygonal faces. 
TEACHER: Let us call this definition Def. 1 (Lakatos, 
1976, pp.15-16) 
The teacher and students then continue suggesting better 
definitions for simple polyhedron trying to amend the shortcomings of 
the previous definitions at every stage. In the end, after examining 
various counter examples and changing the definition for 6 times, they 
came to the agreement that Euler’s theorem holds for simple convex 
polyhedron.2 
On the surface of the dialogue, Lakatos seems to be describing the 
procedure of defining the concept of polyhedron by the teacher and 
students, but at a deeper layer, he is explaining the process of making 
methodological decisions: When mathematicians encounter counter 
examples, they refine their auxiliary hypotheses to protect the hard 
core of their research program (as per negative heuristics), but if these 
measures fail to resolve the anomalies, they use positive heuristics to 
adjust their concepts and axioms. Lakatos could have followed to 
Kant’s recommendation and stay in the methodological level, but he 
proceeds to the ontological level and uses a Hegelian dialectical 
approach to explain the logic of mathematical discovery (maybe his 
realism and anti-relativist approach is the reason he makes this step to 
ontology). He claims that it is mathematics (itself) which is incarnated 
through the mathematicians’ dialogues and decision-making 
procedures. In fact, for Lakatos, the Hegelian and metaphysical 
concept of heuristics is the base for the Kantian concept of heuristics 
in methodology: “The Hegelian language, which I use here, would I 
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think, generally be capable of describing the various developments in 
mathematics.” (Lakatos, 1976:145) 
For example, when explaining development of mathematics, 
Lakatos uses the rational evolution (thesis, antithesis and synthesis) 
and the technical term, “proof-generated concepts”, which are those 
concepts which are created during a heuristic procedure. Examples of 
such concepts are “simple polyhedron” (in the previously discussed 
example) and “uniform convergence” (in the proof of Cauchy’s 
theorem). 
Lakatos (unlike foundationalists) doesn’t reduce the entire concept 
of proof to logical and lingual elements; however, (unlike Hersh) he 
explains these informal characteristics in terms of an informal logic 
rather than cultural and historical values. Therefore, even though 
Lakatos and Hersh both reject the platonic and foundationalist 
viewpoints and emphasize on human and mental characteristics of 
proof (such as mental experiment, decision making and convincing 
power), Lakatos has a methodological approach, while Hersh’s 
approach is sociological. 
The other difference between Lakatos and Hersh is the relation 
between formal and informal proofs in their theories. For Lakatos, the 
different types of proofs are in a linear and longitudinal relation with 
each other. He has pre-formal, formal and post-formal proofs. Pre-
formal proofs develop in informal theories and help those theories 
develop. On the other hand, formal proofs can only be valid in formal 
systems that have been created on the basis of informal theories, 
which owe their development to informal proofs. Finally, post-formal 
proofs can only exist when formal systems are already developed. 
Hersh, on the other hand, puts informal proofs on a par with formal 
ones and calls them practical proofs. The relation is parallel rather 
than linear. 
In other words, for Lakatos, the informal and formal proofs are in a 
linear relation inside a single research program, namely mathematics. 
For Hersh, formal and practical proofs are two parallel but distinct 
research activities practiced by two different institutions: Formal logic 
and mathematics. 
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Summary and conclusion 
Mathematicians sometimes use the name “proof” for arguments that 
do not satisfy the formalistic definition of proof. Visional proofs, 
computer-assisted proofs and heuristic proofs can be mentioned as 
examples. Lakatos and Hersh are two Philosophers of mathematics 
who attempted to present alternate definitions for “proof” to solve this 
problem. Theories presented by these two philosophers have 
similarities and dissimilarities: 
Similarities: 
1- Proof dualism: “Proof” has two different meanings, formal and 
informal (Hersh prefers to say ‘practical’). Formal proofs are those 
that (more or less) satisfy the classical definition, while informal 
proofs are heuristic and rigorous arguments that have been successful 
in convincing their audience in the community of mathematicians and 
they are valid exactly in this sense and for this achievement. 
According to both Lakatos and Hersh, the disjunction of these two 
definitions results in an overall better definition of “proof”. 
2- Humanism: Lakatos and Hersh share the opinion that 
mathematics (in general) and mathematical proof (in particular) are 
human activities. Mathematics is affected by mathematicians either by 
the methodological decisions they make or by the cultural values they 
embrace. Foundationalism in mathematics indicates a non-human 
point of view. For logicists, mathematics refers to the objective and 
abstract world of sets and is independent from mathematicians and 
their decisions or values. 
Dissimilarities: 
1- Linear Proof dualism vs. Parallel Proof dualism: Lakatos sees 
informal and formal proofs in a linear relation with each other and 
speaks of pre-formal and post-formal proofs; whereas, Hersh holds 
that informal proofs are (Which he calls “practical proof” to 
distinguish them from formal proofs) are on a par with formal proofs. 
Linear proof dualism is based on the assumption that mathematics has 
some standard pattern of evolutionary or historical development – pre 
formal, formal and post formal stages. Accordingly, the two main 
types of proofs are provided in a single organism and in order to 
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achieve a common goal: incarnation of Mathematics (i.e., 
mathematical concepts and methods and truth). However, according to 
the parallel proof dualism, two main types of proofs are provided in 
order to achieve two fundamentally different types of purposes: 
production of a valid sequence of signs and persuasion of the 
audience. 
2- Methodological vs. Sociological Humanism: To explain the 
concept of proof as a human activity, Lakatos emphasizes on 
epistemological and methodological purposes and activities of 
mathematicians; whereas, Hersh concentrates on psychological and 
sociological attributes. Lakatos’ humanism can be explained in the 
scope of Hegelian dialectic, while Hersh’s humanism can be best 
understood in the framework of Kuhn’s scientific revolutions. 
Besides, Hersh’s humanism is informative and indicates pluralism; 
whereas, Lakatos’ version of humanism is normative and monistic. 
Each of these two theories has advantages and disadvantages over 
each other and compared to other rival theories, which are beyond the 
scope of this essay. The main goal I accomplished in this article was 
to introduce and compare Lakatos and Hersh’s theories and clarify 
their fundamental similarities and dissimilarities. As Popper has 
correctly pointed out, two important steps towards the solution of any 
philosophical problem are: (1) composing the solutions and ideas in 
form of theories (Popper, 1996:53) and (2) comparing those theories 
with each other (Popper, 1996:54). 
Notes 
1. By “Paramathematics” I refer to any interdisciplinary field that is 
not a branch of mathematics, but related to it. For example, Philosophy of 
Mathematics, History of Mathematics, Sociology of Mathematics, 
Mathematics Education, etc. 
2. Without cavity and stretchable to a plane, Ibid, 34-36 
 
 
 
 
Lakatos and Hersh on Mathematical Proof   /93 
 
 
References 
Davis, Phillip J., Hersh, Reuben, (1990), The Mathematical 
Experience, Houghton Mifflin.  
Detlefsen, M., (2008) “Proof: Its Nature and Significance”, in Proof 
and Other Dilemmas, Eds: Gold, B., et. al., The Mathematical 
Association of America, pp 3-33. 
Hersh, R., (1997), What Is Mathematics, Really? Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
Kitcher, Philip, (1984), The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, 
Oxford University Press. 
Lakatos, Imre, (1976), Proofs and Refutations: the logic of 
mathematical discovery, Eds: John Worrall, Elie Zahar, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lakatos, Imre, (1978), “Mathematics, science and epistemology” in 
Philosophical Papers vol 2, Eds: John Worrall, Gregory Currie, 
Cambridge University Press, pp 61-69.  
Olsker, T. C., (2011), “What Do We Mean by Mathematical Proof?” 
in Journal of Humanistic Mathematics Vol. 1, No 1, January. 
Popper, Karl R., (1996), “The Myth of The Framework: In defence of 
science and rationality”, Routledge. 
 
  
 
 
 
University of Tabriz 
Philosophical Investigations 
Fall & Winter 2015/ Vol. 9/ No. 17  
Dose the Conceptual Interdependency of Belief and 
Desire Undermine the Normativity of Content?*  
Seyed Ali Kalantari** 
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, 
Esfahan University, Iran 
Abstract  
The normativity of mental content thesis appears to have been influential in 
contemporary philosophy of mind. Paul Boghossian (2003, 2005) has 
developed an argument for the normativity of mental content on the basis of 
two premises, i.e. firstly, the normativity of the notion of belief and secondly, 
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Alexander Miller (2008) has criticised Boghossian’s argument for the 
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of content, Miller has argued that the second premise of Boghossian’s 
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that content is normative even if belief and desire are conceptually 
interdependent.  
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Introduction  
It is widely held that a concept is normative only if it is constitutive of 
our understanding of a statement given that the statement entails an 
ought. In his papers (2003, 2005) Paul Boghossian has developed an 
argument for the thesis that mental content is constitutively normative. 
The argument is criticized by a number of critics. In this paper I will 
address to a key objection against the normativity of content thesis 
proposed by Miller (2008).  
In section one of this paper I will reformulate Boghossian's 
argument for the thesis in details. I will then, in section two, clarify 
Miller's objection against the normativity of content thesis. In sections 
three and four, I will propose a new argument for the normativity of 
content thesis to show that Miller's objection fails.  
1- The normativity of content 
Boghossian's normativity of content thesis can be clarified via the 
following four steps:  
In the first step, Boghossian claims that belief attributions are 
constitutively normative since, “it is a condition on understanding 
them that one understand that one ought to believe that P only if P” 
(Boghossian 2005: 212). In other words, he argues that the concept of 
belief is normative since grasping an attribution of belief for someone 
requires grasping that the attribution implies an ought, i.e. that she 
ought to believe that P only if P. This is called the normativity of 
belief thesis in the literature and is endorsed by many key 
philosophers (see Engel 2001; Gibbard 2003, 2005; Shah 2003; Shah 
and Velleman 2005; Wedgwood 2002). The following example will 
clarify the idea:  
(1) Marco understands that Ebeneezer believes that P. 
According to the normativity of belief thesis implies: 
(2) Marco understands that Ebeneezer ought to believe that P only 
if P. 
In the second step, Boghossian claims that there are no norms 
governing propositional attitudes other than belief. He considers the 
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case of desire and states that desire attributions are not normative: 
“suppose I say of Ebenezer that he wants that Howard Dean be the 
next President. In making this attribution, am I in any way speaking 
oughts? … Ebenezer’s desire has conditions of satisfaction – it will be 
satisfied if and only if Dean is the next president. But, in and of itself, 
this doesn’t translate either into a correctness fact, or in to an ought of 
any kind” (Boghossian 2005: 213). Boghossian notes that of course an 
individual may have a particular desire (for X, say) because she 
believes it to be a way of securing the satisfaction of another desire of 
hers, and hence it might be said that the desire is correct to the extent 
that her belief is true. However it does not show that the desire itself is 
the subject of normative evaluation; rather, this is the underlying 
belief. What Boghossian insists on is that there are no oughts about 
desires by virtue of the mere fact that they are contentful states: “it’s 
not clear to me, then, that there are norms on desire merely qua 
contentful state” (Boghossian 2005: 213). 
From the considerations embodied in the first and second steps, 
Boghossian concludes that what is responsible for the normativity of 
belief attribution relates to the concept of belief and not to the concept 
of content. Since, if content is constitutively normative, all the other 
contentful attitudes, including desire, should be normative too. 
Boghossian clarifies this point as follows: “if it’s genuinely 
constitutive of content that it be normative, shouldn’t it carry this 
normativity with it wherever it goes?” (Boghossian 2005: 212) 
In the third step, Boghossian endorses the idea that our 
understanding of content has to go through understanding the attitudes 
that have contents as their objects: “I take it that the concept of a 
proposition, or content, just is the concept of whatever it is that is the 
object of the attitudes” (Boghossian 2005: 214). This consideration, of 
course, implies that the concept of content may be introduced in 
connection with attitudinal concepts other than that of belief, say, and 
desire. Boghossian, however, asks, “whether any non-belief based 
understanding would covertly presuppose an understanding of its role 
in belief” (2005: 214). This question is considered in the fourth step of 
the argument as follows.  
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In the fourth step, Boghossian argues that the concept of belief is 
indeed prior to the concepts of the other propositional attitudes, 
including the concept of desire: “grasp of the concept of desire seems 
to asymmetrically depend on our grasp of the concept of belief in just 
the way that, I have argued, the normativity of content thesis requires” 
(Boghossian 2005: 215). This consideration implies that we 
understand the role that content plays in propositional attitudes 
generally only through our understanding of its role in belief: “we 
would understand content only through belief, and belief only through 
normative notions” (Boghossian 2005: 214). Boghossian argues that 
since the concept of belief is normative, the concept of mental content 
is also normative: “if our grasp of the notion of content were somehow 
to depend in a privileged and asymmetric way on our grasp of the 
concept of belief, then our only route to the notion of a contentful state 
would be through our grasp of a constitutively normative notion … 
that would be enough to substantiate the claim that content itself is 
normative” (Boghossian 2005: 213). 
Boghossian emphasizes that the asymmetry in our understanding of 
belief and desire is a necessary condition for the normativity of 
content: “if, however, it is not true that content depends on belief, that 
content may be understood through its role in other non-normative 
attitudes … then we would not have a thesis of the normativity of 
content but only the rather different thesis of the normativity of belief” 
(Boghossian 2005: 214).  
Below, in order to attain a clearer perspective on the overall 
argument, I have reformulated the premises and conclusions of 
Boghossian’s argument. The argument involves the following four 
premises: 
(3) The concept of belief is normative. 
(4) The concept of desire (and also all the attitudinal concepts other 
than belief) is not normative. 
(5) Our understanding of content has to go through understanding 
the attitudes that have contents as their objects.  
(6) The concept of belief is prior to the concept of desire (and also 
to other propositional attitudes).  
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Premises (5) and (6), according to Boghossian, imply: 
(7) Our understanding of content has to go through understanding 
of belief.  
From (3) and (7) the argument infers the normativity of content:  
(8) The concept of mental content is normative. 
This is because“[according to (7)] we would understand content 
only through belief and [according to (3)] belief through normative 
notions” (Boghossian 2005: 214).  
2- Miller on the conceptual interdependency of belief and desire 
and the normativity of content 
In his recent article, Alexander Miller (2008) argues that premise (6) 
of Boghossian’s argument is implausible. Miller claims that there is 
good evidence which shows that belief and desire are conceptually 
interdependent. That is, “thinking of someone as having beliefs 
involves thinking of them as at least capable of having desires, and 
thinking of someone as having desires involves thinking of them as at 
least capable of having beliefs” (Miller 2008: 237). He argues for the 
interdependency thesis via the following plausible consideration: both 
beliefs and desires potentially feature in the generation of action. He 
clarifies this as follows: “grasping the concept of belief... involves 
grasping that beliefs can lead to action by combining with desires” 
(Miller 2008: 237) and, “grasping the concept of desire... involves 
grasping that desires can lead to action by combining with beliefs” 
(Miller 2008: 237). For example, according to Miller: 
(9) Marco understands that Ebeneezer believes that there is beer in 
the fridge. 
Implies: 
(10) Marco understands that (if Ebeneezer believes that there is 
beer in the fridge and Ebeneezer desires to drink some beer then, 
ceteris paribus, Ebeneezer will reach for the fridge). 
Likewise  
(11) Marco understands that Ebeneezer desires to drink some beer. 
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Implies: 
(12) Marco understands that (if Ebeneezer desires to drink some 
beer and Ebeneezer believes that there is beer in the fridge, ceteris 
paribus, Ebeneezer will reach for the fridge). 
These points, according to Miller, are good reasons to endorse the 
interdependency thesis between belief and desire, far from being a 
unidirectional relation of priority between the two.  
It should be noted here that Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007) have 
tried to show that premise (3) of Boghossian’s argument is false. 
Nonetheless, Miller claims that, even if they failed to undermine the 
normativity of belief, Boghossian’s argument for the normativity of 
content is still implausible. This is because, as explained in section A, 
Boghossian’s argument for the normativity of content is based on both 
main premises of (3) and (6), and Miller attempts to demonstrate the 
falsity of premise (6). As Miller puts it: “even if Bykvist and 
Hattiangadi are wrong about the normativity of belief- and I do not 
say that they are- Boghossian’s argument for the normativity of 
content would still grind to a halt” (Miller 2008: 237). 
In what follows I will argue that Miller's interdependency thesis, 
even if true, cannot undermine Boghossian's normativity of content 
thesis. 
3- Dependent normativity and independent normativity 
In order to pave the way to defuse Miller's attack I will first 
distinguish between the two senses in which Boghossian claims that 
belief and content are normative.  
I remarked above that, according to Boghossian's argument, belief 
is normative since understanding a belief attribution requires 
understanding that forming the belief is constrained by an ought, but 
content is normative for we understand content only through belief 
which is a normative notion. The idea, it seems to me, shows a kind of 
asymmetry between belief normativity and content normativity. That 
is to say, in Boghossian's argument belief normativity is independent 
of content normativity but content normativity requires belief 
normativity (as according to the argument content normativity follows 
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from the assumption that we understand content only through belief 
which is a normative notion). To abbreviate the idea that there is such 
an asymmetry between belief normativity and content normativity, 
from now, I will say that, in Boghossian's theses, belief is 
independently normative but content is dependently normative.  
Note that the constraints 'independent' and 'dependent' on the 
notion of normativity should not remind the notion of spectrum; that 
is, by saying that in Boghossian's argument belief is independently 
normative but content is dependently normative I do not mean, that 
the latter concept is less normative than the former one. What I mean 
is simply that belief normativity is independent of content normativity, 
that is, belief is normative as such. But this is not the case for the other 
way around, if it turned out that belief is not normative it would 
follow that content is not normative.  
4- Miller's objection against the normativity of content fails 
My claim is that Miller's argument against Boghossian's content thesis 
does not work. In order to establish the claim I will argue that 
Boghossian could endorse Miller’s reflection that belief and desire are 
conceptually interdependent, whilst manoeuvring to preserve his 
argument for the normativity of content. My alternative argument on 
behalf of Boghossian for the normativity of content has the following 
three premises: 
(12) The concept of belief is independently normative. 
This premise is grounded on the basis of Boghossian’s 
consideration, embodied in the first step of his argument, according to 
which understanding a belief attribution requires understanding that 
forming the belief is constrained by an ought.  
(13) We understand content only through understanding contentful 
attitudes.  
This premise comes through the consideration that there is no 
independent account of content in hand. The concept of content can be 
introduced only via the concept of contentful attitudes, for contents 
are just what the attitudes are attitudes towards. 
(14) Belief and desire are conceptually interdependent. 
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This premise reflects the argument of Miller rehearsed above 
according to which belief and desire are conceptually interdependent. 
 I will now argue that the three premises entail Boghossian's 
normativity of content thesis.  
Since (13) holds that understanding content requires understanding 
an attitude, say, understanding desire, and that (14) holds that desire 
and belief are conceptually interdependent, it follows that 
understanding content requires understanding both desire and belief. 
In short, (13) and (14) imply:  
(15) We understand content only through understanding belief and 
desire.  
Since (15) holds we understand content only through understanding 
belief (and desire, of course) and that (12) holds that belief is an 
independent normative concept, it follows that we understand content 
only through an independent normative concept which is belief. This 
means that content is dependently normative. In short (12) and (15) 
imply:  
 (16) Content is dependently normative.  
I said that the normativity of content is dependent, for the 
normativity of content follows from the normativity of belief, so it is a 
dependent normativity.  
5- Conclusion  
My argument above, if true, then justifies my foregoing claim that 
even if we give up the conceptual priority of belief over desire in 
favor of the idea that belief and desire are conceptually 
interdependent, it is justifiable to believe that the concept of content is 
normative. Thus, Boghossian’s argument prevails Miller’s attack.  
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Introduction 
As much as Plantinga’s reformed epistemology (RE) was very effective 
and has some recommendations, it has received considerable critics and 
rejections. Usually, such criticisms focus on theoretical aspect and, 
especially neglect one of its problematic aspects from practical point of 
view. Probably, that is because for the People in developed countries, 
including philosophers, who live in modern societies in the West, this 
negative aspect is not outstanding. But who live in societies which are 
toward extremism, comprehend that how such relativistic thesis could 
serve to extremism.  The irony is that in such societies, religious 
intellectuals welcome to RE and consider it as a good means in order 
to both escape extremism and keep the religious faith.  
In this paper, we will suggest that in reality, RE could serve as a 
justification for committing violence and religious extremism. 
Furthermore, its basic idea is not so creative, but a simple version of it 
could be found in some religious and mystical traditions. Calvin and 
Barth are known as pioneers of Plantinga, but we suggest that this is 
not confined to western culture and in the East, as much as, the West, 
there are such ideas.  
The main claims of RE  
We know what RE asserts. But here we point to some basic elements 
directly related to my concern. 
1. Traditional foundationalism is not satisfactory, because of its 
dependence to evidentialism, the problem of self- justifying of basic 
beliefs and their restricting to perceptional and rational beliefs. 
(Plantinga, 1983: 59-61) 
2. As an alternative to foundationalism, he introduces a new 
epistemic rule and criteria, which is known as reformed or moderate 
foundationalism or RE. According to RE, every normative judgment 
concerning the beliefs of a person, or a group of peoples, is dependent 
to his own epistemic and cognitive atmosphere and mood. But its 
surprising demand is that belief in God is really a basic one and we are 
justified to hold it, without basing that belief on other beliefs. 
(Plantinga, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/religion-and-
epistemology). In other words, “ It is entirely right, rational, reasonable, 
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and proper to believe in God without any evidence or argument at all” 
(Plantinga, 1983: 17). The main question is this: why evidentialist 
believes in the past, in the existence of other persons and other minds 
and material objects in the absence of  any argument, but in the case of 
believe in God the same rule does not apply,  while the epistemic status 
is the same in both cases? 
3. He considers the sense of Divinity as a peculiar sense to some 
people who have original and rich spiritual life. Beliefs issues from that 
sense are properly basic and therefore are justified.   
Religious extremism  
It is commonly said that today is the time for battle of ideas. Every 
practice and action based on an idea or assertion and what we assert 
theoretically functions as a foundation or a motive to act in accordance 
with it. What we consider as religion, although beliefs are its essential 
part, but never confined to certain subjective and doxastic aspect. As 
Peirce said, “It is absurd to say that religion is a mere belief. ... . religion 
is a life, and as a life can be identified with a belief,  only provided that 
belief be a living belief, a thing to be lived rather than said or thought” 
(Peirce, 1974: 306). Holy books of certain religions as well as the 
traditions of prophets clearly confirm the social aspects of such 
religions.  But it is possible that somebody’s conception of a religion 
would imply to problematic, radical and controversial beliefs. In this 
circumstances religious extremism rises. 
Two terms of “religious fundamentalism and “religious extremism” 
come together. Far from its first meaning, today “fundamentalism” 
refers to “extreme and agonized defense of a dying way of life.” 
(Marsden, 2006: 4). But, according to religious extremism, “People 
with strong religious belief want to force their view of the word on 
others. They feel that only those who follow their “true” religion should 
be able to make important decisions. It has been said that: “The 
potential for violent conflict exists when our beliefs command us to do 
something aggressive to another group… like take their lands because 
we believe our deity [God] promised it to us.’ (Dan Smith, 2003)” 
Thus, the latter is more radical than the former, and I think the 
former has less negative results to social life. Therefore, in this paper, 
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we concentrate on religious extremism. Now it's time to ask what is the 
relation between RE and religious extremism? 
The great pumpkin objection and religious extremism 
This assertion that believe in God is properly basic, confronted with 
many objections, which the most important of them is the great 
pumpkin objection. If believe in God was basic, then every belief would 
be so. The core of this objection is that RE has some relativist 
implication.  I think that Plantinga’s response is not clear and 
satisfactory. He says, “what reformed epistemology holds is that there 
are widely realized circumstances in which belief in God is properly 
basic, but why should that be thought to commit him to the idea that 
just about any belief is properly basic in any circumstances, or even to 
the vastly weaker claim that for any belief there are circumstances in 
which it is properly basic.” (Plantinga, 1983: 74).  
Trying to answer the great pumpkin objection, Plantinga claims: 
“Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn Murry O’Hare may 
disagree; but how is that relevant? Must my criteria, or those of the 
Christian community, conform to their examples? Surly not! The 
Christian community is responsible to its set of examples, not to theirs.” 
(Planting, 1983: 77) But you imagine that instead of planting, an 
extremist makes such assertion, as it frequently happens. It is possible 
that just when you hold some religious belief as basic, other one 
considers certain other religious belief or beliefs as basic, as well. 
Indeed, Plantinga takes a seris of Christian beliefs as basic ones. But if, 
using same rule and criteria, another one takes different series of 
religious beliefs as basic, beliefs which plainly are extremistic, how we 
can escape this contradiction? If, for instance, a person holds the belief 
that “it is not only permissible killing unbelievers, but preferable”, how 
Plantinga could stop this illegitimate usage of his thesis? This is not a 
thought experiment, but we can cite many concrete examples, as we 
will do. Thus, the problem roots in his basic claim, that is, “the belief 
in God is properly basic”. 
It is evident that this is a version of the great pumpkin objection. 
Believing that the great pumpkin returns every Hallowing, has no 
considerable effects in human social life, but asserting that “it is not 
Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology and Religious…   /109 
 
 
only permissible killing unbelievers, but preferable”, has a trouble 
effects. great Pumpkin objection becomes more and more important, if 
we replace it with our radical assertion.  
Plantinga allows some kind of rational assessment, but it is far from 
the traditional foundationalism or evidentialism. Distinguishing 
between properly basic beliefs with other beliefs, he says: “…A  Belief 
B has warrant for S if and only if the relevant segments (the segments 
involved in the production of B) are functioning properly in cognitive 
environment sufficiently similar to that  for which S’s faculties are 
designed; and the modules of the design plan governing the production 
of B are (1) aimed at truth, and (2) such that there is a high objective 
probability that a belief formed in accordance with those modules (in 
that sort of  cognitive environment) is true; and the more firmly S 
believes B the more warrant B has for. (Plantinga, 2009: 439-440) 
But theory of warrant would not be helpful, because to claim that 
believe in God is properly basic, could not satisfy warrant obligation. I 
suggest that in this case, essentially warrant theory has nothing to do 
with his reformed epistemology, because the first could not remove 
relativistic mark of the later.  
Plantinga’s reformed epistemology implicitly considers normative 
judgment concerning the beliefs of a person to be depended to the set 
of his beliefs. This relativistic perspective leads to solipsism. A solipsist 
is resistant to contrary perspectives, viewpoints and beliefs such a 
person not only presents no argument for his beliefs, but also considers 
contrary arguments invalid and absurd. Thus, he imposes what he 
considers as truth, without any possibility of error. It seems that 
Plantinga’s theory is a roll-back to before 17th century epistemological 
atmosphere, i.e., before John lock and the tolerance idea. Ironically, 
Plantinga gives permission to people who take contrary evidences 
insufficient, to emphasize on their assertions. Plainly, in social life, this 
approach is not safe, if lead to radical actions.  
Now, it is necessary to consider Plantinga’s answer to this later 
objection. He maintains: “a person who carelessly arrives at morally 
repugnant beliefs is guilty, even if he holds that beliefs should be 
arrived at carelessly.” (Planting, 1983: 36) 
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This is insufficient and in turn confronts with another objection. It 
is possible that others consider my radical beliefs invalid, while my 
opinion is different. Inspired reformed epistemology, if I insist on my 
extremistic and immoral beliefs and realize them in my actions, could 
Plantinga find any Postern? This objection becomes more and more 
important, if we outline his view concerning the sense of Divinity. 
Everyone could claim to be equipped with that sense, as many 
extremists do. Every religious extremist appeal to something similar to 
sense of Divinity, otherwise he never could stimulate his followers to 
do what he finds as right choice. The only possible way to justify 
religious violence is this. 
In practice, if, on the ground of something like the sense of Divinity 
as well as my military, religious or charismatic power, I insist on my 
radical beliefs and realizing them, which results in committing 
violence, how you can stop me by arguing against my opinions or by 
appealing to universal moral rules, or something like them? The point 
is that, rational reasoning couldn’t stop any extremist, but every 
extremist needs certain amount of rationalization to justify his 
extremism.  
Blanshard’s predication  
I think that, Brand Blanshard gives the most Decisive answer to 
Plantinga, as if he has predicated RE: “We cannot dismiss the claim to 
such knowledge by saying that we have never ourselves experienced it 
and do not understand what is claimed.  There are many vivid and 
important experiences that remain sealed to most of us.  We may never 
have followed the mathematical flights of von Neumann, or caught 
what Schonberg was trying to say with his strange new scale, or 
experimented with LSD. Still, these things are not wholly cut off from 
us, for we know the kind of experience that mathematics and music 
give and can improve our grasp of it; and though the visions of the LSD 
addict seem remote, we at least know their conditions and could 
produce these in ourselves.  But the experiences alleged by Barth and 
Brunner are not like this.  They are not only meaningless to reason but 
unachievable by any effort or technique.  They have no conditions in 
the brain or mind of the person who has them; they are discontinuous 
with our psychology, with our logic, and even with our ethical 
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ideals.  They are granted to some persons and withheld from others on 
grounds that are admitted to be impenetrable. Even by the person who 
has them they are incapable of analysis or expression, and by the person 
who does not have them they cannot be engendered, examined, or 
imagined. (Blanshard, 1966:p. 69) 
Thus, Blanshard rejects Plantinga’s assumption that religious 
experiences are same as perceptual ones. We have the capacity to 
justify and explore perceptual experiences, while we have no means to 
explore and justify religious experiences and assertions at all.  
Blanshard describes religious and mythical assertions as this: “They are 
not only meaningless to reason but unachievable by any effort or 
technique.  They have no conditions in the brain or mind of the person 
who has them; they are discontinuous with our psychology, with our 
logic, and even with our ethical ideals.  They are granted to some 
persons and withheld from others on grounds that are admitted to be 
impenetrable”, (ibid, p 142) 
 As a final assessment, he says: “The attempt to defend religious 
knowledge by a return to irrationalism will not serve.  The universe is 
not to be conceived as a gigantic layer cake in which the lower stratum 
is governed by scientific law and an intelligible logic, and the upper 
stratum is somehow released from these restrictions into the freedom 
of incoherence.  The theologians who have tried to fix these boundaries 
have not been able to respect them, and in the attempt to do so they 
have not only reduced religious knowledge to something dangerously 
like zero but managed to cast a skeptical shadow over “ (ibid, p 211) 
Religious problems, such as moral problems, are not merely 
theoretical problems, but have many practical implications. Therefore, 
to evaluate reformed epistemology, it is not permissible to neglect 
practical implications and results. Psychological characteristics of 
human beings induce them to extremism, but some suitable means as 
Plantinga’s, and some ground as RE, has the effect of paving the way 
for extremism. 
Some historical evidences 
In the history of the West, and especially, of the East, there are certain 
famous elites and movements, whose Kay doctrine have some 
112/   Philosophical Investigations, Fall & Winter 2015/ Vol. 9/ No. 17   
 
similarities with RE. Unfortunately, most of them have extremistic 
tendency. In this place, in order to show Unagreeable effects of such 
doctrines, we briefly explore certain extremistic doctrines which have 
something to do with reformed epistemology. 
I. John Calvin 
John Calvin is one of the most famous religious extremists. His 
ruling over Geneva in the 16th century is a good example of the ruling 
of an extremist doctrine. As he himself said, we Know that Plantinga 
finds the roots of reformed epistemology in Calvin. Aleksander Santrac 
shows that Plantinga borrowed the term of “the sense of Divinity” of 
Calvin, although there is some differences between them. (Santrac, 
2011).  
In natural sciences, because of methodological necessities, this is not 
permissible that the conduct of scientist enters in our judgments 
concerning a theory. But, as we argued in the beginning, in religious 
doctrines, it is different. It seems that we should not ignore some 
relations between Calvin’s theological doctrine, in the one hand, and 
his conduct as an extremist ruler, in the other hand. At least, his 
appealing to the sense of Divinity, which served as a permission for his 
extremism, is problematic, as if it was as an excuse in order to commit 
violence. 
II. Khawarig 
Khawarig, as an extremist group, was the primary version of Daish 
and Taliban. They committed violence and imposed strong religious 
rules. It was said that “they was judged without any basis, but according 
to their own conception. Therefore, there were no criteria concerning 
religious knowledge, practice and leadership. (Moftakhari, 2000: 91). 
What constitutes the essence of that kind of extremism? They followed 
a rule like Planitinga’s RE. It was said that: “one of the most important 
theoretical rules of Khawarig was the sharp gap between “I” and 
“other” in religious beliefs. I'm just in the right way and no other one, 
except my colleagues. Everyone who is not with me, is in the camp of 
pagans, even if he has been called Muslim.”  (Alashari, 1415: 7-8). This 
is an instance of religious solipsism which also involved in RE.  
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III. Ibn Taymiyye and Seyyed Qutb 
Ibne Teymiyye (1263- 1328) is one of the most controversial figures 
in Islamic world. He rejects rational arguments which are not based on 
Quran and Tradition of the Prophet Mohammad. Reason is valuable as 
long as it is parallel to religious texts. According to him, even 
concerning theological aspect of religion, for example, the existence of 
God, only Quran gives true rational reasons. (Great Islamic 
encyclopedia, paper no. 1008). Also, similar to Plantinga, he suggests 
that: “therefore, if we reject reason and rational knowledge in some 
case, it is not same as rejecting all of rationality and rational items. (Ibn 
Taymiyye, 1954). That is because alone pure religious viewpoint is 
rational. As a Hanbali Muslim, his conception of reason rejects 
philosophical approaches and claims that in the Quran and the tradition 
of prophets, God manifests himself through natural signs not rational 
and logical arguments. (Ibn Taymiyye, 1972: 158(  
Inspired Ibne Teymiyye, Seyyed Qutb based the new form of 
religious extremism in the Islamic world. Seyyed Qutb himself 
confesses to the role of Ibn Taymiyye in constructing his theory. 
Seyyed Qutb maintains that “the struggle between the believers and 
their enemies is in essence a struggle of belief and not in any way of 
anything else” (Qutb, 2007:110). Also, "the whole world is steeped in 
jahiliyyah [=Ignorance] ", a "jahiliyyah . . . based on rebellion against 
God´s hakimiyyah [sovereignty] on earth".(ibid:510-511) All societies, 
including those claiming to be Muslim, were regarded by Qutb as 
mujtama´at jahiliyyah (pagan societies). Man is at the crossroads and 
that is the choice: Islam or jahiliyyah. In the base of these judgments, 
he derived his extremist conclusion, which consists in to remove all 
jahili influnces through jihad (holy war). According to the Qutbian 
system, Jihad (either violent or non-violent) is the means by which "´all 
satanic forces´ are abolished and God´s hakimiyyah is established on 
earth". (Qutb, 2007: 154-183). But his  controversial thesis is that “As 
jahili societies will always be in opposition to Islam Jihad for Qutb has 
two primary functions: the defense of the right of Muslims to believe 
and live by principles of Islam and also the struggle to establish Allah´s 
sovereignty worldwide In Qutb´s opinion, to reduce jihad to self-
defence is to ´diminish the greatness of the Islamic way of life´ and 
leaves open the possibility that mankind will be left "on the whole earth 
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in evil, in chaos and in servitude to lords other than God".  (Qouted 
from: http://www.islamdaily.org) 
Seyyed Qutb, in turn, shaped theorical basis of Alqyaede and Ayman 
al Zawahiri. (Murr, 2004). The foundational fundamentalist thesis 
which they learn of Ibn Taymiyye is that what we believe, whether 
other people consider it rational or not, is legitimate and true; and we 
can practice and behave in the base of our own comprehension. This 
idea is the result of some thesis very similar to Plantinga’s RE. To put 
it more clear, the fideism involved in  RE, which remarked by some 
critics (e.g. Penelhum, 1983), in the one hand, and Seyyed Qutb’s view 
point , in the other hand, both confirm the personal conceptions 
concerning religious matters, without any respect to what the majority 
of  people believe.   
These historical cases have something in common with RE, that is, 
to embrace Personal conceptions instead of following universally 
authentic reasoning. Even if in one case you were exempt of arguing 
for your assertions, you would find a good base for extremism.  
Discussion 
What I offer is basically the Great Pumpkin Objection to RE, except 
that religious extremist hypotheses are substituted for the Great 
Pumpkin hypothesis.  These differ from the Great Pumpkin hypothesis 
in that there might be serious this-wordly consequences if someone 
acted on the hypothesis (e.g., people who have different beliefs might 
lose their lives).  But here is a problem.  Plantinga and other defenders 
of RE think that they have a satisfactory response to the Great Pumpkin 
Objection. They might be right, or they might be wrong.  If they’re 
right, then their response to the Great Pumpkin Objection is equally a 
response to my objection in which the Great Pumpkin hypothesis is 
replaced by a hypothesis based on religious extremism.  Also, Plantinga 
does not respond to the Great Pumpkin Objection by saying that belief 
in the Great Pumpkin is harmless; hence his actual response is not 
refuted by an argument in which the belief is harmful.  But if Plantinga 
and other defenders of RE are wrong, this would need to be 
shown.  There is a large literature on this question, involving delicate 
issues in epistemology. In this paper contributing to this theoretical 
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debate is not my concern, because my hypothesis is that the response 
of the defenders of RE to the Great Pumpkin Objection is not 
satisfactory.  After all, it seems that Blanshard’s reasoning is the most 
reliable basis to defend my hypothesis. 
Thus, this research is a preliminary one to study the results of 
realization of RE, on the one hand, and its similarities with certain 
traditional theories, on the other hand.  
As it was said before, for western people who live in the modern 
societies, it is hard to comprehend dangerous misuses of such theories 
as RE. Essentially, peoples who experienced extremism and irrational 
theories could apprehend the trouble results of rejecting evidentialism 
and reasoning. Therefore, RE could be as a bad weapon in the hand of 
bad peoples, as historical instances confirm this. It should be 
emphasized that  practical results of Plantinga’s RE follows no logical 
process or reasoning, but it is largely  issues from human psychological  
characteristics. RE could serve as an excuse. Our appealing to excuse 
is not the result of a rational process.  
Even if it was the case that extremists are successful because of 
“their organizational structure than their theology” (Iannaccone and 
Berman, 2006), this explains the causes of extremism, while it is 
evident that in justifying every version of extremism and inducing 
people to it, it is necessary appealing to some theoretical and 
theological foundations. Every extremist needs an unquestionable 
territory in order to force people to obey, and that is what RE supplies.  
From practical aspect, in the religious problems, evidentialism is the 
safest approach and RE is the most dangerous one.  
Conclutions 
We showed that, one the hypothesis that the response of the defenders 
of RE to the Great Pumpkin Objection is not satisfactory, RE could be 
used as an extremist mean or as an excuse. We presented two reasons 
for this claim. First, Blanshard’s argument, which we found it as a good 
response for RE. Second, some historical evidences which confirm 
similarities between RE and some extremist ideologies.  
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How is it possible to speak of the ethics of history? Certainly when the 
word “ethics” is understood solely from its modern determination of a 
normativity with respect to living, the expression the “ethics of 
history” makes little sense. And yet the expression is not without 
significance for we know that with respect to the interpretation of 
history there is a normative force at work in the questions and 
decisions involved in any interpretation. We can see something of this, 
more generally so, in a philosophy of history such as Hegel’s where 
history becomes the scene of the actualization of human freedom. And 
if we broaden the meaning of the word “ethics” through its etymology, 
our expression can actually revert to something like a tautology. 
Ethics, as we know, is derived from ēthos, which in ancient Greek 
pertained first and foremost to an individual’s accustomed place. It 
pertained to the habitual and the customary, and in this basic 
determination ēthos approximates what the early Hegel called 
positivity–the historical element in a religion or a society which is 
opposed to the purely natural. What is positive is the historically 
given, produced in the generational movement of life. For Hegel this 
positivity amounts to traditional authority and the task is to reconcile 
it with reason where it would be transformed into living history. 
Suffice it to say that in this regard at least human history is the 
portrayal of human ēthos, or better, ēthos is inseparable from a 
historical element. 
These brief preliminary comments serve to point us to the specific 
focus of my remarks, namely, to Heidegger who in a more decisive 
way links ethics to ēthos and ultimately to our relation to time and 
history.1 In the “Letter on Humanism” from 1946 Heidegger responds 
to the question about writing an ethics by placing the question of 
ethics against the background of modern technological life and 
framing it in its relation to ontology, insisting that what needs to be 
determined first is precisely what ethics and ontology themselves are. 
To this end, while noting that ethics appeared for the first time in the 
school of Plato where it is taken up in relation to philosophical 
science, Heidegger provocatively claims that “the tragedies of 
Sophocles   ... preserve the ēthos in their sagas more primordially than 
Aristotle’s lectures on “ethics.” He explains this claim with the 
equally provocative remark that the essence of this ēthos is captured in 
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the simplicity of the three word saying of Heraclitus: ēthos anthrōpōi 
daimōn. Heidegger then comments that this saying is usually 
translated as “a man’s character is his daimōn,” but this translation is a 
modern one and attention should be paid to the meaning of ēthos as 
abode, dwelling place. More specifically, according to Heidegger “the 
word [ēthos] names the open region in which man dwells,” allowing 
what pertains to man’s essence to appear. As one could anticipate, 
Heidegger has translated the saying of Heraclitus in relation to the 
“truth of being” as the primordial element of the human, and the ethics 
that ponders the abode of man Heidegger calls “original ethics.”2 But 
as Heidegger himself admits, this original ethics that thinks the abode 
of man is not really an ethics at all; it is ontology.  
But how does this bear on the issue of history and our concern with 
the ethics of history? Certainly what Heidegger means by the truth of 
being is not without its historical element. In fact this relation between 
the truth of being and the historical occupies Heidegger’s thinking 
throughout the 1930s and 40s. In recognizing this, it is curious to see 
just how Heidegger has translated the saying of Heraclitus in the 
“Letter on Humanism.” He initially leaves the word “daimōn” 
untranslated and then in his subsequent analysis he translates it with 
only one of the possible meanings of the word, namely, pertaining to a 
god. His most complete translation of the saying soon follows along 
with a more precise determination of the phrase he had chosen to 
translate for the Greek daimōn: “The (familiar) abode of man is the 
open region for the presencing of god (the unfamiliar one).”(Letter on 
Humanism,” 258) While this complete translation resonates with what 
is at the center of the being question for Heidegger, it avoids the word 
that has most frequently been used in modern translations for the 
Greek daimōn and which would directly introduce the historical 
element into the saying of Heraclitus, namely, fate (Schicksal). 
Perhaps Heidegger’s choice of a word and the resulting determination 
of meaning in this matter had everything to do with his current 
situation and his interpretation of his time in the immediate aftermath 
of World War II. Certainly it does have something to do with his 
change of perspective from Being and Time where the word ‘fate’ 
designated the condition of a Dasein in which it takes over what has 
been handed down to it. In any case, without reverting to the usual 
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modern translation, it is yet to be determined in a more precise way–
and in a way that does not abandon the intentions within Heidegger’s 
thinking–how the idea of the ethics of history can be pursued from this 
starting point. And this is the specific focus of my remarks. 
Let me proceed here by noting, along with Heidegger, the 
insufficiency of the modern translation: “man’s character is his fate.” 
The insufficiency, though, has just as much to do with the inadequacy 
of the translation of daimōn as with that of ēthos. In point of fact the 
word daimōn is the more difficult word to translate since its meaning 
shifts in its various usage and its etymological meaning is impossible 
to discover with certainty. In Homer the word is indeed often 
synonymous with theos, a god, but it is not simply interchangeable 
with it. According to Walter Burkert, the word refers generally to a 
force that drives one forward where no agent can be named. What is 
being ordained in the driving power of daimōn is never visible.3 In 
this sense daimōn signifies something like fate or destiny, and there 
appears to be little conceptual difference here between daimōn and 
moira. But even this association between these two words depends on 
a meaningful translation. Moira does not simply mean fate as an 
inevitable outcome, but pertains foremost to portion and the 
apportionment that is the order of life. And in daimōn one must hear 
the associated verb daiomoi, which means to divide, to make a cut, 
and thus daimōn can pertain to the invisible power that assigns a 
portion–what we ordinarily describe as one’s lot in life.  
Accordingly, when Heraclitus says ēthos anthrōpōi daimōn, not 
only must we hear in the word daimon the sense of one’s lot in life, 
but also we must hear in the word ethos the original sense of the word 
as the haunt of an animal, the customary place from which it may be 
expected to appear, to show itself. Thus, as one among several 
possible translations, Heraclitus’s expression can read: “in the living 
and shaping of human life (where human life comes to appear) the 
human lives out its good or ill fortune. This translation has the virtue 
of bringing us closer to the ēthos of Sophocles. As we learn from 
Antigone, it is in relation to the daimonic that the human is said to be 
most strange (deinotaton). The human has this designation of 
strangeness–perhaps it is best to say being formidable–precisely 
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because it is only the human animal that has the capacity to create; 
and this capacity to create is more than an ability for the production of 
artifacts. It is primarily an ability for the creation that occurs by virtue 
of being that being who is never helpless before its future.4 In this 
resourcefulness lies the making that is self-creation–the bringing of a 
human life into its very being. And apropos the tragic, such living and 
shaping involves the double destiny of not being able to know all that 
the individual says and in wanting to know the individual is subject to 
error and hubris. And for Heidegger too, even in a desperate time of 
need, the human is not helpless before its future, and in the living and 
shaping of life commensurate with Dasein’s belonging to being, the 
human faces this double destiny of not knowing and being subject to 
error.5 Certainly it cannot go unnoticed here that Heidegger speaks of 
error and errancy in his essay “The Anaximander Fragment,” which 
was also written in 1946.6 On Heidegger’s account, in the 
unconcealment of beings being itself is withdrawn and thus concealed: 
“the brightness of the unconcealment of beings darkens the light of 
being.” By virtue of this withdrawing “beings are adrift in errancy,” 
establishing “the realm of error” as the sphere of common history. 
“The inability of human beings to see themselves corresponds to the 
self-concealing of the lighting of being.”7 
*** 
In order to bring closer this thinking of Heidegger and with it the 
idea of the ethics of history in relation to our starting point, let me 
offer yet another possible translation of Heraclitus’s expression: “in 
humankind’s place in life there is the elemental power of destining.” 
This translation also requires further determination. Specifically, it 
requires that we determine the meaning of the “place in life” to which 
we belong, this in-habiting that is now capturing the evolving sense of 
ēthos. In his 1941 lecture course entitled Basic Concepts 
[Grundbegriffe], Heidegger provides us with a direct answer to this 
query: 
We must listen our way into that place where we ourselves belong. 
With this, reflection leads us through the question as to whether we 
still belong anywhere at all. Even to merely anticipate where we could 
belong, it is necessary to experience ourselves. This means 
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“ourselves” not according to any historiologically given condition... 
but “ourselves” in respect to what determines us and is other than us, 
which nevertheless governs our essence. We call this, arbitrarily at 
first, the inception of our history. By this we do not mean history as a 
series of events in terms of a “causal nexus,” of which what occurs 
later and today is an effect. History means, again at first appearance 
arbitrarily, the happening [Ereignis] of a decision about the essence of 
truth. The manner in which the whole of beings is revealed, in which 
man is allowed to stand in the midst of this revelation, is grounded and 
transformed in such a decision. Such a happening is exceptional, and 
this exceptional history is so simple when it happens and prepares 
itself that man at first and for a long time thereafter fails to see it and 
fails to recognize it. This is because his vision is confused by 
habituation to the multiplicity of the ordinary..... Remembrance of the 
inception of our history is the awakening of knowing about the 
decision that, even now, and in the future, determines Western 
humanity. Remembrance of the inception is therefore not a flight into 
the past but readiness for what is to come.8 
This passage, in its succinctness, actually captures the entirety of 
the translation of the saying from Heraclitus and not just the 
translation of ēthos. In it we see Heidegger making three interrelated 
claims. With some interpretation we can state them as follows: 1) 
properly speaking, our place in life involves our belonging not simply 
to history with its facticality, but to the inception of history; 2) by 
virtue of this inception, we are involved in a decision about the 
essence of truth, i.e., our place in life entails the specificity of our 
time, which gathers together historical life in its conditions and 
values; 3) remembrance of the inception is a readiness for what is to 
come, i.e., our place in life is oriented to the arrival of what occurs at 
the inception as destining. Let us consider these claims in more detail. 
As we could anticipate from the outset, in the first claim Heidegger 
does not locate the inhabiting in which human life comes to appear 
where one would expect to find it, namely, in what Hegel comes to 
call Sittlichkeit, ethical life–the life of family and civil society and its 
institutions. It is not found, in other words, in the norms of living 
together that we find, as our classic example, in Sophocles’ Antigone. 
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Rather, the place to which we first belong and which governs our 
essence is the inception of our history. By any standard this is a 
remarkable claim, a claim that, to say the least, is indicative of the 
shift in Heidegger’s thinking in comparison with his earlier work. In 
linking human living not simply to history but to the inception of 
history, the issue for Heidegger is no longer the determination of 
Dasein’s stretching along between birth and death as such, that is to 
say, it is no longer a matter of Dasein’s historicity, but of the 
determining that occurs in advance of Dasein’s historical enactment. 
This shift is, of course, the turning with respect to his question of 
being in which, as we see throughout the 1930s and 40s, Heidegger is 
concerned with the issue of origination.9  
But what then does it mean to belong to the inception of our 
history? The answer to this question is complicated in part because 
Heidegger will use other terms alongside that of inception which in 
itself produces a complication. In the “Origin of the work of Art” from 
1935/6, for example, Heidegger tells us that “as every origin 
[Ursprung] has its inception [Anfang], so every inception has its 
beginning [Beginn].”10 The three terms indicated here, fashioned in a 
common relation, are all indicative of an event involving a point of 
departure. The complication lies not just in the fact that Heidegger 
brings these three terms together, but that the terms themselves 
become entangled together. In his preliminary considerations to his 
1943 lecture course on Heraclitus, Heidegger notes that for his title, 
“‘Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens (Heraklit)’ one might 
also say ‘Der Beginn (oder der Ursprung) der Philosophie im 
Abendland’.”11 The entanglement occurs here because Heidegger 
intersects the ontological with the historical. Thus on the one hand the 
terms are indicative of the birth of presencing, as if Heidegger were 
employing these terms in an attempt to re-think the Greek arche, 
which, as we learn from Aristotle, has multiple meanings in its 
ordinary use. Common to most of these meanings is the notion of 
“first,” of what is at the beginning. 12 As it pertains to the movement 
of being, “first” is understood as that out of which being becomes and 
that which rules in the becoming. Thus arche has for Aristotle the 
sense of a ruling beginning that is unsurpassable. If Heidegger is 
indeed thinking arche in relation to at least two of the terms, 
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Ursprung and Anfang, he will not only disengage these terms from 
this classical determination of arche as that which establishes 
command and also rule–as it becomes translated into the Latin 
principium–he will also disengage it from its connection in Aristotle 
with cause (aitia).13 But, on the other hand, the terms are indicative of 
a historical meaning, of how presencing becomes history. For 
Heidegger the Presocratics are anfängliche Denker and the birth of 
metaphysics begins in Plato and Aristotle. 
For us to then see precisely what Heidegger means by inception, 
we need to briefly sort out this entanglement. Immediately following 
the sentence in the “Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger writes: 
The [beginning] is that through which the always-sudden inception 
arises up, as something already found. An occasion belongs to the way 
the beginning is this one or that one. And the occasion is always a 
coincidence or happenstance, a happenstance in the light of and the 
breaking-open region of the inception as the leap of an origin, i.e., as a 
leap wherein the truth as openness of beings arises. Where this 
happens, history commences [anfangen].14 
While Heidegger continues to stress the connection between the 
three terms, we can begin to see here the difference between Beginn 
and Anfang. Beginn has the sense of the place from which something 
starts, and as such can be left behind. With an inception, Anfang, 
something originates and as an occurrence completes itself only at its 
end.15 In saying this Heidegger is surely not suggesting that there is a 
teleological component in this kind of occurrence; rather, he is 
pointing to what is essentially configured by an initiating, founding 
event. Anfang is an inception in the sense of incipere as to take in 
hand, to seize. Anfang is that which seizes and takes hold first, not 
unlike what happens in thaumazein, wonder, which Plato tells us is the 
arche of philosophizing.16 Anfang thus conveys in a way that Beginn 
does not, the character of an address; i.e., its character is that of an 
initiating claim to which one responds, taking hold of one, as if 
captured by it. As such it is not that which has started and is left 
behind as something finished, but that which, in being unfinished, 
comes toward one. In belonging to Western history we are captured by 
that founding event of Western history that has issued in the 
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technological and globalized life we currently inhabit. To add then the 
third term, the initiating event is only understandable in relation to 
Ursprung as the event proper. In the “Origin of the Work of Art, 
Heidegger writes: “Art lets truth originate [entspringen].... To 
originate something by a leap, to bring something into its being from 
out of the source of its nature in a founding leap–this what the word 
origin means.”(The Origin of the Work of Art: 77-8.) In originating, 
something rises up and is brought into being, and for Heidegger 
presencing itself is to be understood from this sense of the originary. 
Let us return to our question: What does it mean to belong to the 
inception of our history? In relation to the inceptive we can now say 
that it means to be seized by an event of appropriation (Ereignis) in 
which being is given to us and enables our being to become what it is. 
It is to be in relation to what being initiates and what generates 
thereby historical destiny (Geschick). To relate this to our translation 
of Heraclitus’s saying: in the inception of history something has been 
sent our way, and it is in relation to this sending (Schickung) that we 
have our place in life. But relating to this sending is more than hearing 
a message, as Heidegger seems to be announcing at the outset of the 
key passage from Basic Concepts, for according to Heidegger, the 
source of the sending is constituted by a certain reserve, a certain 
holding back. “To hold back,” Heidegger tells us, “is in Greek 
epokhē,” and accordingly the destiny of being can be described in 
relation to epochs in which the original sending of being is “more and 
more obscured in different ways.”17 What is being described here is 
the essential forgetting that characterizes the history of metaphysics in 
relation to which, for philosophy at least, a recollection in metaphysics 
becomes necessary. Such a recollection thinks history as the arrival of 
truth’s essence, i.e., the revealing/concealing that Heidegger 
thematizes in relation to aletheia. Hearing the message will thus 
require a specific task for contemporary philosophy. It is no longer a 
task of taking hold of the givenness of things in which beings are 
gathered together in a definite manner but one of thinking the arriving 
from and departing into a hidden being through a destructuring of 
epochs. Despite its speculative and grand narrative overtones, the task 
of thinking is an urgent one for Heidegger precisely because, as we 
have already noted, “the inability of human beings to see themselves 
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corresponds to the self-concealing of the lighting of being.”18 And in 
relation to this task destiny is not at all the outcome of an inevitable 
course of events; it is rather something of the opposite, a contingency, 
since we can respond differently to the opening of human destiny.19 
This is just what Heidegger puts in play in what he calls inceptive 
thinking, namely, the preparatory thinking for another beginning 
beyond the first beginning which occurred in Greek philosophy that 
would initiate another history.  
To belong to the inception of our history, then, is not a matter of a 
passivity in which we simply take over a heritage. It is rather a matter 
of being set within the historical as the happening itself in relation to 
which “we have to be concerned with the meaning, the possible 
standards, the necessary goals, the ineluctable powers, and that from 
which all human happenings begin [anheben].”20 If these goals and 
powers came to pass long ago, they still await the liberation of their 
influence. And so Heidegger contends that what is most futural is the 
great inception as the hidden destiny of all inceptions. But herein lies 
the problem of human living that we have already alluded to: the 
hidden destiny of all inceptions is forced aside, if not refuted, by 
“what they themselves begin and by what follows them.”(The Basic 
Questions of Philosophy: 38). For Heidegger, this means that “the 
customariness of that which then becomes accustomed becomes 
master over that which is always uncustomary in the inception. 
Therefore, in order to rescue the inception, and consequently the 
future as well, from time to time a breaking of the mastery of the 
customary and the all too accustomed is needed. The overthrowing of 
the customary is the genuine relation to inception.”(Ibid) In his 1937-
38 lecture course from which this passage is taken, The Basic 
Questions of Philosophy, Heidegger continues his remarks using the 
language of revolution, contrasting it with the conservative in which 
there is a holding onto what began as a consequence of the inception. 
In this context, the ethics of history, we might say, is one that is 
concerned with a certain renewal. And in this context we should see 
that what Heidegger is suggesting here mirrors Hegel’s analysis of 
positivity. Just as Hegel sees the necessity of a purging of the dead 
elements of the tradition or for the sake of living spirit and its truth, 
for Heidegger too, there is an overturning of the customary for the 
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sake of a different kind of living spirit. But what exactly this renewal 
entails beyond the overthrowing of the customary is not yet fully 
clear. What is clear is that for Heidegger it will affect our place in life. 
In the first draft of this 1937-38 lecture course Heidegger writes: “The 
determination of the essence of truth is accompanied by a necessary 
transformation of the human.... This transformation signifies the 
dislocation of humanity out of its previous home into the ground of its 
essence in order for the human to become the founder and the 
preserver of the truth of being.”(Ibid: 181) 
*** 
If we ask ourselves now where we stand with respect to the further 
determination of the saying of Heraclitus that in our latest translation 
reads “in humankind’s place in life there is the elemental power of 
destining,” we see that we have for the most part really captured only 
half of the translation. What we have captured is the specific 
determination of ēthos, as the abode of the human, as being-in-relation 
to history as happening (Geschehen) from the event of being. Without 
explicitly identifying it as such, we have been describing at the same 
time what Heidegger means by original ethics.21 As noted at the 
outset, this ethics has little to do with what we mean by ethics today. 
An original ethics does not offer guidelines for acting in everyday 
situations, and in fact it shuns the realm of valuing insofar as valuing 
has come to mean nothing more than an estimating from subjectivity. 
And this means for the ethics of history that we are not concerned 
with what in another context deserves the most serious attention, 
namely, a historiography of poverty or injustice, or any other ethical 
history organized around a value of the present. But at the same time, 
what is meant by the ethics of history cannot be without significance 
for the way in which the determination of our living gets worked out 
in relation to its aspirations. What the ethics of history must ultimately 
capture, if not the idea of an original ethics as such, then is certainly 
one of its conclusions, namely, that ethical life is inseparable from 
“our relation to both time and history.”(Hermeneutics as Original Ethics: 
42) Heidegger seems to bring us closer to what needs to be captured 
from the way in which destining, and with it the second half of our 
translation, is to be understood.  
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To pursue this and at the same time to begin to bring the entire 
analysis together, we need to see precisely what it means with respect 
to history to speak of destining and not destiny. Minimally, it would 
seem to convert destiny as allotment and order in life to that of an 
“ever moving order of presencing-absencing.”(Heidegger on Being and 
Acting: 271) But it is precisely here that Reiner Schürmann warns us 
we must be most careful in reading Heidegger. The boundary of the 
last epoch of metaphysics should not be seen as an opening of a place 
or site where an idea of humanity, thought in relation to the crisis of 
the current epoch, is restored. Such a view would amount to, in 
Heidegger’s words, “chasing after the future so as to work out a 
picture of it through calculation in order to extend what is present and 
half-thought into what, now veiled, is yet to come.”22 Such chasing 
would still move within the prevailing attitude belonging to 
technological, calculating representation. No historiographical 
representation of history as happening “ever brings us into the proper 
relation to destining.” If the efficacy of a beginning inception remains 
in force for philosophy and for our living, this truth cannot be 
measured by any history or historical thinking.23 Any talk of a renewal 
amounts to, again in Schürmann’s words, “a disseminating crisis.” 
Minimally then, we can say that in destining we remain in relation to 
what comes first, and only in this engagement where we conduct 
ourselves according to the truth of being is there the “to come” that 
will transform history. Now, while it would be possible for us to 
continue to follow Heidegger in this matter of what is first, for the 
sake of the very idea of the ethics of history presented here, I want to 
pursue this still open issue of destiny and history through the 
interpretive extension of Heidegger’s thinking undertaken by Jean-
Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben. 
Nancy, for his part, interprets destining, which for him still holds to 
the “logic” of Ereignis, as finitude. Here finitude is defined not in 
opposition to the infinite as simple limit, but in relation to the non-
appearing of being itself; i.e., finitude means “we are infinitely finite, 
infinitely exposed to our existence as a non-essence.” We are, in other 
words, infinitely exposed to the otherness of our own being. We begin 
and end “without having a beginning and an end that is ours.”(The 
Birth to Presence: 155) Finitude is thus a lack of accomplishment of an 
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essence of existence, or better, it is the emptying out of essence (Ibid: 
158). To say this yet one other way, existence is simply abandoned to 
its very positing, constituting the finitude of being. Accordingly, our 
history can only be finite history– “the becoming present of existence 
insofar as existence is itself finite.”(Ibid: 163) To make this idea of 
history clearer Nancy contrasts it with finished history in which 
history maintains its end. Finished history is thought as a collection 
that can be collected. But Nancy insists that this idea of history as 
collecting and collection, a history perhaps where there is the 
becoming subject of substance, a history that issues in a grand 
narrative, is exhausted. In contrast to this there is history precisely as 
history–a finite history that entails the rupturing of history where there 
is the infinite deferral of any nature.”24 This history as happening is 
thus history without summation, a history that has not and cannot 
absolve itself, as Hegel, in principle at least, proposes. And so, for 
Nancy, finite history is not the accomplishment of essence, but simply 
an arriving. Destining is destiny without destiny. 
But if destiny is simply arriving what significance can this hold for 
our living? In what sense can we still speak in a credible manner of 
the ethics of history? To answer this question we need to see precisely 
what Nancy means when he says that finite history pertains foremost 
to a history that is “infinitely exposed to its own finite happening as 
such.”(The Birth to Presence: 157) For Nancy it means that the model of 
historical time is nothing other than an opening of a spacing of time, 
“the happening of the time of existence” where “we” happens. Finite 
history, in other words, entails the very notion of “our time.” Our time 
would have to be some aspect of time without stopping time. It would 
be a certain suspension of time, an epoch, a spacing where something 
takes place precisely by being ours. But what is ours is not a collective 
property “as if first we exist and then we possess a certain time.”(Ibid: 
151) Rather, it is our being in common, which Nancy thinks precisely 
as exposure. Our time as the happening of history becomes the time in 
which being-in-common happens, and finite history is the becoming 
present of existence as finite: “History is the proper exposition of 
existence.”(Ibid: 161)  
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 Now, Nancy will say this in yet another way. Nancy calls this 
being-in-common, this exposition of existence, sharing (partage). The 
word sharing means first of all to divide something up; it is an act of 
division. But sharing also means to take part in something. Taken 
together sharing names community, not as a common being, but as a 
relating in which there is exposure to others. Hopefully without 
appearing forced, with Nancy we are translating the apportionment 
that is destiny not as that which comes from the outside, but as that 
which has entered into the very fabric of existence. If the daimōn is 
not an unknown god, but rather the apportionment given to human 
life, then here the daimonic is “the spacing and distancing that opens 
up world.”25 Thus Nancy will translate the “decision” that becomes 
our time as a decision to enunciate our “we”–a decision “about if and 
how we allow our otherness to exist.” We have to decide to make 
history, “which is to expose ourselves to the non-presence of our 
present, and to its coming.”(The Birth to Presence: 166) And in this 
exposing is the conduct toward which thinking strives, a conducting 
“in such a way as to take the measure of the incomprehensible interval 
between every ‘thinking’ (idea, representation, etc.) and the 
fundamental action through which it makes itself think.”26 
Accordingly, with Nancy’s interpretive extension of Heidegger’s 
thinking we have before us another possible translation of Heraclitus’s 
saying ēthos anthrōpōi daimōn. The saying can now read: in being 
infinitely exposed to our own finite happening, there is sharing (i.e., 
allotment, portioning out). 
Let me turn now to Agamben. Agamben’s translation of destining 
draws us into an even greater analysis to which I may be unable to do 
justice here. To begin, it is interesting to see in an analogous way to 
Nancy, how Agamben characterizes “our time.” In a small essay from 
2006, Agamben asks about what it means to be a contemporary. 
Citing Nietzsche’s “Untimely Meditations” Agamben notes how 
Nietzsche attempts to situate his own contemporariness with respect to 
the present by being out of joint. The true contemporary is one who 
neither coincides with nor simply placates oneself to the demands of 
the current times. But it is just because of this that the true 
contemporary is best at grasping his or her own time. The 
contemporary is in a relationship with his or her own time precisely by 
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being able to keep a distance from it. But how is such distancing and 
thus seeing possible? It cannot be a matter of simple reflection for the 
question would remain as to how, in the reflection, one could see 
differently. Agamben claims that what the contemporary sees is not 
some other time that is then contrasted with the contemporary times, 
but rather, in language reminiscent of Heidegger’s description of the 
being event in the “Anaximander Fragment” essay, the very darkness 
rather than the light of one’s own time. Every time, i.e., every epoch, 
holds obscurity, and the contemporary is one who knows how to see 
this obscurity.27 Agamben’s description of seeing this darkness 
suggests something of the impossible and should remind us of 
Heidegger’s question concerning where we belong (and thus to our 
place in life) in relation to the truth of being. In the darkness of the 
sky, Agamben notes, what we perceive is actually the light that cannot 
reach us “since the galaxies from which the light originates moves 
away from us at a velocity greater than the speed of light.”(What is the 
Contemporary: 46) And so the contemporary who fixes his or her gaze 
on the darkness of the epoch is attempting to perceive, in that 
darkness, a light “that infinitely distances itself from us, yet is 
voyaging toward us. Our time is, in fact, most distant, it cannot in any 
way reach us. And so, for Agamben: “Contemporariness inscribes 
itself in the present by marking it above all as archaic. Only those who 
perceive the indices and the signatures of the archaic in the most 
modern and recent can be contemporary.”(Ibid: 50) Agamben’s 
“archaic” functions in a way similar to Heidegger’s inception. It is, in 
Agamben’s words, that which is “contemporary with historical 
becoming and does not cease to operate with it.”(Ibid) “The present 
[or what we can call the proper dwelling place of humanity] is thus 
nothing other than this unlived element in everything that is lived,” 
and so the contemporary is one who returns to a present where we 
have never been (Ibid: 51). 
This peculiar way of accustoming oneself to “our time” reflects 
Agamben’s understanding of our historical being in general, which 
approximates that of Heidegger being discussed here. Agamben reads 
Heidegger to be saying with respect to Ereignis that it is a movement 
of concealment without anything being hidden or anything hiding. 
Accordingly, what is at issue in the event is destiny without destiny, 
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and with it the abandonment of the human to itself. Now, according to 
Agamben–and let me read this sentence carefully–“this abandonment 
of the self to itself is precisely what destines humankind to tradition 
and to history, remaining concealed, the ungrounded at the ground of 
every ground, the nameless that, as unsaid and untransmissable, 
transmits itself in every name and every historical transmission.”28 For 
Agamben the question then becomes one of seeing how this 
ungrounded foundation is actually the taking place of language as the 
event of speech. It is not that Heidegger does not himself take up this 
question. Of course he regards the experience of language to be 
precisely that of saying (Sage) coming to speech, i.e., of the 
experience of the difference between language and speech. But for 
Agamben this is not an experience that I have been called to by a 
voice (as in the voice of conscience). Agamben calls his version of 
this transmitting of the untransmissible in relation to the being of the 
human, as the taking place of language, the experience of infancy. 
So, what is infancy? For Agamben infancy frames the character of 
the potentiality of language that, in turn, will describe in yet another 
way the ēthos of the human. His use of the word suggests that he 
wants to make a reference to the child, and indeed this is so with an 
important qualification. What is distinctive of the condition of the 
child is being without language while having the potentiality of 
language, and thus the ability to grow up in a language. Beginning 
with the condition of childhood there is a movement–one we associate 
with chronological development–in which language is acquired as an 
actualization of a potential. Now the qualification. Agamben does 
want to think of infancy in this way, but not literally, as if our relation 
to infancy is only in this chronological development. Infancy means 
then first of all that we are not simply the animal with language, as 
Aristotle states in what is now the classical definition of the human, 
but the animal deprived of language. And to further invert this 
classical distinction, Agamben claims that it is the non-human animal 
that actually is the one by nature with language. To be more precise, 
the animal with its voice, its phone, is one with its language. With its 
voice the animal communicates immediately without signs, whereas 
the human animal does not have language in this natural way. The 
human animal is at first only capable of speech, and thus must in some 
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sense acquire it, receive it, as if it comes from the outside.  
Accordingly–and this is the second point–what infancy means 
more precisely is to register on an ontological level as an experience 
of speechlessness–an experience prior to saying “I” and with it the 
very idea of subjectivity. In speaking the human subject emerges from 
infancy, which now functions as the negative ground of our being, as 
the very potentiality of language. The origin in relation to which we 
have our place in life lies here. It is an origin that we can never grasp. 
It is that in relation to which we remain divided for it is “the place 
where one can never really be from the beginning.”29 And thus here 
too the origin is not a first cause but that which moves between being 
first and the present moment, transforming pure language into speech. 
In this mediation, which now sets out the difference between language 
and speech and which we can say along with Agamben is the ēthos of 
our humanity, is history. To quote Agamben: “the human is nothing 
other than this passage from pure language to discourse, and this 
transition, this instant, is history.”(Agamben, Infancy and History: 56) 
From this account of the ēthos of our humanity Agamben seems to 
give us a modern version of Sophocles description of the human 
animal. Indeed, it is the case that here too the human is the one who is 
not helpless before its future, but also here we find the human whose 
destiny is one with “its praxis and its history”–a self-giving of a 
foundation. And with this account we have yet another possible 
translation of Heraclitus’s saying. For Agamben, our habitual dwelling 
place is nothing other than that of the daimōnic as, recalling from its 
verbal form, what lacerates and divides. The daimōn is first the one 
who cuts and divides, for “only insofar as it is what divides can the 
daimōn also be what assigns a fate and what destines.”(Potentialities: 
118) A daimōnic scission thus threatens the human in its very ēthos. 
Our place in life can never be grasped without receiving a laceration. 
Thus as Agamben himself translates the saying: “for man, ēthos, the 
dwelling in the ‘self’ that is what is most proper and habitual for him, 
is what lacerates and divides, the principle and place of a 
fracture.”(Ibid) Corresponding to this, the activities of philosophy and 
our living must have their beginnings in marvel and wonder. For 
Agamben, the philosopher can only ever return to where language has 
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already happened. He or she must be at home in the marvel and the 
division. But if the return is the supreme problem for the philosopher, 
Agamben asks what is the “there” to which he or she must, in the end, 
return? What if, Agamben asks, the place to which we return is simply 
the trite words that we have? And, if so, perhaps we could also 
translate Heraclitus’s saying in a final wau: “(in) the haunt of the 
human <history, language, transmission> is the division and the force 
that drives us forward. 
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Introduction 
Some thinkers maintain that our thoughts about the world are 
influenced by such things as point of view, temperament, capacities, 
language, conceptual schemes, scientific paradigm, historical periods, 
and culture. These thinkers are relativist, and there’s approach has 
called relativism. Relativism, as mentioned, takes many shapes and 
forms. Realists hold that reality is independent of our thinking, even if 
it is up to us how we think about it. Relativists, on the contrary, hold 
that what there is, and what is true, depends on many things such as 
point of view and conceptual schemes, and consequently a neutral 
standpoint for evaluating the cognitive norms and moral values in not 
available to us.     
Relativism is frequently defined negatively, in terms of the 
doctrines it denies, as well as positively, in terms of what it affirms.A 
number of philosophers who, despite their protestations, are frequently 
accused of being relativists-Hilary Putnam, Nelson Goodman, Richard 
Rorty, and maybe even Jacques Derrida- can be seen as negative 
relativists in so for as they tend to deny universalism and objectivism, 
but do not accept straightforword attempts to relativise epistemic and 
moral values to social or historical contexts. (see, Baghramian, 
2004:3)        
Relativism is a form of anti-realism. Realism and anti-realism have 
stronger and weaker forms that can be separated from each other. The 
word ‘real’ is derived from Latin res, which means things both in the 
concrete and abstract sense. Thus, ‘reality’ refers to the totality of all 
real things, and ‘realism is a philosophical doctrine about the reality of 
some of its aspects. (Niiniluoto, 1999:1). 
As realism is divided into several subdisciplines, the doctrines of 
anti-realism are likewise divided into a number of varieties.Relativism 
is in fact a bundle of different doctrines. We can distinguish between 
the broad categories of cognitive, moral and aesthetic relativism. 
Cognitive relativism can be subdivided into categories such as 
ontological, semantical, epistemological and methodological. Any of 
this four categories may include some items. Ontological categories 
include objects, facts, world and reality; semantical include truth, 
reference and meaning; epistemological categories include perception, 
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belief, justification and knowledge; methodological categories include 
inference, rationality and progress; and moral categories may include 
at least customs, values, ethics, law, politics and religion. 
On the other hand, there is a great variety of factors which some 
category might be taken to be relative to. Some of the most important 
factors are: persons, groups, cultures, environment, languages, 
conceptual frameworks, theories, paradigms, points of view, forms of 
life, gender, social class, social practices, social interests and values. 
Relativity to individual persons has been called ‘subjectivism’ and 
‘protagoreanism’. Relativity to cultures is ‘cultural relativism’; 
relativity to languages or conceptual or theoretical frameworks is 
usually called ‘conceptual relativism’ or ‘framework relativism’, or 
‘incommensurabilism’; relativity to viewpoint is ‘perspectivism’; 
relativity to gender is ‘gender relativism’; and relativity to social 
factors is ‘class relativism’, or ‘social relativism’.(Ibid, 228). 
It is also helpful to distinguish between local and global form of 
relativism. The former restricts its claim to a specific category (as 
reality that may be relative to culture), while the latter generalizes this 
claim to all categories. For example, global subjectivism asserts that 
everthing is relative to individual persons, but local subjectivism may 
be restricted to morality only. (Ibid.229). 
Discussion of the many faces of relativism occupies a highly 
prominent place in the epistemological literature. Why is this? Briefly, 
the reason is because of the theoretical interest and varieties of 
arguments for philosophical and epistemic relativism. Relativist, from 
Protagoras to postmodern philosopher, frequently appear able to start 
from plausible, commonly held assumptions about the nature of 
knowledge and deduce from these assumptions that we really know 
from our points of view, our mental structure, our forms of life, our 
languages, our conceptual frameworks and soon. Non- relativist 
philosophers then face the task of identifying the mistake in these 
otherwise plausible assumptions. 
The measure of all things 
The first known statement of a relativist position in western 
philosophy is a famous dictum by Protagoras.He famously asserted 
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that ‘Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are that they 
are, and of the things which are not, that they are not’(Plato, 
1997:theat. 152-a1-3). What did he mean? Plato took him to mean: 
‘Each things appears [phainesthai] to me, so it is for me, and as it 
appears to you, so it is for you-you and I each being a man’ (Ibid. 
152a6-8). 
This famous dictum can be interpretated from individualistic, 
ontological, logical, alethic and cultural points of view. 
It seems that ‘man’ in the dictum refers to the individual person, 
and that Protagoras’ thesis has more in common with modern 
subjectivist views than relativism. SextusEmpiricus at times interprets 
Protagoras’ dictum as a subjectivist thesis in the sense that ‘every 
appearance whatsoever is true’ (Burnyeat 1976a:172). 
The ontological dimension of Protagoras’ relativism commits him 
to the view that ‘what appears to each individual in the only reality 
and therefore the real world differs for each’ (Guthrie, 1971:171). 
The logical reading of the doctrine is supported by Plato’s report 
that Protagoras rejected the principle of non-contradiction. The logical 
interpretation is also favoured by Aristotle who argued that for 
Protagoras ‘contradictory statements about the same thing are 
simultaneously true’ and that ‘it is possible either to assert or deny 
something of every subject’ (Aristotle, 1908: Met. [100] b) 
Plato also attributes a thesis of alethic relativism, or relativism 
about truth, to Protagoras, to the effect that if somebody believes or 
judges P, then P is true for that person (Baghramian, 2004:29). 
Whatever the preferred interpretation of Protagoras relativism, it is a 
mark of the great anxieties cauced by Protagoras’ arguments that both 
Plato’s theory of Forms and Aristotle’s formulation of the categories, 
which included the category of ‘the relatives’, were, in part, attempts 
to neutralize the threat posed by it (Barnes, 1988:90). 
Plato in Theaet offers three interlinked arguments to show that 
relativism is self-refuting. Suppose you come to a decision in your 
own mind and then express a judgement about something to me. Let 
us assume with Protagoras that your judgement is true for you. But 
isn’t it possible that the rest of us may criticise your verdict? Do we 
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always agree that your judgement is true? Or does there rise up against 
you, every time, a vast army of persons who think the opposite, who 
hold that your decisions and your thoughts are false? …Do you want 
us to say that you are then judging what is true for yourself, but false 
for the tens of thousands? …And what ofProtagoras himself? Must he 
not say this, that supposing he did not believe that man is the measure, 
any more than the majority of people, then this Truthof his which he 
wrote is true for no one? On the other hand, suppose he believed it 
himself, but the majority of men do not agree with him; then you see-
to begin with- the more those to whom it does not seem to be the truth 
outnumber those to whom it does, so much the more it isn’t than it is? 
(Plato, 1997: Theaet, 170d-171a) 
One main objection to Protagorean relativism is that, when we 
form our beliefs and theories, we are aiming to represent things as 
they really are. That means we think it is possible not only to succed, 
but to fail. We succed when our beliefs and theories represent things 
as they are, and we fail when they do not (See. Kirk, 1999:39). 
It has also been argued that the main problem with Protagorean 
relativism is that a relativist cannot distinguish between what is right 
and what one thinks is right. Hilary Putnam maintains that the 
relativist cannot make sense of the distinction between being right and 
thinking that he is right. However, the distinction between being right 
and thinking that one is right is essential to our ability to distinguish 
between asserting and making noises (Baghramian, 2004:35). 
Aristotle argues that Protagoras’ doctrine implies that contradictory 
judgements are true at the same time about the same thing. Aristotle 
says, 
Again, if all contradictory statements are true of the 
same subject at the same time, evidently all things 
will be one. For the same thing will be a trireme, a 
wall, and a man, if of everything it is possible either 
to affirm or to deny anything (and this premise must 
be accepted by those who share the views of 
Protagoras). For if any one things that man is not a 
trireme, evidently he is not a trireme; so that he also 
is a trireme, if, as they say, contradictory statements 
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are both true. And we thus get the doctrine of 
Anaxagoras that all things are mixed together; so 
that nothing really exists. (Aristotle, 1908: Met, 
book 𝛤, 1007621) 
The relativist assumes that every utterance and its negation is true. 
Therefore, the relativist is unable to make a meaningful statement, and 
even the very expression of relativism as a position is meaningless 
since it does not exclude its denial. In this way relativism involves 
flouting the law of non-contradiction. 
Mind, Language and the world   
Is the world come ready-made or we divide it into various categories 
and kinds by applying a conceptual scheme or categorical framework? 
Are we buildworls by building systems of beliefs? Is this a true 
proposition that worlds are created through system of description, and 
different worlds are created by different systems of description? 
No doubt our thoughts about the world are influenced by such 
things as point of view, capacities, experiences, temperament, religion 
and culture. But some thinkers maintain that we make or construct the 
world. Nelson Goodman goes much further and maintains that, not 
only what exists itself depends on us, but even reality is relative. 
Quinesuggests that even the ‘truths’ of logic and mathematics may be 
‘revisable’ and are not ‘necessary’ in any respectable sense. These 
thoughts sum up under the title of ‘conceptual relativism’.  
Before elaborating the Goodman’s conceptual relativism, let me 
mention very briefly to Popper’s three worlds. 
In popper’s terminology, world 1 contains physical things and 
processes -from middle-sized ordinary objects to small (atoms), large 
(stars, galaxies), and process like entities (fields of force). 
World2 is the domain of consciousness, in both animals and human 
beings. It consists of the mental states and processes within individual 
minds. For humanity, world 2 thus contains what is called ‘psyche’ or 
‘soul’. 
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World3 consists of the products of human social action. It consists 
of abstract entities like propositions, arguments, theories, and natural 
numbers (see Niiniloto, 1999:23). 
Many people can doubt about the reality of Popper’s world 2 and 
world 3 and maintain that these two world and theirs entities are 
relative to language and conceptual schemes or to culture.But most 
people properly think that Popper’s world 1 and entities within this 
world are real and completely mind- independent. An ontological 
realist insists that world 1 is ontologically mind- independent. Even if 
we can interact with it and transform it though our actions, we are not 
the creators of the world 1. Religious man and woman believe that in 
the beginning of time the world was created by God. 
The anti-realist, on the contrary, insists that ‘reality’ simply is the 
picture presented by human judgement, not some unreachable 
abstraction we are perpetually striving to grasp. This is the position 
that Goodman embraces. According to Goodman one builds worlds by 
building systems of beliefs. Goodman’s position stems from the long-
standing dispute between realist and anti-realist philosophers.  
We can find the seed of this line of thought or conceptual 
relativism in German idealism, especially, in Kant’s transcendental 
idealism and Nietzsche’s perspectivism. The basis of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism is the distinction of appearance and things in 
itself. According to Kant our empirical knowledge is a compound of 
that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty 
of cognition supplies from itself. Kant argues that: 
What objects may be in themselves, and apart from 
all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains 
completely unknown to us. We know nothing but our 
mode of perceiving them. (Kant, 1933: A42-B59) 
Intuitions are those representations by means of which objects are 
given to us, and concepts those by means of which we think about 
objects. Accordingly, objects of our cognition are mere appearances. 
In sum, our mode of cognition determines objects constitution. For 
Kant, the categories of understanding are the universal and necessary 
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conditions of thought and knowledge. But new Kantian thinkers do 
not insist on there being a unique and immutable scheme. 
Nietzsche reject the distinction between the noumenal and the 
phenomenal world. He claims that we not only construct the world in 
which we live but also can construct it in different ways. Nietzsche 
writes of the invention of thinghood and [our] interpreting it into the 
confusion of sensation (Nietzsche, 1968:§552). He argues: ‘the value 
of the world lies in our interpretation… previous interpretations have 
been perspective valuations by virtue of which we can survive in life’ 
(Ibid.,§616). He also writes of truth as something which is ‘a mobile 
army of metaphors … [he proclaims that] truths are illusions of which 
we have forgotten that they are illusions’ (Nietzsche, 1999: 146). 
According to Nietzsche, since we cannot appeal to any facts or 
criteria independently of their relation to the perspectives we have, we 
can do little more than insist on the legitimacy of our own perspective, 
and try to impose it on other people. In sum, Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism refers to this position that truth is relative to historically 
conditional points of view. 
Goodman and radical relativism  
Nelson Goodman in Structure of Appearance and ways of 
worldmaking changed the current conception of conceptual relativism 
and developed what he called a “redical relativism”. As Harris 
properly says, the title, ways of worldmaking, is appropriately chosen 
because Goodman really means that we actually make different 
worlds by creating different theories or systems. (Harris, 1992:65) But 
every systems consist of many statements that may be incompatible 
whit each other. Goodman observes that apparent conflicts between 
plausible statements can often be resolved by relativization to frames 
of reference: 
Consider, to begin with, the statements ‘the sun 
always moves’ and ‘the sun never moves’ which, 
though equally true, are at odds with each other. 
Shall we say, then, that they describe different 
worlds, and indeed that there are as many different 
worlds as there are such mutually exclusive truths? 
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Rather, we are inclined to regard the two strings of 
words not as complete statement as ‘under frame of 
reference A, the sun always moves’ and ‘under 
frame of reference B, the sun never moves’ –
statements that may both be true of the some worlds. 
(Goodman, 1978:2) 
According Goodman we can have many describtion of the world, 
but there is no way of describing the world independently of all frams 
of reference. Much more striking thing is the vast variety of frams of 
reference or versions and vision in several sciences… Even with all 
illusory or wrong or dubious versions dropped, the rest exhibit new 
dimensions of disparity. Here we have no neat set of frams of 
reference. (Ibid, 3) 
In Goodman’s radical relativism even truth is relativized to 
different worlds or versions. No doubt this relativism is consistent 
with the pragmatic theory of truth. Indeed, the only guiding principles 
for system choice and ‘worldmaking’ are pragmatic. Correspondence 
whit a world independent of all versions has no place in Goodman’s 
philosophy. He explicitly rejects the notion that there is any sort of 
criterion or test for measuring the accuracy of a theory by its 
correspondence with world in any realist sense (Goodman, 1972:30). 
However, he insists that contradictory and incompatible sentences 
cannot be simultaneously true of the same world. 
I maintain that many world versions-some conflicting 
with each other, some so disparate that conflict or 
compatibility among them is indeterminable- are 
equally right, nevertheless, right versions are 
different from wrong versions: relativism is restrained 
by consideration of rightness. Rightness, however, is 
neither constituted nor tested by correspondence with 
a world independent of all versions. (Goodman, 
1996:144) 
Goodman wants to replace the objective notion of truth with the 
relative concept of rightness.Description of the world from a realist 
point of view can be true or false. In Goodman’s relativism the truth 
and falsity of judgements are relative to the versions of individual. 
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The idea of worldmaking is the ontological aspect of his relativism. 
Goodman describes the process of worldmaking in terms of 
composition and decomposition. He argues that: 
Much but by no means all world making consists of 
taking apart and putting together, often conjointly: on 
the hand, of dividing wholes into parts and 
partitioning kinds into sub-species, analyzing 
complexes into component features, drawing 
distinctions; on the other hand, of composing wholes 
and kinds out of parts and members and subclasses, 
combining features into complexes, and making 
connections. Such composition or decomposition is 
normally effected or assisted or consolidated by the 
application of labels: names, predicates, gestures, 
pictures. (Goodman, 1978: 7-8) 
We have to ask whether Goodman’s relativism and worldmaking 
should be understood literally or metaphorically. Is he simply 
confusing World 1 and 3? Before answering to these questions, let me 
to refer to Goodman’s important article under the title of ‘on star 
making’. He in that article replaces the concept of worldmaking with 
the notion of starmaking and claims: 
Now we thus make constellations by picking out and 
putting together certain stars rather than others, so 
we make stars by drawing creation boundaries rather 
than others. Nothing dictates whether the sky shall be 
marked off into constellations or other objects, we 
have to make what we find, be it the Great Dipper, 
Sirius, food, fuel, or a stereo system. (Goodman, 
1996:145)                              
Stars and constellations are made by us. Worlds or world versions are 
constructed by human beings. No doubt, many versions of the world 
can be right, but many other versions of the world are wrong. 
Therefore, some ways of worldmaking yield true or right worlds and 
that others yield false worlds. Although Goodman calls his position 
“radical relativism” he, at the same time, imposes severe restraints to 
that. He says, ‘willingness to accept countless alternative true or right 
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world-versions does not mean that everything goes, …that truths are 
no longer distinguished from falsehoods, but only that truth mush be 
otherwise conceived than as correspondence with a ready-made world 
(Goodman, 1978:94). If some world-versions are to be right and 
others wrong, there must be some standards or “rightness” according 
to which such an assessment is made. Goodman’s standard of 
rightness is his notion of fit with practice (Ibid, 138). 
Now we must answer to the above mentioned question: whether 
Goodman’s Idea of worldmaking should be understood literally or 
metaphorically? Goodman says, ‘we do not make stars as we make 
bricks; not all making is a matter of molding mud. The worldmaking 
mainly in question here is making not with hands but with minds, or 
rather with languages or other symbol systems’ (Goodman 1996:145). 
Does he mean that we have to take his Idea of worldmaking 
metaphorically? The answer is no, because he then adds: ‘yet when I 
say that worlds are made, I mean it literally…’(Ibid).Thus, he clearly 
wishes to make the radical claim that the project of worldmaking goes 
all the way from artefacts to what the realist takes to be objective, 
non-relative physical reality. 
Goodman’s position has interesting relations to Thomas Kuhn’s 
claims about theory-relative ‘worlds’. Also, since according to 
Goodman individual statements have truth-values only relative to 
some theory of description or some frame of reference, he also aligns 
himself very closely with Quin’s holism. These similarities are readily 
apparent in Goodman’s discussion of the comparison of ‘the sun never 
moves’ and ‘the sun always moves’. But unlike Quine, who gives 
ontological preference to a world composed of physical objects, 
Goodman does not attribute ontological priority to any particular 
frame of reference (see Harris, 1992, 61-68). Goodman, like Kuhn, 
maintains that there are no good epistemological grounds for 
preferring one kind of system or frame of reference to another. 
Objections to worldmaking theory 
Goodman’s radical relativism faces several difficulties. There are 
some subtle objections to his theory. One problem facing Goodman is 
how to distinguish between right and wrong versions. As we saw, 
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Goodman argues that a description is right if it fit with the practice for 
which the version has been constructed. Goodman relativises the 
rightness of design and truth of statements to a system. There are 
criteria of rightness or ‘fit’, but they are based on the specific purpose 
that a version serves. This allows us to assess judgments within a 
given system or version, but we are left with no metacriteria to 
adjudicate between all those versions that are internally coherent or 
workable (see Baghramian, 2004:232). 
Furthermore, Goodman’s criteria of rightness might be interpreted 
as relative to his own meta-theory of worldmaking. Harvey Siegel 
says, meta-version is itself only one countless possible meta-versions. 
So the restraints on radical relativism which keep it from being the 
case that “everything goes” in Goodman’s relativism are themselves 
relative to Goodman’s meta-version. Relativity of versions re-arises at 
the level of meta-version. In short, it is the case that not “everything 
goes” only in Goodman’s meta-version (see Harris, 1992: 70-71). 
According to John Searle, when Goodman writes, “we make stars 
by drawing certain boundaries rather than others”, there is no way to 
understand that claim except by presupposing something there on 
which we can draw boundaries … contrary to Goodman, we do not 
make “worlds” ; we make description that the actual world may fit or 
fail to fit. But all this implies that there is a reality that exists 
independently of our system of concepts. Without such a reality, there 
is nothing to apply the concept to (Searle, 1997: 22-28). 
As we saw, Goodman argues that ‘we make constellations by 
picking out and putting together certain stars rather than others’ 
(Goodman, 1996:145). He also insist that ‘when I say that worlds are 
made [by us], I mean it literally (Ibid). It seems certain that it is up to 
us whether and how we use words ‘star’ or ‘Himalayas’. But that by 
no means implies that the existence of star or Himalayas is also up to 
us. They are out there regardless of how we descript them. As John 
Searle says, ‘different descriptions of facts […] came and went, but 
the facts [such as Himalayas] remained unaffected’ (Searle, 1997: 28-
29). 
It is important to emphasize that, as Harvey siegel has argued, 
Goodman’s relativism, like all other relativistic claims, is self-refuting 
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because Goodman believes his ‘restrains on radical relativism, his 
criteria of rightness to be version- neutral, and to pick out his version 
as right. But, by his own scheme, those restraints, those criteria cannot 
be seen as version- neutral, but rather must be seen as part of his meta-
version-and so cannot non-question-beggingly pick out his version as 
right’ (Siegel, 1987: 155-6). 
The relativist tells us things are relative to A, B or C, but this is a 
self-refuting claim that we are not really capable of taking seriously. 
This is not to say that relativistic position is not a serious one about 
our epistemological and cognitive relationship to the worlds. Rather, it 
seems certain that we cannot help but believe in some rational and 
ontological principles and facts such as, non-contradiction, causation, 
deductive reasoning and external worlds.It seems certain that 
existence of something are relative to A, B or C, but there is a logical 
error in argument from “it is possible to relativises some things to A, 
B or C” to “it is possible to relativises everything to A, B or C”. In 
other world, relativism loses all meaning if we try to relativise 
everything. The game of relativizing itself presupposes non-relative 
reality. 
Conclusion 
Protagoras in ancient Greece and Nelson Goodman in modern period 
are two outstanding proponents of relativism. Protagoras relativises 
truth to man: man is the measure of all things. Goodman claims that 
rightness of description and truth of statements are alike relative to 
system. He also relativises ontology to version, and maintains that 
there is no realistic ontology of physical objects to make any one of 
the choices metaphysically or scientifically more desirable than any 
other choice. 
The main problem whit Protagorean relativism is that a relativist 
cannot distinguish between what is right and what one thinks is right. 
False beliefs and self refutivity are other difficulties of Protagorean 
relativism. 
Goodman’s position faces several difficulties such as: (1) since 
there is no meta criteria to adjudicate between versions that are 
internally coherent or workable, he cannot distinguish between right 
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and wrong versions; (2) relativity of versions re-arises at the level of 
meta-version; (3) Goodman’s worldmaking presuppose something out 
there on which we can draw boundaries and complete the process of 
worldmaking. In short, Goodman’s relativism, like all sorts of 
relativism, requires a context and in any context, there are necessarily 
truths and mind-independent realities. 
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Introduction 
In Descartes theological writing, he promotes two jointly puzzling 
theses that scholars have called, ‘peculiar’1 ‘strange’2 
‘incoherent’(Curley, 1984: 569-597), and ‘counter-intuitive.’3 They 
are as follows: 
T1) God freely creates the eternal truths (i.e. Descartes’ Creation 
Doctrine).  
T2) The eternal truths are necessarily true.  
According to Descartes’ Creation Doctrine, God freely chooses 
which propositions (including those of logic and mathematics) to 
make necessary, contingent and possible. However, the Creation 
Doctrine (CD) makes the acceptance of T2 tenuous for CD implies 
that God could have acted otherwise—instantiating an entirely 
different set of necessary truths. Intuitively, though, this seems to 
make the eternal truths not really necessary after all! Commentators 
have sought various ways to harmonize these two theses without 
undoing Descartes’ other important claims.4 Some have argued that 
Descartes did not hold to T1 throughout his career.5 Others have 
rejected T2, arguing that for Descartes, there are no necessary truths 
(Frankfurt, 1977: 36-57). In the paper, “Descartes’s Theory of 
Modality,” Jonathan Bennett seeks to reconcile T1 and T2 by 
relativizing modality to human understanding. Bennett writes, “I 
submit that our modal concepts should be understood or analyzed in 
terms of what does or does not lie within the compass of our ways of 
thinking.” (Bennett, 1994: 647). So for Bennett, ‘impossible’ merely 
means that humans are unable to conceive otherwise: “‘impossible 
that P’ means that no human can conceive of P’s obtaining while 
having P distinctly in mind; and similarly for P’s possibility and its 
necessity”(Ibid). By making the truth value of modal propositions 
dependent on human perception, Bennett is able to make room for 
Descartes’ Creation Doctrine. He writes:  
Given that all modal truths are at bottom truths about 
what we can conceive, and given that God made us how 
we are (this being a truism for Descartes), it follows that 
God gives modal truths their status as truths. He made it 
The Creation of Necessity: Making Sense of …   /155 
 
 
necessarily true that 2+2=4 by making us unable to 
conceive otherwise(Ibid, 649). (Emphasis added) 
Although, Bennett’s attempt to reconcile T1 and T2 has many 
advantages, namely its ability to handle what he calls the “Bootstraps 
Problem,” it suffers from two fatal flaws: First, on Bennett’s view, the 
eternal truths are not truly eternal; and second, the eternal truths 
depend on human perception for their necessity; and these are views 
which Descartes explicitly denies. An additional concern for Bennett’s 
position is that it entails that Descartes overlooks the relationship 
between conceivability and actuality. Bennett argues that Descartes 
overlooks the consequences of his alleged modal conceptualism for 
his arguments in the Meditations:  
By keeping voluntarism [or CD] out of [the Meditations], 
Descartes helped hide from himself the split in his 
thought. Had he let it in, it would have…compelled him to 
become explicitly clear about how indubitability relates to 
truth. Perhaps Descartes was subliminally aware of this, 
that being why voluntarism does not show up in the 
Meditations or either of its cousins—the Discourse on the 
Method and the Principles of Philosophy (Ibid, 652-653). 
All other things being equal we would hope that Descartes did not 
embrace a view that undermined his arguments in the Meditations. In 
order to avoid this less-than-ideal consequence of Bennett’s view, I 
would like to offer an alternate reading of Descartes which reconciles 
T1 and T2 and avoids the problems that plague Bennett’s account. But 
before proceeding, let us examine the textual evidence for T1 and T2. 
The Creation Doctrine 
I have asserted in T1 above that Descartes held that ‘God freely 
creates the eternal truths.’ As stated above, this is part of Descartes’ 
Creation Doctrine; but what exactly does CD entail and how does it 
generate the difficulties mentioned above? First, there are three main 
components of Descartes’ Creation Doctrine. 1) God is the efficient 
cause of all things. Descartes clearly states this in a letter to Mersenne. 
He writes, “You ask by what kind of causality God has established the 
eternal truths. I reply: by the same kind of causality as He created all 
156/   Philosophical Investigation, Fall & Winter 2015/ Vol. 9/ No. 17   
things, that is to say, as their efficient and total cause” (CSMK 3:25). 
2) Since all things are created by God, all things depend on God. 
Descartes writes in the Sixth Replies, “…there is nothing whatsoever 
that does not depend on [God]. This applies not just to everything that 
subsists, but to all order, every law, and every reason for anything’s 
being true or good” (CSM 2:293)6. 3) God freely creates the eternal 
truths. Descartes concept of divine freedom was quite different from 
the received view (or St. Thomas’ view).7 For Thomas, God cannot 
help willing what is good, true and beautiful because these eternal 
truths are part of God’s very nature—they ‘reside’ in His intellect. 
Therefore, when God chooses to create, the choice to create is free, 
but the choice of eternal truths is fixed by God’s nature. In short, God 
is not able to make the eternal truths other than what they are. This 
thereby ensures their necessity—the eternal truths could never have 
been other than what they are. For Descartes, Thomas’ account of 
God’s freedom in creation limits God’s freedom and power and in 
addition, threatens His simplicity.8 Because of this, Descartes believed 
that ‘indifference’ was required for divine freedom. He writes in the 
Sixth Replies, “As for the freedom of the will…It is self-contradictory 
to suppose that the will of God was not indifferent from eternity with 
respect to everything which has happened or will ever 
happen…”(CSM 2:291). Descartes goes on to explain that if God had 
beliefs about what was “good or true” before God willed them to be, 
He would be impelled by his beliefs to create accordingly and 
therefore, He would not be truly free:  
…it is impossible to imagine that anything is thought of in 
the divine intellect as good or true, or worthy of belief or 
action or omission, prior to the decision of the divine will to 
make it so. I am not speaking here of temporal priority: I 
mean that there is not even any priority of order, or nature, 
or of rationally determined reason’ as they call it, such that 
God’s idea of the good impelled him to choose one thing 
rather than another. (CSM 2:291-2)  
Descartes is careful to emphasize the ‘simultaneity’ of God’s 
believing and willing so that one will not necessitate the other. 
Therefore, for Descartes, God selects the eternal truths arbitrarily (or 
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more fairly ‘indifferently’): In short, God is free to “make it not true 
that all radii of the circle are equal—just as free as He was not to 
create the world” (CSMK 3:25). The result of the doctrine of divine 
indifference is that God’s power and freedom is unlimited. God is free 
to instantiate whatever mathematical, logical and moral truths he 
wishes. As we see in this selection from a 1644 letter Mesland, God 
even was free not to create the law of non-contradiction or to make 
2+2≠4(CSM 2:294): 
“The power of God cannot have any limits…[This] shows 
us that God cannot have been determined to make it true 
that contradictories cannot be true together, and therefore 
he could have done the opposite” (CSMK 3:235). 
And for Descartes, the result of God’s actual decision to will the 
law of non-contradiction into being, is that it ‘becomes’ necessary.  
In order to help us understand the nature of the contradiction 
between T1 and T2, let us rewrite T1 as T1’ according to what we 
have learned about what Descartes means when he says that God 
freely creates the eternal truths. 
T1’: If God freely creates the eternal truths, then God could have 
made 2+2≠4. 
As we have seen above, Descartes believed that God’s freedom in 
creation entails that God could have made the laws of mathematics 
different than what they are so the consequent follows from the 
antecedent. Now let us turn to the textual evidence for T2: 
The Necessity of Eternal Truths 
In addition to being freely and indifferently created, Descartes also 
believed that the eternal truths are necessarily true (as stated in T2 
above). In a 1640 letter to Mesland, Descartes writes that God willed 
“that some truths should be necessary” (CSMK 235). What does 
Descartes mean here by necessity? Descartes describes the eternal 
truths, such as the truths of geometry, as having “a determined nature, 
or essence, or form…which is immutable and eternal” (CSM 2:45). 
There are also texts where Descartes speaks of the eternal truths 
holding in all possible worlds (although, it is important to note that 
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Descartes probably didn’t think of ‘possible worlds’ in the same way 
as contemporary metaphysicians). For example, Descartes writes in 
the Discourse on Method, “I showed what the laws of nature were, 
and… to show that they are such that, even if God created many 
worlds, there could not be any in which they failed to be observed” 
(CSM 1:132). In addition to the passages listed above, there is also 
systematic, inter-textual evidence for Descartes’ belief in the necessity 
of eternal truths (Kaufman, 2002: 24-41). Descartes’ commitment to 
true and immutable natures in the ontological argument, his belief that 
we clearly and distinctly perceive necessary truths, and his 
commitment to the a priori in his physics would all be undermined if 
the eternal truths were not necessary in the strongest sense (Curley, 
1984: 547). Therefore, in order to avoid destabilizing many of 
Descartes’ views, we must have a robust understanding of the 
necessity of the eternal truths. So we can rewrite T2 as T2’: 
T2’: If the eternal truths are necessarily true and 2+2=4 is an eternal 
truth, then 2+2=4 is a necessary truth. 
As I showed above, Descartes believed that the eternal truths are 
necessarily true. I also showed that a simple mathematical truth, like 
2+2=4, is an example of an eternal truth. Therefore, for Descartes 
2+2=4 is necessarily true. 
If the contradiction between T1 and T2 was not immediately 
apparent above let me use the amended T1’ and T2’ to show that a 
direct contradiction follows from their joint acceptance: 
T1’: If God freely creates the eternal truths, then God could have 
made 2+2≠4. 
a1) God freely creates the eternal truths. 
b1) God could have made 2+2≠4 
c1) If God could have made 2+2≠4, then it was possible for 2+2≠4. 
d1) It is possible for 2+2≠4. 
e1) Therefore, it is not necessary that 2+2=4. 
T2’: If the eternal truths are necessarily true, then it is necessarily 
true that 2+2=4. 
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a2) The eternal truths are necessarily true. 
b2) Therefore, it is necessarily true that 2+2=4. 
As one can see e1 and b2 follow from T1’ and T2’, respectively, 
and that e1 and b2 are directly contradictory: It is impossible that 
2+2=4 is both necessarily and not necessarily true. In the following 
section I will discuss Bennett’s proposed solution to this difficulty.  
Bennett’s Conceptual Analysis of Modality 
As mentioned above, Bennett seeks to reconcile T1 and T2 through 
relativizing modality to human perception. He argues that since what 
is necessary is just what humans (and perhaps other persons) believe 
is necessary, then God’s indifference in creation does not undermine 
the strong modal status that necessary truths require in Descartes’ 
work. To support this claim, Bennett points out that throughout 
Descartes writings is an “intensely subjectivist strand, in which issues 
about what is really the case are displaced by or even equated with 
issues about what to believe or about what can be believed.”(Bennett, 
1994: 651). Indeed, Descartes stated quest in the Meditations is to find 
indubitable propositions to form a solid base for knowledge—
Descartes often emphasizes our perception of truth over truth 
simpliciter: This is evidenced in the following passages: 
We should think that whatever conflicts with our ideas is 
absolutely impossible and involves a contradiction. 
(Emphasis Mine—CSMK 3:202) 
There is no point in asking by what means God could have 
brought it about from eternity that it was not true that twice 
four make eight, and so on; for I declare that this in 
unintelligible to us. (Emphasis added—CSM 2:294). 
In these passages it seems that Descartes is saying that the truth of 
modal propositions is relative to our perceptions of them. In addition, 
in texts such as the following letter to Arnauld, Bennett argues that 
what Descartes is saying is that when God wills certain modal 
‘propositions,’ what God is really doing is willing a determinate set of 
human mental faculties. Descartes writes: 
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…I would not dare to say that God cannot make a mountain 
without a valley, or that one and two should not be three. I 
merely say that he has given me such a mind that I cannot 
conceive a mountain without a valley, or an aggregate of one 
and two which is not three, and that such things involve a 
contradiction in my conception. (CSMK 3:358) 
According to Bennett, the pairing the statements, “It is not 
impossible for God to make an uphill without a downhill” and “we 
cannot conceive of an uphill without a downhill” (Ibid, 645) should 
lead the reader to believe that the truth value of modal propositions is 
dependent on human perception. The modal proposition “it is 
impossible for there to be a mountain without a valley” is true only 
because we think that it is true. 
One key benefit of Bennett’s interpretation is that it addresses the 
‘Bootstraps Problem’—a problem that plagues all non-conceptualist 
interpretations of Descartes’ Creation Doctrine, according to Bennett. 
The problem is that if God were free to choose any set of eternal 
truths, God is then able to select those truths that guarantee Himself 
necessary existence. The flip-side of this, though, is that God was also 
free to choose his own non-existence (or his own contingent 
existence). So did Descartes really think that God was indifferent with 
respect to the nature of his own existence? It seems that Descartes 
would have rejected the possibility of God bringing about his own 
non-existence; but the difficulty is finding a principled and textually 
plausible way to insulate God’s person from Descartes’ own Creation 
Doctrine. For Bennett, God’s necessity just consists in our inability to 
conceive of God’s non-existence. The Bootstraps problem is not a 
problem on Bennett’s interpretation because it is meaningless for the 
conceptualist to ask if it ‘was’ possible for God to bring about his own 
non-existence. Why? Namely, on a conceptualist framework, humans 
are not able to ask these questions. Some may object that this is not 
really a solution at all; because what is in question is God’s modal 
ontology. But, to ask such a question, according to Bennett, is to pre-
suppose non-conceptualism or commit a category mistake. Although it 
might be a misnomer to call Bennett’s interpretation a ‘solution’ to the 
Bootstraps problem, it does at least untie that particular knot for 
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Descartes. However, as we shall see next, by untying this knot, 
Bennett creates some additional tangles for himself. 
Objections to Bennett’s View 
Although Bennett’s interpretation has much in its favor, textual 
support, an interpretation that takes both T1 and T2 into account, and a 
‘solution’ to the Bootstraps Problem, it also suffers from some serious 
difficulties. As mentioned above, if Bennett’s view is correct, 
Descartes would be guilty of ignoring the question of how our 
perceptions of what is necessary is connected to what is actually 
necessary.9 We will not rehearse this objection again, but will move 
on to two, more serious objections: First, on Bennett’s view, the 
eternal truths would not be eternal and second, the eternal truths 
would not be dependent on God, but on his creatures.  
First, if the modal status of propositions depends on human 
perception alone, then the eternal truths cannot be eternal for the 
obvious reason that humans are finite. This is a serious departure from 
Descartes’ intentions. He is clear that the eternal truths have been true 
for all time (and/or have been timelessly true). And second, Descartes 
is clear that the eternal truths depend on God alone and not on his 
creatures. However, on Bennett’s interpretation, the necessity of 
eternal truths depends on the persons who perceive them; their 
necessity is not dependent on God, but on created beings. Descartes, 
however, is clear that there is no one thing that is not dependent on 
God. The following texts provide evidence both for the eternality of 
the eternal truths, and their sole dependence on God: Descartes writes 
that “…we should not suppose that eternal truths ‘depend on the 
human intellect or on other existing things’; they depend on God 
alone, who as the supreme legislator has ordained them from eternity” 
(Emphasis mine—CSM 2:293). Again Descartes is unequivocal about 
the dependence of all things on God when he writes, “…there is 
nothing whatsoever that does not depend on [God]. This applies not 
just to everything that subsists, but to all order, every law, and every 
reason for anything’s being true or good” (CSM 2:293). Additional 
evidence for the eternality and divine dependence of the eternal truths 
can be found in the Fifth Meditation: 
162/   Philosophical Investigation, Fall & Winter 2015/ Vol. 9/ No. 17   
When, for example, I imagine a triangle, even if perhaps no 
such figure exists, or has ever existed, anywhere outside my 
thought, there is still a determined nature, or essence, or 
form of the triangle which is immutable and eternal, and 
which is not invented by me nor does it depend on my mind. 
(Emphasis added—CSM 2:44-45) 
And in Descartes’ First Letter to Mersenne, he writes: 
The mathematical truths that you call eternal have been 
laid down by God and depend on him entirely, no less than 
the rest of his creatures. Indeed, to say that these truths are 
independent of God is to talk of him as if he were Jupiter or 
Saturn and subject him to the Styx and the Fates (Emphasis 
added—CSMK 3:23). 
So from the above, it is clear that Bennett’s interpretation cannot be 
right because Descartes is very clear that the eternal truths must be 
both eternal and dependent on God alone.  
Bennett, however, is not without a response. He argues that the first 
objection (i.e. that on his view the eternal truths are not actually 
eternal) misunderstands the nature of his conceptualist account of 
modality. When the critic wonders if the eternal truths are actually 
eternal, this question presupposes a non-conceptualist understanding 
of modality. The conceptualist cannot countenance such a question: 
“Anything we say now about the modal status that a proposition had 
or does or will have, or would have if…, must be determined by our 
actual present intellectual limits.”(Ibid: 664). Given these limits, the 
eternal truths are eternal—humans cannot conceive of a time when the 
eternal truths did not or will not hold. According to Bennett, this is all 
the content we are entitled to give the concept of eternality. Although, 
conceptualism about modality may be a coherent position deserving of 
defense, it is a different question whether or not Descartes himself was 
a conceptualist. It seems that the most natural reading of the text 
(CSM 2:44-45, CSMK 3:23-24), would lead any non-philosophically 
motivated reader to conclude that Descartes literally believed that the 
eternal truths have been true and will be true eternally.  
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Bennett does not directly respond to the second objection (i.e. that 
on his interpretation the eternal truths depend on created beings and 
not on God) but focuses on a text that seems to explicitly contradict 
his position:  
“Hence we should not suppose that eternal truths ‘depend 
on the human intellect or on other existing things’; they 
depend on God alone, who is the supreme legislator, has 
ordained them from eternity”  
Bennett argues that Descartes only appears to contradict his 
conceptualist position, because he is replying to a critic who has asked 
if the “truths depend solely upon the intellect while it is thinking of 
them, or on existing things, or else they are independent…’”10 (CSM 
2:281).  
According to Bennett, Descartes’ response is that they do not 
depend on the human intellect in this way—while the intellect is 
thinking of the eternal truths. So he concludes that Descartes only 
appears to say that the eternal truths do not depend on the human 
intellect, but in fact, Descartes is only denying that they depend on the 
intellect while it is thinking of them. 
Bennett’s reading of the above text is questionable: if Descartes 
wanted to say that the necessity and the eternality of the eternal truths 
depend on human perception in any way, then Descartes was 
philosophically sophisticated enough to unequivocally state this. Even 
if one grants that Bennett’s reading of this single text is plausible, 
Bennett does not address all the other texts that clearly state that the 
eternal truths depend on God alone (CSM 2:44-45, CSMK 3:23-24). It 
is strange that Bennett thinks that this single text is the only truly 
problematic text as the overall impression one receives from reading 
Descartes’ theology is that everything, including the eternal truths 
depend on God. 
I believe that there is a better way to account for the subjective 
language that Bennett observes in Descartes. Descartes often speaks in 
subjectivist language because his project of methodological doubt 
required it. Bennett notes that passages, such as the above following, 
prioritize human subjective impressions: “Everything which 
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I…understand is …created by God so as to correspond…with my 
understanding of it” (CSM 2:54). It sounds at first as if God creates 
the world to match our perceptions. But this is taking the above quote 
too literally. Given the supremacy of God in Descartes’ theology, it is 
unlikely that Descartes intended this interpretation. There is another 
explanation for the “intensely subjectivist strand” (Bennett, 1994: 
651) that we find in Descartes. Descartes stated objective in the 
Meditations is to find solid, indubitable truths on which to base human 
knowledge. If Descartes was a conceptualist, then there would be no 
need to question the reliability of his perceptual faculties as he does in 
the Meditations. Descartes wants to find some propositions that are 
actually true so that we might have a solid foundation for all 
knowledge. In short, Descartes project of methodological doubt 
explains the subjective language that Bennett observes. Descartes 
believed that having clear and distinct perceptions of some idea meant 
that this idea was actually true independent of our thinking that it was 
true. It is the fact that certain things are necessary that we cannot 
conceive of them otherwise, not the other way around. Bennett has the 
causal direction backwards: Our concepts are not what ‘create’ 
necessity, but it is because God willed certain propositions to be 
necessary that we conceive certain things as necessary. Our 
understanding is constrained precisely because God has made certain 
things impossible (possible, contingent, necessary etc.). Since God is 
not a deceiver, God is able to fashion our perceptual faculties in such a 
way so that they will correspond to what is real: “Everything which I 
clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so 
as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it” (CSM 2:54). 
The reason our subjective modal impressions are the way they are is 
because God made modal truths the way they are. 
An Alternate Account of Cartesian Modality 
A more accurate interpretation of Cartesian modality would ideally 
embrace both T1 and T2, while giving a plausible answer to the 
‘Bootstraps’ problem. It was the original difficulty of reconciling T1 
and T2 that motivated Bennett’s conceptualism. But, as we have seen, 
Bennett’s route is not textually open to us. Therefore, there must be a 
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way to coherently embrace both T1 and T2 while avoiding Bennett’s 
conceptualism about modality. 
As I argued above, there is a strong textual case that Descartes 
would have embraced T1’ and T2’. (I don’t think this claim would be 
very controversial among Descartes scholars). I also argued above, 
that what follows from T1’ is e1 and what follows from T2’ is b2. And 
e1 and b2 are directly contradictory:  
e1) It is not necessarily true that 2+2=4. 
b2) It is necessarily true that 2+2=4. 
If Descartes means the same thing by each of his terms in e1 and b2 
then Descartes has directly contradicted himself. However, I will 
argue that for Descartes, these propositions are not contradictory. This 
is because of the way Descartes uses the modal terms that are involved 
in the supposed contradiction above. In short, the modal terms 
Descartes uses are indexed to God’s willing. So the sense in which 
Descartes uses, ‘possible’ or ‘could’ depends on what relation the 
term bears to God’s willing. For example, in passages where 
Descartes is specifically addressing God’s freedom in creation, modal 
terms used should be understood as indexed sans God’s willing of the 
eternal truths. In other words, by formulating the Creation Doctrine, 
Descartes is imagining God ‘before’ He has willed what is to be 
necessary. Speaking in this way e1 is true: God could have made it so 
that 2+2≠4 and so it is not necessary1 that 2+2=4. However, God has 
timelessly willed that 2+2=4 so cum God’s willing the eternal truths, 
it is necessary2 that 2+2=4. This makes b2 also true. So given the 
adjusted meanings of necessarily1 and necessarily2, e1 and b2 do not 
involve a contradiction: 
e1) It is not necessarily1 true that 2+2= 4. 
b2) It is necessarily2 true the 2+2=4. 
I am not accusing Descartes sloppy equivocation because Descartes 
only uses necessity1 when he is speculating about divine freedom (or 
when he speaks about what is possible for God). Because of this, the 
Descartes scholar can make a principled distinction between the two 
senses of ‘necessity’ that Descartes uses. 
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Some might argue that ‘necessity2’ is not what we mean when we call 
something ‘necessary’. If a proposition could have been otherwise, 
then it is not really necessary. Although we might wonder if 
Descartes’ notion of ‘necessity’ is robust enough for us, Descartes 
would have been satisfied with his account of modality. This is 
because for Descartes, God’s willing something to be a certain way is 
sufficient for it to be that way. When God willed []P, His will 
guaranteed that []P. So, necessity2 is real necessity for Descartes. 
Some might object that Descartes is cheating—that his explanation 
seems cheap and unsatisfying. Descartes, however, is not being 
disingenuous. In fact it is what we should expect of Descartes given 
his Creation Doctrine—that all things originate from the will of God 
(Kaufman, 2005: 1-19). Descartes scholar, Dan Kauffman makes the 
excellent point that to expect to know why ‘[]P’, beyond that God 
willed that ‘[]P’, is to “expect something to which we are not entitled” 
because the question “‘Why did God do a?’ is in principle, 
unanswerable”(Ibid, 18-19). The question is unanswerable because if 
God had a reason for willing ‘[]P,’ then God would not be indifferent 
with respect to ‘P’. Therefore, for Descartes, God’s will is what 
distinguishes necessarily1 ‘P’ and necessarily2 ‘P’. To require more of 
Descartes is to commit a Cartesian category mistake. 
If the above account of necessity is not convincing, there is 
another, related way to reconcile e1 and b2: this involves the way that 
we understand the phrase ‘not true’ in e1’above. When Descartes 
speaks of what God could have timelessly willed, Descartes is 
speaking of a ‘time’ when nothing (short of God’s existence) had a 
truth value. On CD one can infer that ‘before’ God’s decision to will, 
all truth values were undefined. So for example, one might ask if 2+2 
‘did’ equal 4 sans God willing it to be so; but since this proposition 
did not exist, it had no truth value. So e1’is not false: ~[](2+2 =4), but 
not because it is false that [](2+2 =4), but because it is undefined that 
[](2+2=4). E1 and b2 seem contradictory because we are thinking in 
terms of 2-valued logic, but in situations like the one that Descartes is 
considering, 3-valued logic is called for.  
In Saul Kripke’s work on modality, he developed a 3-valued logic 
that is applicable to descriptions of modality in Descartes’ Creation 
Doctrine. For Kripke, “‘necessarily Fa’ means ‘a is F in every world 
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where a exists.’”11 So worlds where a does not exist, do not count 
against the necessity of Fa. So the world where God has not yet willed 
any proposition is a world where 2+2≠4 because this proposition does 
not ‘yet’ exist. Necessarily 2+2=4, is true because on Kripke’s system 
of logic we are allowed to ignore worlds with empty domains—
namely the world that existed sans God’s willing mathematical 
propositions. Therefore, e1 and b2 are not contradictory in 3-valued 
logical systems such as Kripke’s. 
The ‘Bootstraps’ Problem 
Last, what might we say about the Bootstraps problem? Could it be 
that, Descartes thought God was indifferent with respect to his own 
existence? Could God have brought it about that He did not exist? It 
seems that Descartes would have made every attempt to block this 
undesirable consequence of his Creation Doctrine. But Descartes does 
not explicitly address this issue. There could be three reasons why 
Descartes did not address this: 1) Descartes overlooked this 
consequence of his Creation Doctrine 2) Descartes did not state the 
implications of CD because he was afraid of being charged with 
heresy or 3) Descartes thought that the answer was obvious. First, let 
us assume that Descartes was too good of a philosopher to overlook 
such obvious and major implications for his view; therefore, I will rule 
out 1, leaving either option 2 or 3. I will argue that either option 
represents a solution to the ‘Bootstraps’ problem. It will be sufficient 
for our purposes to show that either 2 or 3 will work because my goal 
is just to demonstrate that there are responses to the Bootstraps 
problem available to the non-conceptualist. 
Second, it is possible that Descartes meant to have CD apply to 
God’s own person. On this view God was indifferent with respect to 
his own existence: God was free to bring about His necessary 
existence or was free to bring about His own non-existence. There are 
texts that imply that Descartes might have meant this. In the Fifth 
Meditation Descartes’ explains that our understanding of the necessity 
of God’s existence is like the necessity of certain geometrical 
properties: 
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Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is 
one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any 
shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs to 
his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct 
than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that 
some property belongs to its nature (CSM 2:45). 
In the above text, our understanding of the necessity of certain 
mathematical truths is being paired with our understanding of God’s 
necessary existence. This text seems to imply that if God’s existence 
and the existence of certain mathematical properties are similar, then 
God could also have also brought about His own non-existence. This 
view has the advantage of straightforward consistency—Descartes 
does not need to make an exception for God’s person in CD. Although 
this interpretation diminishes God’s supremacy, Descartes might 
argue that limiting God’s freedom/power in any way (even his 
freedom to bring about his own non-existence) is limiting God’s 
supremacy.  
According to the third option, Descartes did not address the 
bootstraps problem because he thought the answer was obvious. There 
are hints in Descartes’ writings that he did not believe that the 
Creation Doctrine applied to God’s own person. For instance, 
Descartes writes to Mersenne that “the existence of God is the first 
and most eternal of all possible truths and the one from which alone 
all the others proceed” (CSMK 3:24). This passage implies that God’s 
existence is immune from the effects of CD—that God was not 
indifferent with respect to his own existence. Descartes also seemed to 
think (as can be seen in the above texts) that God could not have 
brought it about that there was a class of things that existed and did 
not depend on God’s conservation. Descartes writes, “there cannot be 
any class of entity that does not depend on God” (CSM 2:294). This 
leads us to believe that Descartes thought that God was not indifferent 
about the dependence of all things on Him. Another reason why we 
might believe that the above two propositions represent a higher-order 
necessity for Descartes, is that his argument for the existence of God 
depends on God being a necessary being. If it were possible for God 
to instantiate the eternal truths and then bring about His own non-
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existence, then Descartes’ argument for God’s existence12 in the Third 
Meditation would fail. It might seem ad hoc for Descartes to make an 
exception to CD for God’s existence. However, this exception is 
consistent with Descartes’ theological views. God’s existence and the 
dependence of all things on God was a foundational belief for 
Descartes. There are some beliefs that one takes as basic that cannot 
be analyzed further. For Descartes, God is the most basic and absolute 
ground of being.  
Conclusion 
Bennett’s approach to Cartesian modality is misplaced: One does not 
have to resort to conceptualism about modality in order to explain the 
subjective language found in Descartes or to reconcile Descartes’ 
Creation Doctrine with the necessity of the eternal truths. After 
showing that Bennett’s argument implies that Descartes held the non-
eternality of the eternal truths and the independence of the eternal 
truths from God, I offered two arguments reconciling the Creation 
Doctrine with the necessity of the eternal truths. First, I showed that if 
one understands Descartes’ use modal terms as indexed to God’s 
willing, then apparent contradictions vanish. Second, if one evaluates 
the truth value of modal propositions ‘non-bivalently’, then one can 
also unravel the apparent contradiction. After arguing that one can 
reconcile Descartes’ Creation Doctrine and the necessity of the eternal 
truths without Bennett’s conceptualism, I addressed the Bootstraps 
problem. I argue that there is textual evidence for two, different 
interpretations that both adequately address the problem. Although, 
there is not enough space in this paper for a full-scale analysis of the 
Bootstraps problem, the point is that one does not need to resort to 
conceptualism in order to offer a consistent interpretation of 
Descartes. 
Notes: 
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4. Namely, Descartes’ a priori physics, his clear statements that God is 
not a deceiver, his view that clear and distinct ideas are a guide to truth, and 
Descartes’ arguments for the existence of God. 
5. A. Koyre, Essai sur l’idee de Dieu et les preuves de son existence 
chez Descartes (1922): 19-21. in Harry Frankfurt, “Descartes on the 
Creation of Eternal Truths,” The Philosophical Review 86, No. 1 (1977): 36-
57. 
6. All references to Descartes’ writings come from either CSM: John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Duglad Murdoch (eds.), The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, volumes I and II (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985) or CSMK: John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff, Duglad Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (eds.), The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes, volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991). 
7. I label Thomas’ position as the traditional view although other 
scholastics (Scotus and Suarez) differed in their creation doctrines.  
8. Henry Frankfurt argues that Descartes might have been motivated by 
concerns about God’s simplicity when he formulated his Creation Doctrine: 
Descartes was concerned that by giving logical or temporal priority to God’s 
intellect in creation, would create more than the accepted distinction of 
reason in God rendering God a complex entity. Therefore, Frankfurt argues 
that Descartes might have formulated CD as a response to scholastic views 
that he believed threatened God’s simplicity. 
9. And if they are not, God is a deceiver. 
10. This is Bennett’s translation of the Sixth Objections (CSM 2:281) 
11. Gramme Forbes, An Introduction to Modal Logic, unpublished 
manuscript. 
12. The argument for God’s existence in the Third Meditation grounds 
God’s existence is the dependence of all things on God. 
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I. Place's approach in outline 
It seems that identity is an issue in which usually the metaphysicians 
or the logicians are interested. However, the person who is the true 
pioneer of what became known as the identity theory of mind, whose 
papers paved the way for turning contemporary philosophers to 
materialism is not a metaphysician or logician; rather he is a 
psychophysiologist whose name is U. T. Place. Although he 
introduces himself as the one who is sympathetic to behavioristic 
approach attributed to Ryle and Wittgenstein (Place, 2004a, p. 45), in 
general, he is a part of an influential philosophical tradition elaborated 
in the bundle theory of mind, whose gist can be reported as  
The mind is a kind of theatre, where several 
perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, 
repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of 
postures and situations. There is properly no 
simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different, 
whatever natural propension1 we may have to imagine 
that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the 
theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive 
perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we 
the most distant notion of the place where these scenes 
are represented, or of the materials of which it is 
composed (Hume, I, IV, §VI). 
Such viewpoint caused Place to firmly adopt a reductive approach 
to the mind so that, regardless of some adjustments, it has remained 
unchanged from about 1950s until his death in 2000. According to his 
adopted view, conscious experiences are not events which have 
occurred in a mysterious place so-called the mind, nor are events 
managed by such entity which has been brought into being from a 
completely different material compared to what our body has been 
made of. He holds that conscious experience (or what is usually 
recognized as a mental event), “is an integral and vital part of the 
causal mechanism in the brain that transforms input into output, 
stimulus into response, thereby controlling the interaction between the 
organism and its environment” (Place, 2004j, p. 28).2 Although, this 
functional definition is not necessarily inconsistent with a dualistic 
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approach; he expressly emphasizes on a reductive one and believes 
that all states of consciousness are processes in the brain (Place, 
2004a, pp. 46-7 & 2004j, p. 15), that it is a reasonable scientific 
hypothesis (Place, 2004a, p. 46). (See also: Ayer, 1971, p. 23.) But 
when one asserts that “all A's are B's”, there will be always an 
ambiguity of how it must be interpreted; “all A's have the same 
intension as B's have” or “all A's have the same extension as B's 
have”. What Place intends, as I think, is the latter (Place, 2004f, p. 
87).1 So to say that “all states of consciousness are processes in the 
brain” is not to say that “these two are synonyms”. It is to say that 
there are two types of things, mental events and a certain as yet 
unspecified type of cerebrospinal activity, “which do not just happen 
to satisfy two descriptions but are such that the features that lead us to 
apply the one description also leads us to apply the other, and where 
the absence of the same features would in all cases lead us to 
withdraw both” (Ibid, p. 82). This perfect correlation between two 
types of events, in such a way that causes them to be equivalent, 
finally convinces him to acknowledge their identicalness (Ibid, p. 89). 
He casts his hypothesis in Leibniz's principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles2 as below 
(1)   ∀𝑥∀𝑦[(𝛢𝑥 ≡ 𝛢𝑦) ⊃ (𝑥 = 𝑦)]      
Leibniz's principle has been previously refuted by Kant (A264 / 
B320 & A272 / B328 & A281-2 / B337-8). To find an outlet keeps 
Place away from being confronted by Kant's critiques, if there is any, I 
propose another formulation for his hypothesis. Place speaks about a 
common property which can be attributed to a brain process same as a 
mental event (Place, 2004g, p. 102); instead, I suggest to speak about 
two different but equivalent types of describing an event. It can be 
formulated as  
(2)     (∀𝑥)(𝑀𝑥 ≡  𝐵𝑥) 
That is to say, scientific research will ultimately show that for any 
event x there is an equivalence between analyzing it as a mental and as 
a brain event. Our suggested formula contains the very equivalence 
which Place looks for. Applying one of these two descriptions leads us 
to apply the other; if not, in all cases leads us to withdraw both. So, 
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the only problem confronting the psychophysiologist is the problem of 
showing how a mental event could be equivalently described as a 
brain process or vice versa. This formula cannot be ruled out of court 
by a priori philosophical argument3 because it is basically proposed to 
explain the abundance of experimental observations and will be lastly 
verified by them, so its truth is a posteriori. This is parallel to the 
fourth Newtonian rule emphasized in Principia: “propositions 
gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either 
exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, 
until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact 
or liable to exceptions” (Smith, 2004, p. 159).4 In brief, Place's 
reductive approach to the true nature of mind-brain relationship is 
entirely same as Schlick's approach to the fate of all philosophical 
problems, wherein he says: “some of them will disappear by being 
shown to be mistakes and misunderstandings of our language5 and the 
others will be found to be ordinary scientific questions in disguise” 
(Schlick, 2002, p. 19).   
II. Refuting Place's approach 
Place develops his hypothesis in such a way that one may think it will 
lastly make its rival positions become no longer in use. Moreover, 
there may be some connections between his approach and artificial 
intelligence, which has recently attracted remarkable attentions 
towards itself. Due to this supposed connections, disapproving his 
approach is not easy. But I think his hypothesis is not reasonable as he 
claims. Since I challenge the justifiability of his position, especially of 
reducing mental events to brain events and philosophical problems to 
scientific ones, it will be necessary for me to discuss and try to raise a 
number of problems concerning which one of his hypotheses is 
untenable. I am going to do so via discussion about four theses 
supporting his position. I think whatever makes these theses valid (or 
invalid), will also be able to strengthen (or weaken) his position. The 
reader will give me the greatest aid in the task of trying to make these 
matters clear if he kindly assumes that nothing is clear in advance. 
Thesis (1): whatever can be disregarded in a physical explanation, 
can be ontologically disregarded too.    
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According to statement (1), Place's hypothesis is some sort of 
intertheoretic reduction adopted for explaining the relationship 
between events but, at the end, he utilizes it to give a materialistic 
conclusion about the essential nature of what we called mental. As a 
general rule, if we develop a new and very powerful theory which 
entails a set of propositions and principles that can almost perfectly 
mirror the propositions and principles of some older theory or 
conceptual framework, and if the older one parallels a portion of the 
newer one when they are meticulously analyzed, then we may 
properly conclude that we have apprehended the very same reality that 
is incompletely described by the old framework, but with a new and 
more penetrating one (Place, 2004f, p. 89; Churchland, 1999, pp. 26-
7). So a materialist may argue as below:  
Premise (1): what is now apprehended by a physical conceptual 
framework is the very same reality that has been already 
apprehended by a psychological one.   
Premise (2): the physical framework just needs to presuppose only 
one type of matter for a proper explanation and 
prediction. 
Conclusion: if a chain of causes is required to explain an event then, 
based on identity theory, those links of the causal chain 
where a dualist fills by events occurred in (or managed 
by) a mysterious entity so-called the mind can be filled 
by the cerebrospinal events. Therefore, quite the opposite 
of a dualistic claim, there is no justified reason for 
presupposing a type of matter rather than what the 
physical framework presupposes.  
It is an ontological restriction deduced from a physically efficient 
explanation. But “there is no conceivable experiment which could 
decide between materialism and epiphenomenalism”, Smart asserts 
(Smart, 1959, p. 155). Because what epiphenomenalist supposes rather 
than materialist has no causal effect and hence does not appear in the 
causal chain required to explain an event, so it can be omitted in an 
explanatory reasoning. But, despite this, we are not justified to omit it 
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ontologically. Therefore Place cannot justifiably settle disputations in 
favour of a materialistic position.  
Smart's disputation holds an internalistic approach to the 
justification, so Place, in reply to his objection, appeals to an 
externalistic response. He abandons his rival objection by reliance on 
a commonsense belief, holding that any hypothesis of mind ought to 
be consistent with our commonsense and to explain it as a matter of 
fact, as much as possible.6 As a commonsense belief, we all believe 
that ‘how and what we think and feel affects what we say and do’. It 
seems that identity theory is more compatible with the above belief 
than epiphenomenalism or even psychological parallelism (Place, 
2004c, p. 79). Perhaps, we initially think that Place can avoid Smart's 
objection by using an externalistic approach, but it will finally make 
his program end up methodologically in an incompatibility. Although 
this incompatibility is a short cut to rebut Place's hypothesis but I 
leave it to be discussed in thesis (4).  
Let us turn to materialist argument especially where he claims: 
those links of the causal chain filled by mental events can be 
equivalently filled by the cerebrospinal events. It is what I cast in 
statement (2). If so, we have  
   (3)     (∀𝑥)(𝑀𝑥 ⊃  𝐵𝑥) 
That is to say, for any event x if regarded as a mental event then 
scientific researchers will ultimately show that what occurred is a 
brain event; however, Place's assertion is partly stronger. He claims 
what occurred is a certain, yet unspecified type of brain event (Place, 
2004f, p. 82 & 2004c, p. 76). But is it a universal proposition applying 
to all states of mental events whatsoever, as Place claims? 7 Is pain a 
certain type of brain event, for example, C-fibers firing? If so, then 
there might be a madman (or even a Martian) who sometimes feels 
pain, just as we do, but whose pain differs greatly from ours in its 
causes and effects;8 in this case, could we justifiably claim that he 
feels whatever, if he feels one, but his feeling is not pain?9 How 
should he behave or react so that we are convinced that he is in pain? 
Although the case of madman (or Martian) is sufficient to show that 
Place's assertion is not applicable to all states of mental events 
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whatsoever, but of course, objections are not restricted to these 
unusual cases. Neuroscientists recently hold that the functional 
properties of neurons and the functional architecture of the cerebral 
cortex are dynamic, some modifications in neural network have been 
seen which are effective in recovery of function after neural lesions, 
and thus a part of neural network might undertake the role of other 
ones (Gilbert, 1999, p. 598). So while Place insists on the one-to-one 
match between a given type of mental event and an unspecified type 
of brain event, neuroscientific discoveries show that mental events 
might be realizable to a great extent. Place's interpretation of 
statement (3) unjustifiably ignores these discoveries. After all, his 
other assertion might still be justified: these objections have been fut 
forward by scientific researches and can be settled by the same 
researches as well. So the disputation about the true nature of mind-
brain relationship is still a scientific issue. However, analyzing Place's 
response to token identity can refute this assertion as well.  
Physical multiple realizations of mental events, beside other 
reasons, lastly convinced some such as Davidson to introduce a 
version of token identity which I formulate as: 
(4)      (∃𝑥)(𝑀𝑥 ∧  𝐵𝑥) 
10 
That is to say, there is at least an event, such as a, regarded as a 
mental event causally related to a physical event, such as b. Since, to 
Davidson, there is no strict psychophysical law relating a mental event 
to a physical one,11 so if two events instantiate a strict law then both 
are physical; that is, a itself also must be a physical event (Davidson, 
2001a, especially p. 224). For two reasons, Place rejects token 
identity. I formulate his first reason, based on what logical empiricists 
named verification principle, as these:     
Premise (1): When we utter a statement, it is factually significant, if 
and only if, we can specify any observations relevant to 
the determination of its truth or falsehood. But if it is of 
such a character that the assumption of its truth, or 
falsehood, is consistent with any assumption whatsoever 
concerning the nature of our future experience, then it is, 
if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition. 12 
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Premise (2): Unlike type identity physicalism, token identity 
physicalism rests not on the outcome of future 
psychophysiological research but on an a priori 
argument; that is, it is not committed to any prediction as 
to what future empirical research will reveal (Place, 
2004f, p. 88 & 2004c, p. 73).   
Conclusion: So any putative psychophysical token identity statement 
is not factually significant. 
Assessing truth-value of our suggested formulas, (2) and (4), help 
us to understand Place’s another reason. “There is no conceivable 
prospect of the truth of any psychophysical token identity statement 
being established in the future that does not depend on the prior 
establishment of the truth of a psychophysical type identity 
statement”, he writes (Place, 2004f, p. 88). I can add, moreover, if 
statement (2) is false then statement (4) will be consequently false too; 
in other words, if we are to abandon the former we have to abandon 
both. These two replies of Place to token identity offend the other part 
of his hypothesis; because he, contrary to his previous claim, settles 
the debate on type and token identity by a priori argument rather than 
scientific research. 
Type identity, based on statement (2), implies another consequent 
statement as below; in a way that statement (2) is a conjunction of 
statement (3) and (5). 
(5)     (∀𝑥)(𝐵𝑥 ⊃  𝑀𝑥) 
That is to say, for any event x if regarded as a brain event then 
scientific researchers will ultimately show that what occurred is a 
mental event; of course, according to Place's type-type identity, it is a 
certain type of mental event. But what is claimed to be revealed, is not 
of those possible results straightforwardly verified or disproved by 
experiment, rather it is of those which is manifested through one's own 
introspective reports and we have no choice but to postulate it as a fact 
of what occurred within individuals. Due to this, Place adopts a 
behavioristic approach (Place, 2004a, p. 45)13 or somewhere employs 
the adverbial theory of sensation (Place, 2004a, pp. 50-51 & 2004j, 
pp. 15-6). Although these solutions are partly effective, there are still 
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some problems which are yet open to debate. (a) We do not know for 
certain that the adverbial theory is applicable to all mental events 
(Lowe, 2004, pp. 118-9). (b) Place holds, for most cognitive concepts, 
there can be an analysis in terms of dispositions to behave. There is, 
however, no limit to the ways in which individuals might manifest a 
given mental event; so in giving a definition for it, we will have an 
open-ended list of behaviors. But no term can be well-defined whose 
definition is open-ended and unspecific (Ibid, pp. 42-4; Churchland, 
1999, p. 24). Moreover, as I think, “an open-ended list” is not to say 
that if we can anyhow add more behaviors to the list then we will 
correspondingly come nearer to understand the given mental event. 
There is no guarantee for this achievement. (c) Based on invert 
spectrum argument, it seems perfectly conceivable that two 
individuals' color experiences might be systematically inverted with 
respect to each other. If it was the case, both of them would 
nonetheless have exactly the same powers of color-discrimination and, 
other physical circumstances being equal, both of them would apply 
color terms to objects in exactly the same way (Lowe, 2004, pp. 53-5). 
That is to say, two perfectly different mental events might have been 
felt even in exactly the same physical and behavioral circumstances. 
(d) There is also a more fundamental problem. Behavioristic approach 
is based on an assumption that language and behavior always function 
in the same way, always serve the same purpose: to manifest what 
occurs within (Wittgenstein, §304).14 What does convince us not to 
doubt this presupposition?15 
All these demonstrate that our suggested formula, statement (2), 
although is useful to clarify what Place exactly claims but is 
inadequate to explain the true nature of mind-brain relationship. 
Recently, some physicalists prefer to substitute type identity with 
strong and weak supervenience. According to proposed definitions for 
them (McLaughlin, 1996, p. 558), I formulate strong supervenience as  
(6)      □[∀𝐵(𝐵𝑥) ⊃  ∃𝑀(𝑀𝑥)]  ∧  □(𝑀𝑥 ⊃ 𝐵𝑥) 
And weak supervenience as 
(7)      □[∀𝐵(𝐵𝑥) ⊃  ∃𝑀(𝑀𝑥)]  ∧ (𝑀𝑥 ⊃ 𝐵𝑥) 
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Although, on the one hand, the former may acknowledge a 
reductive approach16, as I think, it is not appropriate for depicting 
Place's standpoint about how linguistic conventions necessarily 
determine the referent of a given name. It will be discussed with more 
specifics in thesis (3). On the other hand, the latter does not seem to be 
so that lastly obliges us to subscribe to reductionism (Davidson, 
2001a, p. 214); furthermore, it does not satisfy Place's position on the 
true nature of mind-brain relationship. Because his position is a 
materialistic one, and any robust materialistic position needs to 
guarantee that what is material determines all that there is in the 
world, whereas it cannot give such guarantee (Kim, 1993, p. 63). 
Briefly, there are, of course, numerous events physically related to 
each other but if we try to insert these related events in a determinate 
one-to-one correspondance imposing an ontological restriction on 
them, then things will not turn out as we assumed.  
Thesis (2): there are psychophysical causal laws appropriate to 
mature our understanding of mind-brain relationship. 
Type identity needs some sort of psychophysical causal laws 
whereby can relate and reduce one type of events to another. Since 
Place holds that “any dispositional statement is itself a universally 
quantified causal law in the sense that is required” (Place, 2004c, p. 74 
& 2004g, p. 103 & 2004h, p. 108), thus it is obvious that he will refute 
any disapproval of regarding dispositional statement as, for example, 
token identity elaborated by Davidson.  
According to token identity, Davidson asserts that there is no 
psychophysical law that causally relates and reduces one type of 
events to another. He holds that “any effort at increasing the accuracy 
and power of a theory of behavior forces us to bring more and more of 
the whole system of the agent's beliefs and motives directly into 
account”. Furthermore we traditionally regard human as a rational 
agent so, in inferring this theory from the evidence, all the requisites 
of being a rational agent must be fulfilled. These requisites result in 
more or less acceptable theories in such a way that there is no 
objective ground for any choices (Davidson, 2001a, pp. 221-2). It is 
because we may give necessary conditions for acting on a reason; 
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however, we cannot give sufficient ones. What prevents us from 
giving both necessary and sufficient conditions for acting on a reason 
also prevents us from giving serious laws connecting reasons and 
actions (Davidson, 2001b, pp. 231-3 & 2001a, pp. 223-4). “There may 
be true general statements relating the mental and the physical, 
statements that have the logical form of a law; but they are not law-
like”, Davidson adds. Even if, anyhow, “we were to stumble on a non-
stochastic true psychophysical generalization we would have no 
reason to believe it more than roughly true” (Davidson, 2001a, p. 
216). In other words, there is a difference between being causally 
related and being in such a way that can instantiate a law. There may 
be some dispositions, as Place claims, which make a given man have 
some behaviors but it is not to say that, based on these dispositions, 
there must also be a law relating situations and behaviors in such a 
way that whenever that given man had been faced with such-and-such 
situations, and if such-and-such further circumstances had been 
satisfied, he would have behaved in such-and-such a way.17 We 
cannot say so. Because, on the one hand, human is a rational agent; he 
ceaselessly considers various factors surrounding him, thus he may 
suddenly give up an action and busy himself with an unpredictable 
one. Therefore, his action cannot be described in a closed system18 and 
hence there cannot be psychophysical laws, those which his situation 
and behavior instantiate as cause and effect.19 On the other hand, such 
psychophysical laws are to reduce human behavior into world of 
physics while the rational aspects of human behavior have no place in 
the world of physics. Imagine how odd it is to say that Newtonian 
laws will properly answer if the material particles are truthful 
representations of their mass or of the magnitude of exerted forces. In 
general, Davidson claims that a universal true statement is law-like if, 
and only if, can be capable of sustaining a true counterfactual 
conditional while a dispositional statement is not so. Unlike him, 
Goodman puts forward considerable reflections which can affect both 
Davidson's and Place's position. 
First, Goodman asserts that counterfactual conditionals and laws 
capable of sustaining them have their own difficulties and are 
troublesome (Goodman, 1983, pp. 3-27 & especially pp. 34-8). So he 
offers focusing on dispositions instead of dealing with counterfactual 
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conditionals and their sustaining laws (Ibid, pp. 38-9 & pp. 86-7). He, 
of course, emphasizes that it is not certain this changing in strategy 
solves anything by itself (Ibid, p. 40), whereas, Place thinks it can be 
so. In any case, since dispositional statement says something 
exclusively about the internal state of a thing (or an event) while 
counterfactual says in addition something about the surrounding 
circumstances (Ibid, pp. 39-40), therefore turning from the later to the 
former is also in accord with Place's internalistic approach which I 
will clarify in thesis (4). 
Second, when we distinguish law-like from non-law-like, we do 
nothing except seeking to know which one is justifiably capable of 
receiving confirmation from our observations. Suppose that a scientist, 
here a neuroscientist, by means of electroencephalogram observes that 
“whenever a mental process occurs, there occurs a corresponding 
brain process that has the same degree of complexity as the mental 
process reported by the subject, has all the causal properties required 
to generate the behavior that the mental process is supposed to 
generate, and whose occurrence is a causally necessary condition for 
the occurrence of that behavior” (Place, 2004c, p. 76). Based on his 
observation, he makes hypothesis 𝐻1 
𝐻1:     All mental processes are brain processes. 
He may seem justified to believe in 𝐻1  because a number of 
evidences confirm it. But some further examples will show that his 
accepted theory of conformation not only includes a few unwanted 
cases, but is so completely ineffectual that it virtually excludes 
nothing. Suppose that, for example, all instances of crudes extracted 
before a certain time t are black. At the time t, it depends on our 
observations recorded up to time t, all evidence statements assert that 
crude a is black, that crude b is black, and so on; and each confirms 
the general hypothesis 𝐻2  
𝐻2:     All crudes are black.  
Now suppose that, after time t, environmental conditions change in 
such a way that we can observe an instance of gray crude, for the first 
time. Let us introduce another hypothesis 𝐻3 as this 
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𝐻3:      All crudes are blay. 
That is to say, any instances of crude are blay, if observed up to 
time t and in that observation it is black, otherwise, it is gray if 
observed after time t for the first time. If so, then at time t we have, for 
each evidence statement that given crude is black, a parallel evidence 
statement asserting that that crude is blay. And the statement that 
crude a is blay, that crude b is blay, and so on, will each confirm the 
general hypothesis 𝐻3 that all crudes are blay. 
Now, while the neuroscientist seems to be justified to believe in 
𝐻1, nevertheless, based on his accepted theory of confirmation, we 
have a serious problem of 𝐻2  and 𝐻3 . They make incompatible 
predictions about the result of observation after time t. According to 
the former, what we will observe is an instance of black crude; 
whereas according to the latter, we will observe an instance of gray 
one. We are not justified to hold one and reject the other because they 
both are confirmed equally by evidence statements describing the 
same observations.20 If so, then we may introduce one (or more) 
alternative(s) for 𝐻1  which are based on evidence statements 
describing the same observations, but make incompatible prediction. 
These cases, “though seldom encountered in practice, nevertheless 
display to the best advantage the symptoms of a widespread and 
destructive malady” (Goodman, 1983, p. 80).   
It shows that hypotheses, and indeed laws, are not merely 
summaries of the observations (Ibid, pp. 84-5), otherwise, laws could 
be justifiably confirmed only by them. There may be no certain 
relationship between evidence cases and laws. But if there is no such 
relationship then what determines the genuine nature of laws? 
Unfortunately, there is not still a complete agreement on how this 
question ought to be answered. “Empiricists are inclined to interpret 
laws as summaries of observation. Realists are inclined to interpret 
laws as tendency statements grounded in a hierarchy of assumptions 
about the natures of the physical systems which possess them.21 Yet 
other philosophers are inclined to interpret at least some Laws of 
Nature as grammatical rules, specifying the way in which certain 
concepts are to be used” (Harré, 2000, p. 221). Now, which account 
ought to be preferred? It seems that there is no one common feature 
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which marks out all and only laws, that is to say, there may be a 
family resemblance between the various cases in which we would use 
the term “law” (Ibid, p. 221; Wittgenstein, §67). While the laws are so 
then it is quite misleading to claim that, by means of laws, you are to 
know the true nature of mind-brain relationship. However, it seems 
that Place claims to do so.  
Thesis 3: over the times, scientific discoveries develop/readjust the 
meaning of words employed to describe our mental life.  
Nowadays, it is too difficult to neglect the success of scientific 
approach in making a great deal of alterations around us. Thus, 
materialists are used to speaking about these successes in such a 
exaggerated manner that one may assume our perception of mental 
events (e.g. pains, itches, mental images, and so on), as other issues, is 
also exposed to a gradual development/readjustment in meaning so 
that the meaning of our words will eventually not be as it has been 
before. It is this standpoint that Place employs to deal with a problem 
that threatens the validity of his approach. When we claim that there is 
a perfect correlation between two events in such a way that implies 
their identicalness, there exists a necessity here (Place, 2004f, p. 82). 
But to Place, it is just analytical propositions which are referring to 
such perfect and hence necessary correlations. If so, since the truth 
value of these propositions is determined completely and exclusively 
by linguistic conventions, then these propositions basically do not 
refer to factual states of affairs expected to be revealed through a 
scientific discovery.22 As a permanent tradition in philosophy, those 
propositions referring to factual states of affairs have been regarded as 
synthetic not analytic, as ones referring to contingent states of affairs 
and not to necessary ones. So in arguing for type identity theory of 
mind, Place needs to argue for the existence of a kind of proposition 
that is necessarily true and its truth value determines anyhow by 
referring to factual states of affairs not exclusively by some linguistic 
conventions. By criticizing Quinean skepticisms on the sentences such 
as “Whatever is green is extended”, where, according to Quine, it is 
not clear whether it is true analytically or synthetically (Quine, 1951, 
pp. 31-4), Place found what he was looking for. He writes:  
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There is a linguistic convention whereby the predicate 
“green” … is restricted in its application to extended 
substances and their surfaces; and if we apply the 
principle that a statement that is true solely by virtue 
of linguistic convention is analytic, that makes the 
statement “Whatever is green is extended” an analytic 
proposition. … However, to claim that there is 
evidence for the existence of a linguistic convention 
that forbids the ascription of color predicates to non-
extended objects is not to deny that underlying that 
linguistic convention there is a contingent fact about 
the physics of light, namely, that, as far as we know, 
photons can only reach the eye of an observer if they 
are emitted from and/or reflected by some kind of 
extended object, and that, consequently, it is only such 
objects that can be distinguished by their color (Place, 
2004d, p. 153).23  
This could be the very Archimedean support needed to dislocate 
the rigid boundary seemed to be drawn between analytic and synthetic 
statements forever. The thing needed to be solved was introducing a 
process through which a synthetic proposition could transform to an 
analytic one. If he could anyhow do so then the problem would be 
solved completely. For Place, of course, we are acquainted with such 
process; or at least, scientists must be so (Place, 2004e, p. 179). He 
holds that, as a result of cumulative empirical discoveries that render 
the old manners of talking inconveniently and inappropriately,24 some 
of the sentences that previously expressed an analytic truth cease to do 
so and sentences that were previously synthetic become analytic 
(Place, 2004d, p. 154).25 In his 2004f paper, Place more clearly 
explains how aforesaid transformation occurs:    
[We all know that] the observations on the basis of 
which we describe a sample as a case of water and the 
observations on the basis of which we describe it as 
H2O are widely separated. Nevertheless, the fact that 
the predicates have the same extension … is so well 
established and so widely known that “Water is H2O” 
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has become an analytic statement and, by the criterion 
of what it is self-contradictory to deny, a necessary 
truth. That this conceptual connection has developed 
is shown by the observation that in cases of doubt a 
chemical test showing that a sample has the chemical 
composition H2O takes precedence over all other 
criteria in showing that it is in fact water. A similar 
outcome is to be expected in the case of consciousness 
and the particular pattern of brain activity, yet to be 
identified, in which presumably it consists. As things 
stand, the existence of such a pattern of brain activity 
is… a hypothesis that will be confirmed or 
disconfirmed by future neuropsychological research. 
If, as seems increasingly probable, such research 
establishes both the existence and the nature of the 
pattern of brain activity in which consciousness 
consists, and these results become widely known, the 
development of a similar analytic and necessary 
connection between the two is to be expected (Place, 
2004f, p. 84).26 
In brief, he holds that the attribution of a property which has been 
experimentally discovered about an object becomes sometimes so well 
known that can be expressed in an analytical proposition.27 Place's 
standpoint herein, as I construe, is based on the following three theses:  
Thesis 3.1: For any name or designating expression X, there exist 
specified descriptions28 (or maybe an unspecified cluster 
of descriptions 29) P which the members of a linguistic 
community believe that ‘𝑃𝑋’ and summarize the meaning 
of X. 30  
Thesis 3.2: These very descriptions are sufficient to pick out an 
individual 𝛼 uniquely, which is the referent of X.31 
Thesis 3.3: It is just by an analytical proposition that can necessarily 
attribute the entire descriptions P (or most of them) to 
‘X’. 
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Place necessitates the above-mentioned triplet because he firmly 
believes that it is what occurs when we are referring to something or 
ascribing a property to them.32 He believes that we employ the 
denotation of a noun or designate expression as a criterion for 
deciding whether or not a given instance belongs to the extensions of a 
singular (or even a general) name;33 and it is just due to the fact that 
the meaning of a name summarizes all properties attributing to its 
referent. But is it exactly so?   
Let us take the case of “Chehel-Sotoun”, a very famous mansion in 
Isfahan.34 Supposing that the meaning of “Chehel-Sotoun” 
summarizes all properties which a competent Iranian historian can 
express about this mansion, if someday these properties (or even some 
of them) are not attributable to the present referent of “Chehel-
Sotoun” then do we say that the meaning of aforesaid name has 
changed or it has no referent now? Do we get into trouble in 
identifying the referent of “Chehel-Sotoun”? Certainly, it is not what 
occurs for most of us (or at least for Iranian people). Moreover, we do 
not even try to determine which or how many of these properties must 
remain fixed so that we can be sure that the aforesaid name does not 
lose its referability. Here, someone, such as Searle, claims that in spite 
of this fact that we do not necessarily need specified properties to be 
sure that the aforesaid name does not lose its referability, it is an 
undeniable fact that “Chehel-Sotoun” has a sufficient but so far 
unspecified number of these properties commonly attributed to it so 
that any possible extension lacking at least some of these properties 
could not be the referent of it (Searle, 1958, p. 172). Although Searle 
admits that most of these properties just assign contingent facts to our 
referent but it cannot convince him to claim that a given proper name 
in itself has no sense, because he did not know “how, unless the name 
has a sense, is it to be correlated with the object?” (Ibid, p. 168) So if 
it can be conceivable to explain the correlation between a proper name 
and its referent without supposing any sense then both theses (3.1) & 
(3.2) will be completely abandoned. We know, at least now, it has 
been possible by the causal theory of reference presented by Kripke.    
Kripke asserts that ‘names are rigid designators’; that is to say, 
each of them, regardless of which properties attributing to its referent, 
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in every possible world designates the same object (Kripke, 1980, p. 
48). According to him, properties have no determinant role in 
identifying the referent of a name. Most of people know nothing of 
why a mansion must be named “Chehel-Sotoun” while it has only 20 
columns, some of them even wrongly think it has a porch with 40 
columns; nevertheless, they have no problem in identifying the 
referent of “Chehel-Sotoun”. In explaining why it is so, Kripke 
writes:         
It is in general not the case that the reference of a 
name is determined by some uniquely identifying 
marks, some unique properties satisfied by the referent 
and known or believed to be true of that referent by 
the speaker. First, the properties believed by the 
speaker need not be uniquely specifying. Second, even 
in the case where they are, they may not be uniquely 
true of the actual referent of the speaker's use but of 
something else or of nothing. This is the case where 
the speaker has erroneous beliefs about some person. 
He does not have correct beliefs about another person, 
but erroneous beliefs about a certain person. In these 
cases the reference actually seems to be determined by 
the fact that the speaker is a member of a community 
of speakers who use the name. The name has been 
passed to him by tradition from link to link (Ibid, p. 
106). 
He then adds, as an implicit conclusion, the general term employed 
in assigning a type of objects functions in the same manner too; it has 
“a greater kinship with proper names than is generally realized”, he 
says (Ibid, p. 134). Possession of most of those properties, by which 
we originally identified the instances of a kind, “need not be a 
necessary condition for membership in the kind nor need it be a 
sufficient condition” (Ibid, pp. 119-21). The terms such as pain, 
impression, imagination and the like are also so (Ibid, p. 148). In these 
all cases “the reference actually seems to be determined by the fact 
that the speaker is a member of a community of speakers who use the 
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name”. It appears that causal theory of reference presents a better 
picture than that given by descriptive theses (3.1) & (3.2). 
But what can we do about thesis (3.3)? Is it just an analytic 
proposition which can attribute a necessary truth to ‘X’? Do we have a 
necessary truth of ‘X’ attributed by a synthetic proposition? In other 
words, do we have a posteriori necessary truth of ‘X’? To Kripke, 
some of the problems which bother people in these situations come 
from a confusion, between what we can know a priori in advance and 
what is necessary (Ibid, p. 109). He holds that objects (or a type of 
them) “may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may 
be fixed by a description” (Ibid, p. 96).35 By this initial naming, we 
refer to their essence with no regard to their actual existence or even 
any possible status of existence that they may have.36 Due to this, the 
given name can rigidly designate its own referent in every possible 
world. 
Now, suppose that a physicist stochastically comes across some 
evidence for a new kind of matter. He uses, for example, 𝛷 as a name 
rigidly designating the matter he has come across. By further 
researche, it is discovered that ‘𝛷 ’ is a new element with atomic 
number n. It is certainly something he did not know in advance. It can 
be imagined that this might be an unfamiliar state of an element one of 
those discovered previously or even an unknown composition. But 
once he knows that this is a truth of the very nature of the substance of 
which it is made of,37 it cannot then be imagined that this thing might 
have failed to be an element with atomic number n. Let us introduce E 
as “being an element with atomic number n” then we can formulate 
above situation as    
(8)       □(∀𝑥)(Φ𝑥 ⊃ Ε𝑥) 
According to statement (8), necessarily for any matter x, if it is an 
instance of ‘𝛷’ then it has n proton. But to Place, who believes in a 
descriptive theory of reference, a proposition such as “‘𝛷 ’ has n 
protons” is a synthetic proposition expressing a contingent truth of ‘𝛷’ 
(Place, 2004f, p. 82) which if becomes so well established and so 
widely known, it may transform to an analytical proposition 
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expressing a necessary truth of ‘𝛷’. As he construes, the situation 
must be casted as  
(9)           (∀𝑥)(Φ𝑥 ⊃ □Ε𝑥) 
 According to statement (9), for any matter x, if it is an instance of 
‘𝛷’ then this is a priori known via meaning which necessarily has n 
protons. But it is clearly wrong that a scientist, who is to know the true 
nature of something, thinks the necessity, revealed by his scientific 
researche is a necessity coming from meaning. If the necessity is so 
then he can significantly claim nothing about the true nature. Instead, 
he ought to think that that a necessity comes from the essence of what 
science deals with, which is verified by experiments. That is what 
statement (8) expresses; a posteriori necessary truth of ‘𝛷’. So, if 
Place is to speak about the true nature of mind-brain relationship then 
he ought to abandon thesis (3.3). 
Thesis 4: what is called a mental event is entirely what occurs in 
one's inside, especially in his cerebrospinal system. 
Although Place's approach is fundamentally based on an 
internalistic approach to the mind-brain relationship, he frequently 
oscillates between internalism and externalism. But what does it 
distinctly mean, having an internalistic (or externalistic) approach to 
the subject in hand? 
Suppose that there is a set of factors F to possess a given property 
P in such a way that a subject S possesses property P if and only if F 
is satisfied. According to internalism, none of Fs presupposes the 
existence of anything other than the given S to whom that property is 
ascribed; but to externalism, there may be at least one member of F 
which is not so (Goldman, 2009, p. 2). Therefore, when we discus a 
given mental event, if we assume that none of the factors necessary to 
possess it presupposes the existence of any individual other than the 
subject to whom that event is ascribed then we have an internalistic 
(or individualistic) approach to the issue. And if we do not employ 
such assumption then we have an externalistic approach to the issue. 
Here, what is so important is that the former can be differently stated; 
no mental event presupposes the existence of the subject's body: it is 
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logically possible that a disembodied mind exists to which that event 
can be ascribed (Putnam, 1975, p. 220). This statement, which is 
traditionally attributed to Descartes, adopts a view to the intrinsic 
nature of mental event. Place intends to show that even if, anyhow, we 
can abstractly observe a mental event,38 we will not be inevitably 
obligated to reach to the Cartesian conclusion. It is not an event over 
and above the physical and physiological processes in one's inside. He 
writes:    
I shall assume that … statements about pains and 
twinges, about how things look, sound, and feel, about 
things dreamed of or pictured in the mind’s eye are 
statements referring to events and processes that are 
in some sense private or internal to the individual of 
whom they are predicated. The question I wish to raise 
is whether in making this assumption we are inevitably 
committed to a dualist position in which sensations 
and mental images form a separate category of 
processes over and above the physical and 
physiological processes with which they are known to 
be correlated. I shall argue that an acceptance of 
inner processes does not entail dualism (Place, 2004a, 
pp. 45-6).39 
Therefore, due to the fact that Place has focused all his attention on 
the discussion of the true nature of mind-brain relationship, it makes 
no sense that he is not seriously asserting anything of the true nature 
of mental events when he says: “the properties attributing to mental 
events can be the properties of a brain process, as Leibniz's Law 
requires”. Consequently, he should believe that what determines the 
intrinsic nature of mental events must occur in one's own body, 
especially in his own cerebrospinal system, not in a mysterious place 
so-called the mind. Thus, according to him, when we discuss the 
intrinsic nature of a given mental event, we have no need to 
presuppose the existence of anything other than the body of whom 
that event is ascribed to.40 This is an internalistic (or individualistic) 
approach to the subject. But if he is going to be an internalist so he has 
to retain the approach through his program and never puts an assertion 
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offending this approach. He is not methodologically justified to 
temporarily change his entire approach to the subject whenever he 
reaches an impasse. Anyway, it is indeed an undeniable fact that he 
occasionally did so.41  
Conclusion 
Let us summarize what we have accomplished up to now, if we have 
done any. As we have seen, Place, sympathetic to Schlick, holds that 
philosophical problems about the true nature of mind-brain 
relationship disappears and is settle adhering to materialism and then 
we will find ourselves faced with a purely scientific issue, namely, 
whether there is in fact a physiological process that is identical with a 
given mental event. He holds that this empirical problem will also be 
settled by further psychophysiological researches (Place, 2004b, p. 54 
& 2004c, p. 74). First, I hope to have proved that there are still 
various stubborn philosophical problems which are yet unsettled. 
Therefore, discussing the true nature of mind-brain relationship is not, 
at least so far, a mere scientific problem in disguise. Second, even if 
the philosophical objections will be settled in favor of a materialistic 
view, I hope to have proved that the identity theory is not as tenable 
that Place claims. To be sure, it is not to say that we ought to abandon 
Place’s position entirely. In denying the justifiability of his position, 
we must be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. It is a 
remarkable fact that physical methods work well in so many domains. 
For what need explaining in those domains are structures and 
functions. If these are all that must be explained about mind-brain 
relationship then, although we do not have anything close to a 
complete explanation of them yet, we will have a clear idea of how we 
may explaine them by means of physical accounts. These are the easy 
problems of consciousness, in D. Chalmers' words, because they 
concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions 
(Chalmers, 2007, p. 226 & 233). To explain a cognitive function, we 
need to only specify a mechanism that can perform the function. The 
methods of cognitive science are well-suited for this sort of 
explanations, and so are well-suited to such problems. Nevertheless, 
the key issue is that there are some other problems concerning the 
subject in hand which are not so. These are the hard problems of 
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consciousness because they persist even when the performance of all 
the relevant functions is explained (Ibid, p. 225 & p. 227). It is widely 
agreed that conscious experiences arise from physical bases, but we 
have no good explanation of why and how they arise. Why should 
physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems 
objectively unreasonable that it should, yet it does (Ibid, p. 226 & p. 
228 & 233). So, Place's reductive approach may solve some of the 
easy problems, but it justifiably tells us nothing about the hard ones, 
something about the true nature of mind-brain relationship and its 
components. It is why I believe that discussing the true nature of 
mind-brain relationship is not a mere scientific issue in disguise. 
Notes 
1. Smart also presented an explanation the same as what Place asserted 
in his 2004a paper (Smart, 1959, p.145-7). But, thereafter, Place aimed at 
completing it.  
2. See: Place, 2004c, p. 80 & 2004g, p.102. 
3. It is what Place introduces as the main characteristic of his 
hypothesis (Place, 2004c, pp. 72-3). 
4. To observe a more explicit diction where Place has used this 
criterion, see: (Place, 2004b, pp. 54-5 & 2004c, pp. 79-80). 
5. One of these linguistic analyses will be discussed later, in thesis (3). 
6. Commonsense belief is justifiably applied as much as a fact served 
to verify the result of our researche. A commonsense belief, as I construe, 
satisfies all conditions proposed by Goldman to be weakly justified at the 
primary level (Goldman, 1988, p. 59). Place speaks about commonsense 
beliefs, and about our ordinary psychological language indeed, as if there is 
no reasonable doubt about the justifiability of our primary reliance on them 
(Place, 2004j, p. 28). We should reinterpret them in a new and more 
penetrating framework, not try to eliminate them. This is a sort of 
Reliabilism counted as an externalistic theory of justification (Goldman, 
1988, p. 65).  
7. See: Place, 2004a, p. 47.  
8. See: Lewis, 1983, pp. 122-3. 
9. D. Lewis presents a solution for this problem (Lewis, 1983, p. 126).  
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10. Kim proposes statement (7) instead of statement (4) in order to 
formulate Davidson's position (Kim, 1993, pp. 57-64; Davidson, 2001a, p. 
214). This suggestion seems to be more accurate but, about the subject in 
hand, it is not so. For if I follow Kim, in contrast to Davidson's position, I 
have to cast Place's statement (6). But the latter statement, as I think, does 
not correspond to Place's standpoint about linguistic conventions and how 
the referent of a given name is necessarily determined by them. For more 
details you can see the following discussion of thesis (3).  
11. It will be more discussed in thesis (2). 
12. See: Ayer, 1971, p. 16 & p. 20. 
13. Moreover, his 2004i paper is a perfect instance of this approach. 
14. To read a more fundamental one, see: Wittgenstein, § 294.  
15. If that is not so ‘there is no way … whereby we can use the 
introspective reports of other people as evidence of the nature of their mental 
processes or have any reason for believing in the existence of such processes 
in the case of others” (Place, 2004c, p. 79). It is an implicit reliance on an 
externalistic approach to subject in hand which is not finally to Place's 
advantage. I will speak more about it in thesis (4). 
16. McLaughlin, unlike Kim, does not agree with this idea 
(McLaughlin, 1996, p. 559; Kim, 1993, p. 57).  
17. See: Kant, A 91-92 / B 124. 
18. In this system ‘whatever can affect the system must be included in 
it’ (Davidson, 1999, p. 30); see also: Davidson, 2001a, pp. 219-220. 
19. We [cannot] expect ever to be able to explain and predict human 
behavior with the kind of precision that is possible in principle for physical 
phenomena. This does not mean there are any events that are in themselves 
undetermined or unpredictable; it is only events as described in the 
vocabulary of thought and action that resist incorporation into a closed 
deterministic system (Davidson, 2001b, p. 230). 
20. I have modified Goodman's counterexample; anyway, see: 
Goodman, 1983, pp. 73-4. 
21. See: Place, 2004g, pp. 100-101.  
22. Place introduces analytic and synthetic as this: “a statement is 
analytic, necessary, and true a priori if and only if, without being a statement 
about the meaning of words and expressions contained in it, its truth is 
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determined completely and exhaustively by the linguistic conventions 
governing the construction and use of the sentence that is used to make it. By 
the same token, a statement is synthetic, contingent, and true a posteriori if 
and only if its truth is determined partly by the linguistic conventions 
governing the construction and use of the sentence used to make it and partly 
by virtue of a correspondence between the meaning of the sentence when 
uttered in a relevant context, as determined by those conventions, on the one 
hand and the way things actually are, were, might have been, or possibly will 
be in the aspect of the world to which the sentence relates on the other” 
(Place, 2004d, p. 150); see also: (Place, 2004e, p. 172). 
23. Place discusses two other cases of this very class. See: Place, 2004e, 
p. 172.  
24. Although the proponent of eliminative materialism insists on this 
very idea too (Churchland, 1999, pp. 44-5), contrary to Place, has no 
suggestion to clearly show how it can be possible.  
25. Moreover, an analytic truth may become an analytic falsehood. 
“Take for example the principle that whales are fishes. If we adopt the 
medieval definition of a fish as a creature that lives in the sea and propels 
itself through the water by means of fins and a characteristically paddle-
shaped tail, the statement ‘Whales are fishes’ is an analytic truth, since, on 
that usage, the criteria for assigning an object to the class ‘whales’ include 
those for assigning an object to the class ‘fishes’. But once we adopt the 
modern convention according to which a fish has to be cold-blooded and 
reproduce itself by means of eggs fertilized outside the body and which 
precludes anything that is a mammal from also being a fish, the sentence 
‘Whales are fishes’ becomes an analytic falsehood. However, because of the 
changed conventions, the proposition that ‘Whales are fishes’ used to 
express, given the previous conventions, is not the same proposition as that 
which the same sentence now expresses” (Place, 2004d, p. 149). 
26. Elsewhere, he repeats this very assertion. See: Place, 2004f, p. 87. 
27. See also: Ayer, 1971, p. 95. 
28. It is based on descriptive theory of proper name which is specifically 
attributed to Frege and Russell. For example, see: Frege, 1948, p. 210, 
especially footnote 2.  
29. It is based on cluster theory of proper name which is specifically 
attributed to P. F. Strawson and J. R. Searle. For example, see: (Searle, 1958, 
p. 171).  
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30. “While particulars exist independently of human and animal 
conception …, they are formed into classes only by virtue of the intensions 
or concepts imposed on them by the mind” (Place, 2004d, p. 152). 
31. “The very existence of the classes that constitute the extension of a 
general term and the very possibility of making an identifying reference to 
the object picked out by a singular term depend on the intension of the 
general term and the sense of the singular term” (Place, 2004d, p. 152). 
32. Although, on the one hand, the theses (3.1) and (3.2) are basically of 
those which have an internalistic approach to how the referent of a given 
name is determined, on the other hand, Place's focusing on convention and 
“what we do according to them in referring to something” (Place, 2004d, p. 
146) is such that it may be right to think that his explanation must have an 
externalistic approach to the present problem. Because being justified due to 
a factor which is not immediately in one's own epistemic access is the 
characteristic of externalistic approach to the subject. This is one of the cases 
that will be discussed when I get to thesis (4). 
33. It seems that he is impressed by Frege when he asserts: “The 
referent of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by its 
means” (Frege, 1948, p. 213). 
34. The name, meaning “Forty Columns” in Persian, was inspired by the 
twenty slender wooden columns supporting the entrance pavilion, which, 
when reflected in the waters of the fountain, are said to appear to be forty. 
35. To prevent some misunderstandings, he comments his assertion as 
this: “two things should be emphasized concerning the case of introducing a 
name via a description in an initial baptism. First, the description used is not 
synonymous with the name it introduces but rather fixes its reference. Here 
we differ from the usual description theorists. Second, most cases of initial 
baptism are far from those which originally inspired the description theory. 
Usually a baptizer is acquainted in some sense with the object he names and 
is able to name it ostensively. Now the inspiration of the description theory 
lay in the fact that we can often use names of famous figures of the past who 
are long dead and with whom no living person is acquainted; and it is 
precisely these cases which, on our view, cannot be correctly explained by a 
description theory” (Kripke, 1980, footnote 42). 
36. Although Kripke does not clearly assert this but it can be implicitly 
inferred from his statements especially when he explains how we use the 
term “tiger” to designate a species (Kripke, 1980, pp. 119-121), or when he 
explains what is the original concept of cat (Ibid, p. 122). To read a clearer 
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account of this, see: Larijani, S. (1996/1997), Referring and Necessity, first 
edition, Mersad Press, Ghom, pp. 118-126. 
37. A truth of the nature is a truth of what the object could not have 
failed to have, what it could not have lacked while still existing (See: Kripke, 
1980, footnote 57). 
38. He never refutes the existence of such private experiences; see: 
(Place, 2004j, pp. 27-8). 
39. There is nothing that the introspecting subject says about his 
conscious experiences which is inconsistent with anything the physiologist 
might want to say about the brain processes which cause him to describe the 
environment and his consciousness of that environment in the way he does 
(Place, 2004a, pp. 51-2). 
40. Although I regard him as an internalist, it is not to say that he 
believes what is referred by our introspective reports and usually expressed 
via the words are some sort of mental entities which epistemic access to 
them is of one's own privilege. He holds that the thoughts, as Frege put this 
term, are not some sort of entities inside the heads of those who subscribe it, 
or entertain them; but they are purely linguistic entities closely related to the 
sentences used to express them. They clothe themselves in the material 
garment of sentences and thereby become comprehensible for us. Anyway, it 
cannot be a perfect intentional turning in his internalistic approach to an 
externalistic one in 2004d; because his 2004f and 2004g papers seem to be 
as internalistic as his 2004a paper. So I regard it as one of his few odd claims 
same as what he claims about ontological status of dispositions (Place, 
2004g, pp. 100-101) or as an inconsistency brought into being due to his 
inattention to have a unified approach to the subject in hand.   
41. See, for example, his answer to rival objections in thesis (1) and his 
statements in thesis (3) of linguistic conventions and how the referent of a 
given name is determined by them. Moreover, his statements of how we 
employ our commonsense practical beliefs in resolving cognitive 
dissonances that we may confront, is also another reason subscribing his 
occasionally appealing to those factors which are not immediately in one's 
epistemic access (See: Place, 2004e, pp. 175-7). All of these are based on an 
externalistic approach. 
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This article presents Muhammad Arkoun's (1928-2010) key ideas on 
ethos, civil society, and secularism. Following reflections on adab, one 
of Arkoun's inspirations for rethinking Islamic heritage (turāth), this 
contribution reflects on how Arkoun reconsiders the impact of 
philosophy, both in theology as well as academic scholarship. The 
paper shows how Arkoun hoped to generate an innovative intellectual 
education, which would eventually lead to a humanistic consciousness 
within the Islamic as well as the non-Islamic realm. Arkoun's analytical 
project does not rely on Islam as a remedy for social challenges, but 
rather on an emancipated secularism in whose realm a patient pedagogy 
will lead humanity to establish stable values as bases for fighting 
“underdevelopment, ignorance, eruptions of violence, corruption, and 
intolerance”(Arkoun 1994: 86). The paper closes with a display of 
Arkoun's thoughts on the emergence of individual citizenhood.  
The intent of this paper is to engage thoroughly with Arkoun's 
thought and, in consequence, to offer sufficient learning material for 
students of Islamic theology and philosophy of religion to gain a 
broader picture of the wide spectrum of contemporary Muslim thought. 
It aims at providing an incentive for the pursue of critical-reflective 
scholarship in the field of modern Islam 
Source of Inspiration: adab 
Arkoun’s philosophical project is inspired by a holistic approach to 
education, called adab.1 In its frame, education is a task which 
ultimately leads to the emergence of a ‘new ethos’ within what he calls 
a solidarity project among cultures. According to Arkoun, the tradition 
of adab embodies an Islamic concept of holistic learning, which carried 
the prospect for this 'new ethos'.  
In Arkoun's narrative, adab belongs to a body of knowledge, which 
was for a period of time oppressed or silenced by dominating 
orthodoxies, or what Arkoun terms the hegemonic reason. Such 
marginalized knowledge needs to be brought to light and examined as 
to which degree and in which way it could and did contribute to human 
knowledge about the world and our being in it (Arkoun 1994: 76). Adab 
is a tradition of writings on human ethics, education and behaviour and 
sometimes also identified as Islamic humanism or Islamic humanist 
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culture itself.2 One representative of this humanist tradition is Ibn 
Miskawayh (932-1030 AD), a Persian neo-Platonist, humanist and 
ethicist, on whose work Arkoun wrote his doctoral thesis.3 Ursula 
Günther suggests that it is this initial study on Islamic humanism, as 
presented by Miskawayh that set the foundation of Arkoun’s “long-
term project of a critique of Islamic reason embedded in the generic 
context of religious thought”(Günther 2004: 129). And indeed there exist 
striking parallels between elements of Miskawayh’s adab and Arkoun’s 
deconstructivist approach.4 Commonalities include the openness 
towards diverse, also non-Islamic sources of knowledge, the necessity 
to overcome borders of religious doctrines, and the liberalization of 
thinking.5 Expected results are no less than all-penetrating mental and 
cultural “renewal and creativity”(Arkoun, 1994: 77). Arkoun, 
throughout his work, consequently attempts to unravel and deconstruct 
cultural and religious restraints. He promotes multi-level scientific 
communication and sharing of knowledge (‘collective birthright of 
humankind’) and the application of numerous scholarly disciplines in 
order to germinate a more inclusivist approach to religion.6 Another 
parallel between adab and Arkoun’s approach is the hope that 
enhancing human sciences means to agree on a practical ethical 
framework which instructs people towards, both moral thinking and 
behaviour. As Goodman formulates Miskawayh’s views on humanity: 
“Society”, Miskawayh argues, “is our means to this end: Each of us is 
necessary to someone else’s perfection, and all of us must cooperate to 
provide the material base necessary to humanize our existence.” This 
incorporated the idea that humankind ought to be developed into an 
educated and hence moral culture as part of the “fulfilment as 
individuals and as a species” and to seek “inner sustenance […] in the 
clarity and learning of the mind, the rule of reason, nourished not by the 
sunna of the Prophet but by paideia, the adab of humanity”)Goodman 
2006: 109). Already here we can glimpse a possible tension between the 
philosophical approach to life and knowledge as opposed to the 
traditional theological advance. As I mentioned earlier, much of the 
hopes for the contemporary Muslim world, according to Arkoun, rests 
on rethinking the Greek heritage, specifically the sciences and 
philosophy. Arkoun applies the same critique to humanities as practised 
at Western institutions of education, as we will encounter later.  
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Referring to the prosperous times of philosophy and natural sciences 
within the Islamic ruled realm of the medieval ages, Arkoun contends 
that within the exclusivist interests of the self-established orthodoxies 
“neither the Qur’an nor the Prophet encouraged the study of these 
subjects; quite to the contrary [...].”(Arkoun1994:74). 
In contrast, “Miskawayh’s philosophical interests centred mainly 
upon ethics and political thought. He presents philosophy as the sole 
‘true education’ (adab haqiqa/ alethine paideia), and as the way to 
salvation (najah/soteria).”7 Some might detect that the dichotomy of 
religion ('Qur'an' or 'Prophet') and philosophy is artificially constructed, 
and indeed, this construction is found in numerous references to 
Arkoun's thought. Still, even though Arkoun does very rarely delve into 
contexts of eschatology, he agrees with Miskawayh’s idea that 
philosophy is the main deliverer of holistic education, while at the same 
time Arkoun looks into the Islamic social and scriptural heritage to find 
dynamics towards his anticipated philosophical project. Arkoun's 
project anticipates how Islamic thought reviews its often marginalized 
(also Hellenist-based) heritage and generate autonomously a reliable 
way of formulating authentic values for today’s (also culturally 
religious) societies. Here Arkoun's project also brings up questions 
about identity and management of cultural (politico-religious) heritage 
that this article will touch up in later paragraphs.  
Ethos, Islamic Studies and Philosophy 
Arkoun promotes the development of an ethos which goes beyond 
principles of Western enlightenment and renaissance. Some 
contemporary thinkers of Muslim descend contend that the transfer of 
models of 'development' from one culture (here 'the West') onto another 
culture (here 'the Muslim-majority countries') is the only remedy for 
socio-economic challenges of contemporary Muslim -majority 
countries. These accounts are based on the artificial dichotomy of 'the 
West' and 'the Other' and do no justice to the complexity of inter-
cultural dynamics and influences, shared and contesting histories, as 
well as the manifold factors that play into current impacts on countries' 
social well-being. In contrast to such fast-fixing approaches of - 
woefully much too often - far dispatched-from-reality-intellectuals, 
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Arkoun attempts an all-around critical evaluation of the entire mental 
heritage of cultures that are historically connected. Arkoun addresses 
foremost the realm of civilizations that has developed around the 
Mediterranean Sea. Arkoun admitted that it is not possible for him or 
any single person to conduct such a critical project. It is, he proposed, 
a project of solidarity among those cultures, with the aim of betterment 
of the social conditions for all. Arkoun was hence a stern promoter of 
the discipline of Mediterranean Studies within the humanities. Here 
Arkoun shows similarity to the project of Fazlur Rahman, who 
endeavoured a spirit towards the better of each individual, which then 
spills her goodness into the wider society.8 We see that Arkoun's ideas 
of course reach beyond Islamic traditions such as the adab. This is 
because all intellectual movements are for him only a portion of all 
possible rich sources of inspiration.  
 One project that tries to define stable social values with reference to 
religious consciousness is the Weltethos project formulated by the 
German scholar Hans Küng. Muhammad Arkoun is one of the 
representatives of religious denominations who were frequently 
addressed and asked for advice and support by Hans Küng for this 
project. Muhammad Arkoun amongst other scholars signed the 
“Universal declaration of global ethos” presented 1993 at the first 
parliament of world religions.9 The tenets of this declaration were as 
follows: “Commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life, 
commitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order, 
commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness, 
commitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men 
and women.” I take it that the establishment of these values is what lies 
in some form or another at the heart of Arkoun’s overall project. When 
we speak of an Arkounian 'new ethos', it must contain in a narrow sense 
at minimum these above mentioned tenets.  
Considering such tenets as goals of Arkoun’s work, I take a look at 
his more specific proposals of reform, here with regard to scholarship 
of Islamic Studies. Arkoun pins much hope on innovation within the 
academia, the realm in which he was active most of his scholarly life. 
He opts for a reformation of both, confessional and Western Islamic 
scholarship. A distinction between these two Islamic studies is 
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important to draw. In institutions of higher learning within some non-
Muslim majority countries with a significant proportion of Muslim 
citizens Islamic studies exists of both, non-confessional and 
confessional discipline. In Germany, for example, students can choose 
to study Islam as a curriculum portion from within cultural studies or 
inter-religious non-Islamic courses (often within departments of 
ethnology, anthropology, cultural studies, Christian Protestant and 
Catholic institutes). Since some years, students can also choose the 
confessional study of Islam at state-universities. Here they are 
instructed in the classical disciplines of Islamic sciences (tafsir(ريسفت) ,
asbāb al-nuzūl (لوزنلا بابسأ) , fiqh (هقف), history of Islam etc.) leading 
towards a degree that enables these students to enter professions such 
as religious school teachers, imams, and pastoral councillors.10 The 
difference between these two types of Islamic studies is not to be found 
so much in the degree of trust to scientific measurements (for that also 
scientific findings about the history of Islam and the Quran can be 
included in confessional Islamic studies, as they are similarly applied 
within confessional Biblical and Christian studies), the distinction is 
found in the choice of profession. The confessional degree enables 
students to take on roles of religious guides while the non-confessional 
degree enables students to inquire Islam as a cultural phenomenon.  
Ursula Günther delivers a thorough account of Arkoun’s critique of 
both scholarships. Hence I mark what is important for our purpose. On 
bottom line Arkoun states that confessional Islamic studies should open 
up for additional disciplines like social sciences and overcome the 
limits of thinking as set by orthodoxy. Non-confessional Islamic studies 
should give up their clear-cut box-thinking -studying a subject from 
only one hermeneutical perspective- and they should become engaged 
in a dedicated discourse about current issues, cause and effects in the 
Islamic world, which means to include knowledge about the social 
circumstances and cultural factors that play a role in the system 
(especially to the religiously informed patterns of thinking and praxis). 
Both confessional and non-confessional scholars must reach what 
Arkoun calls a meta-level on which both types of scholars achieve 
autonomy and where it does not matter from which cultural or religious 
background the scholars come(Günther 2004: 107). I think Arkoun also 
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addresses here, amongst others, the Islamic world which includes 
Muslim Diaspora communities and the new generations of Muslims 
born in non-Muslim countries. Arkoun himself taught many students 
with this background.  
For the inner-Islamic debate, as we already know, he most strongly 
recommends a reassessment of turāth (heritage). Islamic historiography 
uses, in the eyes of Arkoun, mechanisms of selection and distortion, for 
example, apotheosis of heroic acts and mythologization of authorities 
(Günther 2004:112). Of these mechanisms one always needs to be aware 
when dealing with scriptural writings. In addition, he heavily criticizes 
the low intellectual quality of inner-Islamic religious discourses, 
speaking of what he calls the “scandalous shortcomings of Islamic 
discourses.” (Günther 2004:108). Apparently – and of course we know 
this from the cases of the trials against Abu Zayd in Egypt and against 
Fazlur Rahman in Pakistan– even if Muslim intellectuals have 
something to add to the religious discourse, they are often excluded 
from the discourse.11 The fate of being excluded from the religious 
discourse in core Islamic countries is that of several modern Muslim 
thinkers who often need to pronounce their words in the non-Islamic 
realm.  
Arkoun sees in some Western Orientalist accounts of Islam (which I 
tend to distinguish from value-open non-confessional religious studies 
approaches) the propensity to support the exclusion of non-mainstream 
Islamic thought. What Arkoun portrays here is a 'scholarship' that 
contributes to the exclusion of already marginalized thought that has 
been produced by Muslims for Muslims. Also Western scholarship 
should adopt a more critical and detailed perspective on Islam, since 
Islam is diverse and not represented solely by a dominant orthodoxy.12 
It must be the task of Western scholarship to inform students and in 
consequence the public about this diversity in order to shape awareness 
of the many facets and hence more realistic picture of Islam.  
Since Arkoun is deeply rooted in the philosophical tradition and the 
Parisian school of deconstructivism, he finds a starting point for reform 
within the academic humanities. He pleads for reforms within all 
disciplines, including the confessional as well as scientific Islamic 
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studies and calls for introducing philosophical learning and teaching in, 
both, curriculum and methodology. He considers such things as crucial 
for expanding the horizon of education since the “philosophical attitude 
is the basis for the mental flexibility and openness” (Günther 2004:108). 
Hence philosophical studies will contribute to holistic education, which 
is necessary for aiming at the new ethos. We see again that Arkoun 
closely links education with an emerging humanism. This becomes 
apparent in his critique of the history of philosophy in confessional 
Islamic studies. He makes out a decline of culture of knowledge in 
Islamic culture since the 10th century, more specifically since the 
dominance of the theological thought of al-Ghazali. Arkoun 
acknowledges specifically the diminishing of ijtihād, individual 
thinking applied to Quran and hadith in order to derive legal opinions.13 
Along this line Goodman mentions al-Ghazali’s opposition to much of 
Miskawayh’s humanistic and secular elements.(Goodman 2006:113). 
Here I assume that Arkoun adopts an assertive position towards adab 
and Miskawayh’s draft of humanist thought while also taking on a 
critical stance to al-Ghazali’s hostility to elements of Miskawayh’s 
thought. Arkoun recognizes the negative influence of the line of thought 
established by al-Ghazali, on which Islamic orthodoxy heavily draws 
on. But he wants to make clear that Islam is not inherently anti-
humanistic or anti-philosophical. He contends that it is a misconception 
that with al-Ghazali’s critique of philosophy there was “put an end to 
the successes of Greek thought by contributing to the victory of 
orthodoxy.”(Arkoun 1994:75). What must truly occur is a recovery, or 
in Arkoun's term an archaeology, of suppressed and marginalized 
streams of Islamic thought, especially those in the fashion of 
Averroism. In all, deconstruction of Islamic thought is the decisive tool 
for this archaeology.  
Secular and Muslim Civil Society 
I understand Arkoun’s proposals for reforming education to be 
ultimately geared at changing society, by means of evolving 
responsible, self reflective and critical citizens. In this endeavour 
solidarity of sciences must go hand in hand with solidarity of ethics. 
Politics should aim at building and preserving a civil society of 
tolerance (Toleranzgesellschaft). The system in use must be an 
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institutionalized democracy which constitutes a society that is equally 
progressive and moral.14 Arkoun criticizes governments of Islamic 
countries, which do not allow freedom of thought, equal rights, 
education, and universal suffrage. He seems indeed quite sceptical 
towards the possibility of establishing democracy and civil societies in 
Islamic countries ) Hendrich 2004: 306). On the other hand he is also 
critical of secular democracies. We will find that Arkoun often 
embraces certain outcomes of secularism, but at the same time also 
investigates them critically. One could call this a love-hate relationship 
of Arkoun towards liberalism and secularism. In example, France is, in 
the eyes of Arkoun, not truly enlightened, since it actively and 
forcefully opposes public expressions of faith. He calls the French state 
system a “militant secularism” which attempts to be a model of an 
enlightened secular state (Arkoun 1994:77). However, a truly 
enlightened state is aware of the religious fact (fait religieux) and its 
mechanisms within society and does not on the contrary chose to ignore 
or even fight it. He says the religious reality is part of social reality and 
cannot be successfully denied. According to Akroun, ignoring the fait 
religieux leads to a gap within society, from which one side will favour 
a religious leadership and the other support rational and secular 
leadership. The study of Arkoun's writings has led me to the conclusion 
that Arkoun anticipates that religion is an impending factor of all 
societies, and that he takes this for granted and does not explain how he 
comes to believe this, other than maybe observation. However, it is 
certain that he pleads for an emancipated secularism that is aware of the 
penetrating dimension of religion. Arkoun seems to say that reality 
cannot be divided into that of belief and that of secular history, since 
both interact and perforate each other.15 With this conscience then 
politics must lead towards an autonomous civil society under the 
guidance of the proposed solidarity of science and ethics. On this 
depends nothing less than a ‘common future of all peoples.’(Cf. 
Arkoun, ‘Auf den Spuren, 145.’) Discourse about this common future 
must take place in an atmosphere of freedom of will and thought. 
Ideologies (in Marx’s sense of the term) will not be able to enhance the 
establishment of a responsible civil populace. Attempts of reading from 
the Quran that Muhammad was a socialist or democrat or that all 
modern natural-scientific findings are already prescribed in the Quran, 
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become, in Arkoun's view, ridiculous enterprises. These readings are 
reactions to modernity, but they do not constitute a modern way of 
inquiry. They project our own beliefs onto religious writings. 
According to this line of thought, Arkoun rejects the idea of the need 
for establishing a theocratic society in order to deliver people from 
mischief. Of course, some Muslim responses to modernity try to read 
the necessity of a unity of state and religion from Islamic history and 
Islamic scriptures (Quran, sunna and sīra). And Arkoun admits that 
Muhammad reinvested religious symbols, the symbolic capital, in order 
to make the eschatology of the new religion relevant for the people at 
that time and place. Yes, the new path to salvation must have been 
paved with new rules for society. But the actual “making of Islam into 
a state” took place due to the demand for a centralized administration 
of the fast expanding Islamic empire. Arkoun seems to say that neither 
Muhammad nor the Quranic text suggested such a unity, but that the 
demand for it was a late sociological phenomenon. He writes, “since 
the death of the Prophet, Islam has never recovered the special 
circumstances permitting its double expression as symbol and politics 
[...].”(Arkoun 1994:21).  
Reflecting on a potential frame for a civilian society, Arkoun is 
indeed sceptical about French laicism, or ‘militant secularism’. 
However, he was a member of the ‘Committee for Laicism’ in France.16 
Arkoun’s view on secularism is mainly a critique of the idea that 
separating state and religion on legal and administrative levels is at all 
possible, because religion still influences society. He is not denying the 
need for such artificial divisions, but - as we have seen above - calls for 
a secularism which is not blind to the religious fact as social fact. 
Further, in his remarks on nationalism, Arkoun objects the feasibility of 
seeking a unity of a pantocratic umma as long as the freedom of the 
individual is not guaranteed.  
Arkoun believed that nationalism of Islamic countries always relies 
on a mythologized Islam, which in form of the ‘ulama’ supports its 
interests. Nationalism is a political system favoured by numerous 
Islamic countries and such an attempt at unifying Islamic people is the 
establishment of the Arab Islamic League. This creation of unity must 
be understood as a reaction by Islamic countries to what is perceived as 
Western dominance in an effort to 'cure' Islamic cultures. But as long as 
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an artificial unification is enforced on a still illiberal people, democratic 
structures have no future. Arkoun notes: “[...] these people possess a 
wealth of resources still poorly understood, poorly interpreted, and 
insufficiently exploited. In vain they request means of democratic 
expression; explosions of anger are quickly repressed, dismissed as 
‘betrayal’ of the national cause, [...].” Arkoun makes clear that “in the 
end, genuine unity must result from the freely expressed will of all 
citizens, but the path that leads there remains long, muddy, and 
disconcerting.”(Arkoun 1994: 29). We see here again a reflection of the 
goals of a global ethics projects as Arkoun embraces the freedom of will 
and expression and human rights.  
Arkoun as a well-established intellectual observed and commented 
on movements of thought on both, the Islamic and the non-Islamic 
academic and political realms. He proposed that intellectuals play a 
crucial part in sharpening the awareness of the need for the rights of 
people. But Arkoun is questioning the intellectual and epistemological 
abilities of intellectuals who address issues of human rights like free 
choice of religion, freedom of thought and expression. This is because 
intellectuals are themselves often caught in a vicious circle. Their role 
is to critique and rethink conditions of society. They ought to contribute 
to shaping public opinion by making background information of 
political and social issues comprehensible and accessible to the public, 
and to communicate their critiques. But if rights of freedom of speech 
and opinion are not granted to them in the first place, they can hardly 
contribute to shape the awareness of the need of such rights for an 
oppressed populace. How can deliverers liberate the conscience of the 
people, if they are not free themselves? Here Arkoun reflects again back 
on Islamic history and finds positive impulses. For example, he believes 
that the original umma, during the lifetime of the Prophet, had the merits 
of an ideal community due to its “spiritual quality” (Arkoun 1994: 53). 
Such quality was determined through the immediate and intense link 
between God and the hearts of the people within the Quranic discourse. 
Arkoun does not think this original community, where the spirit 
dynamically informed people towards change, is something today’s 
Muslim communities could revive or imitate. Today’s societies’ source 
of change is the constant act of rethinking truth-claims, as held e.g. by 
the three monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam). 
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These truth claims are mostly thought as ultimately mutually exclusive 
and any thinking based on exclusivism cannot contribute to holistic and 
critical enquiry into the human condition. Here Arkoun pleads for a 
paradigm shift: “A reciprocity of consciousness as a base for an 
exchange of rights and duties on a level of legal equality would come 
only after there occurred an epistemological, hence mental, break with 
the concept of theological truth developed in the three revealed 
religions.”(Arkoun 1994: 54). The mental break with exclusivist truth 
claims will enable intellectuals to enter a meta-level from which all 
strive to reveal mechanisms behind human phenomena, regardless, as 
said above, of their own backgrounds or affiliations. Above all, a 
common formulation of the values of an ideal society must occur 
outside religious exclusivist thinking. Although Arkoun did not 
compose a list of the often mentioned base-values for the new ethos, he 
was concerned with finding a methodology to discover ways of 
maximising freedom from political, ideological, religious manipulative 
powers. 
 Intriguingly, even if Arkoun pleads for overcoming the borders 
of religious thinking and truth claims, he still finds inspiration for a 
model of the ideal community in divine revelation or as Arkoun calls 
them, the ‘vistas of liberation.’17 This stance might illustrate Arkoun’s 
internal conflict between Islamic/religious and non-Islamic sources of 
inspiration. Arkoun believes that the event of revelation plus the 
religious texts potentially create a positive force for the advancement of 
the person towards responsibility, which entails awareness of rights and 
duties.18 At this point in his writings I can only find reference to the 
Quran as an example of scripture that implies such liberating powers. 
This Quranic material operates with narratives which speak of personal 
responsibility towards the will of God. Arkoun admits that the 'modern' 
notion of citizen has no immediate foundation in the scriptures. But it 
seems for him that scriptures lay down basic criteria for a kind of God-
fearing citizenhood. The evolution of a person towards a responsible 
citizen is one of Arkoun’s central issues that invokes the question of 
personhood and human rights. In this context he admits that “Muslim 
theological thought has not committed itself to the kind of modern 
interpretation that would highlight” ‘problems’ “in contemporary 
discourse on human rights.”(Arkoun 1994: 56). As we shall see,19 
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Arkoun’s reading of sura 9 suggests that a discussion about human 
rights might have already been initiated by the Quranic discourse. The 
above quotation shows that to him the Quran contains the dynamic for 
forming a responsible and autonomous individual. Regarding sura 9 he 
writes “the fundamental message of sura 9 is not outmoded,” (Arkoun 
1994: 56) and he says one efficacy of the Quranic discourse is the 
“deployment of the free person.”(Arkoun 1994: 57).  
The birth moment of the Muslim personality is charged with rich 
symbolic investments of formerly profane actions. Violence is one of 
these notions that the Quran turns into a sacred action, when carried out 
for the defence of al-ḥaqq. Arkoun pays much attention to sura 49 and 
9 when it comes to talking about the emergence of the person, even 
though, as mentioned above, it is not clear how he hopes to establish 
his ideas from the Quranic material. One reason for Arkoun to have 
chosen to dedicate a great deal of notice to sura 9 could be that it 
includes themes particularly important for formulating Islamic beliefs: 
the pact between Muhammad and others (9:1), covenant between God 
and God’s people (112) [1], believers/unbelievers (9: 20, 23-4, 29, 30, 
54, 71, 75, 80, 84) [2], oaths between believers and opponents [3], 
victory and triumph (9:14, 72, 89, 100, 111), gaining paradise (9:72), 
dooming in hell (9:35), belief/unbelief in afterlife (9:85), fight against 
unbelievers/warfare (9:5, 16, 20, 24, 41, 44, 73, 81, 86, 88, 90-94), al-
ḥaqq (9:29), ethics (9:100), hajj (9:3). The sura clearly states what the 
person has to do in order to gain salvation.20 It becomes clearer now that 
Arkoun is concerned with the sociological and anthropological reading 
of the Quran.21 
The discourse of transcendence and of absoluteness opens an infinite 
space for the promotion of the individual beyond the constraints of 
fathers and brothers, clans and tribes, riches and tributes; the individual 
becomes an autonomous and free person, enjoying a liberty guaranteed 
by obedience and love lived within the alliance. The consciousness of 
the person, thus liberated, does not even require the mediation of 
another human consciousness, as it does in Christianity, which depends 
on the mediation of Jesus; the ontological access of a Muslim is direct, 
total, and irreversible. [...] Qur’anic discourse has broadly demonstrated 
its efficacy as a space for the emergence, training, and deployment of 
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the free person, who enjoys guarantees of life, property, family, and 
private domicile not as “citizen” of a civil society managed by elected 
representatives or by universal suffrage (sovereign of the nation 
founded in 1789 by the French Revolution) but as God’s partner in an 
eternal compact (Arkoun 1994: 57). 
Arkoun also explores the dialogical nature of the Quran. Arkoun 
identifies a general technique of the Quranic discourse which is mostly 
comprised of: “‘We’ of the addresser (called God in the discourse of 
faith), the ‘thou’ (Muhammad), the ‘you’ comprising the believers, 
‘he’ and ‘they’ (man and the people still outside the new emerging 
space of communication). This configuration of pronouns establishes 
the basic, constant space of communication and meaning in the entire 
discourse of the Qur’an.” Throughout the Quranic discourse there is a 
tension amongst these protagonists (addressee and addresser, subject 
and object): “[...] through which there emerges a consciousness of 
culpability. Through it, man thereby comes to be transformed into a 
conscious, reflective subject in the sphere of ethics and law. He 
becomes responsible for every thought, action and initiative in his 
life.”(Arkoun, ‘Revelation Revisited’, 12-3.)  
 From this third perspective, it suffices to establish that what can be 
called the qur’ānic stage, the instantiation of a new religion, is a 
complex historical process engaging simultaneously social, political, 
cultural, and normative factors. These are entangled with ritual, 
customs, ethics, familial structures (see family; tribes and clans; 
kinship), competing structures of the imagination and the collective 
interactive memory of such entities as Jews, Christians, Sabians (q.v.), 
polytheists (frequently termed “pagans”), and all cultural groups of the 
ancient Near East. All these modes and manifestations of the historical 
existence of such social groups in Arabia are not only present in the 
qur’ānic discourse but transformed. They have been sublimated, 
uprooted from their local conditions to constitute an “existential 
paradigm” of the human condition. Divested of its particularity, this 
qur’ānic paradigm is capable of producing and informing individual 
and collective existence within the most diverse cultural and historical 
contexts.(Arkoun, ‘Islam’, EQ) 
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Furthermore he suggests a semiotic analysis as displayed in a 
diagram in the article “Notions of Revelations.”  
 
Sura 9 delivers all material for this “dramatic structure” of the 
Quranic discourse and reading it, according to the diagram, restores its 
possible meaning to the first audience in its historical context. As said 
before, the sura needs to be read in the light of the different protagonists, 
whose interaction establishes profound tension within a “historical 
paradigmatic drama.”(Arkoun, Reform or Subvert, 126.) In the context of 
reading sura 49 and 9 Arkoun writes:  
The groups of protagonists are transformed into 
protagonists of a spiritual drama [sic]. The political and 
social situations and what is actually at stake are 
sublimated into paradigms of conduct and recurrent 
choices inexorably involving the ultimate destiny of every 
soul (person) confronted at the same time with temptations, 
constraints and solidarities of the immediate life (al-dunyā, 
or ‘society’ as we could call it today) […].(Ibid, 127f.)  
The Quran involves the addressees into a dialogue that leaves them 
transformed. The drama displays the individual’s struggle for salvation 
against the odds of its own social, political and historical reality.22  
According to Arkoun, Quranic revelation contributed to the 
liberation of the person from tribal codes. The new allegiance is based 
on obedience of the individual to God. Surely there is a tension between 
such a model of personhood and that of the 'Western ideal' (however 
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authentic or feasible) of moral autonomy. Arkoun speaks explicitly of 
the “Muslim person”, or the “person of Islam” who appeared first when 
the people of the former jāhilyya committed “to the faith and to fighting 
(jihad) for the Prophet’s cause, the small group of early believers 
(mu’minūn) [...].”(Arkoun 1994: 89). The growth and recurrence of this 
person he says comes down to the normative character and 
mythological structure of Quranic discourse, the force of ritual and the 
promise for salvation, the centralization of state “which took ‘true 
religion’ (orthodoxy) under its protection and drew legitimacy from it 
in return”, and the image of original Islam and the narratives of 
“universal ‘Islamic’ history” as “initiated by the Prophet for individual 
and collective behaviour.”23 As Arkoun notices, “the emotional climate 
that predominates in Muslim societies today renders the scientific study 
of a large number of delicate problems impossible”(Arkoun 1994: 93). 
Still, he, in contrast, mentions the importance of the image of the initial 
Islam for the beliefs and developments in Islamic societies. He does not 
judge whether this widespread and traditional image of early Islam is 
wrong or misleading, but stresses its impact: 
One can never overemphasize the role and recurrent power of the 
politico-religious imaginary put in place by what I have called the 
Medinan experience. All historical activity of any significance in the 
Islamic domain has been a result of this imaginary. These activities 
themselves presuppose the production of a type of person who has 
internalized all the representations, all the ideal symbolic images 
carried by traditional Islamic discourse. […] The person should be 
studied as a haven of liberty; choices are made, options eliminated, and 
combinations put together to make up each personality and eventually 
to confirm the selection of the personage, the leader, the imam at the 
level of local group, the nation, and the community of believers. Such 
a study becomes indispensable to a reconstruction of the delicate 
mechanisms that definitively order both individual destinies and the 
historical development of societies.24 
The basic personality receives, according to Arkoun, the meaning of 
the initial set up of the Muslim person; in other words, what it means to 
belong to Islam according to the context of the ‘Medinan experience.’ 
Arkoun is aware that this concept of person is not the same as a modern 
notion of responsible individual with particular freedoms. However, he 
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seems to attribute a positive effect to the notion of revelation and the 
dynamics of the first Muslim umma. 
Reflections 
This article sets out to contribute to filling a lacuna of scholarly 
representation of minority Muslim intellectual thought on religion, 
Islam, the Quran, society and reform. Especially within English 
speaking scholarship Muhammad Arkoun's work is rarely reflected 
upon in a thorough fashion. He is often mentioned amongst other names 
listing 'progressive Muslims', 'contemporary Muslim thought', 
'reformism in Islam' etc. It is not uncommon to find his and other names 
in sometimes more polemic than scholarly pieces which try to either 
seize his project for the points being made, or to criticize and reject his 
approach, without having formerly attempted to understand his 
concepts. Consequently, the search for details of his project results 
often in vain. Hence, I believe it is essential to present voices like his in 
a close-to-objective and representative manner, before one enters into 
controversial discussions about the contents. Only by a proper 
engagement with the scholarly accounts of these self-proclaimed 
Muslims, a scientist of religion can begin to compare and discuss them 
towards specific questions, frame them within current discourses in 
social and theological studies.  
Through a consideration of what we have found above, portray of 
Arkoun's concepts can be summed up as follows. Arkoun draws on 
both, concepts from Islamic heritage as well as the non-Islamic 
intellectual sphere. He views religion as an immanent part of social 
reality and tries to reconsider some dynamics of Islam that seem helpful 
in the project of liberating people from all backgrounds from constraints 
on thought, politics, ideology etc. Nothing less than the formulation of 
a new ethos is on his mind. There is no one possible frame in which this 
liberation can take place, neither the re-projection of a supposedly 
known past, nor the un-reflected attempt to imitate adab, nor the 
adoption of some principles of enlightenment, often termed and quickly 
rejected as a product of the West. He asks cultures from shared histories 
around the Mediterranean to join into a critical reflection process 
towards a project of formulating values that will be the basis for a living 
together where the individual as well as the society benefit broadly from 
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development (mental, social, political, economical). Whether this 
constant reflection and criticism might one day overcome the religious 
fact, Arkoun does not touch upon. For him religion is and remains a fact 
of the social and historical set-up of all civilizations involved, whether 
they call themselves Muslim, Christian or secular. However, only in a 
frame of 'healthy' secularism, a process conscientisation can take place. 
Such secularism, in the broadest sense, encourages evolution of thought 
and does not dictate thoughts in any direction, e.g. pro or contra 
religiosity. Arkoun seems to believe that the most effective impulses 
for a liberation-of-the-mind project will be given from within academia 
and consequently in all learning institutions, where philosophical 
reflection, freedom of thought and individual responsibility is taught 
and encouraged. He promotes an advancement of education on all levels 
in order to enable an autonomous civil society that is then empowered 
to make reflexive decisions and to gain responsible suffrage. In the 
context of Muslim-majority countries such progressive education must 
entail critical engagement with the own heritage (turāth), the 
reconsideration of marginalized Islamic philosophies and the inclusion 
of non-Islamic sources. It does not suffice, in the eyes of Arkoun, to 
either reject religion as a hindrance to modernity, nor to mythologize 
religion into an absolute remedy. Through education, this is Arkoun's 
hope, democratic structures will be erected and existing ones stabilized, 
freedom of thought and expression strengthened, as well as autocratic 
regimes and ideological infiltrations (e.g. extremism) challenged.  
The liberating elements of religion can only be discovered when 
truth-claims of self-established orthodoxies are overcome, horizons are 
broadened and a plurality of world views can be accepted. This also 
means to overcome internal power struggles of religious and political 
elites, in order to instead concentrate on analysing the prerequisites 
which are necessary for an improvement of the human condition. 
Arkoun's ideas open a huge spectrum of possibilities of how to talk 
about religion and society, in a fashion that is respectful and 
constructive. His philosophy contributes to a global advance of 
contemporary humanistic thought, and deserves integration into the 
curriculum of both, Islamic theology as well as non-confessional 
religious studies.  
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Notes: 
1. Greek counterpart: paideia. In ‘ancient Greek’ paideia meant “a 
system of broad cultural education” or formally “the culture of a society.” The 
Oxford Dictionary of English. 
2. The term adab existed in similar use in pre-Islamic time. Adab in its 
oldest meaning “implies a habit, a practical norm of conduct, with the double 
connotation of being praiseworthy and being inherited from one's ancestors.” 
(Gabrieli, ‘Adab’, EI) 
3. Arkoun’s PhD thesis on Miskawayh from 1970 is discussed in detail 
by Günther in her PhD thesis Mohammad Arkoun, 161-7. Arkoun also wrote 
an entry on ‘Miskawayh’ in EI2, vol.7, 143-4. 
4. Groff, Islamic Philosophy, 6: Adab “comprises knowledge of poetry, 
rhetoric, oratory, grammar and history, as well as familiarity with the literary 
and philosophical achievements, the practical-ethical wisdom and the 
exemplary individuals of the pre-Islamic Arabs, Indians, Persians and Greeks. 
It can be said to encompass the natural sciences as well, although its primary 
focus is always on the human. […] at its apex, the adab tradition – at least as 
interpreted by Islamic humanists such as Abu Suleyman Muhammad al-
Sijistani, al-Tawhidi and Miskawayh – gave rise to the cosmopolitan ideal that 
wisdom and moral exemplars could be drawn from many cultures, and that 
their insights were the collective birthright of humankind.” 
5. Arkoun, “Auf den Spuren,” 148. Arkoun on adab: “[...] in what I have 
called the philosophical adab (paidaia) of the 4th [AH] or 10th [AC] century, 
we can see a liberalisation of the cognitive activities, similar to those of the 
European Renaissance […].” He asserts though that even Renaissance as well 
as enlightenment were not absolutely free from theological influences. 
6. Arkoun often mentions the necessity and usefulness of a range of 
disciplines which he would like to link through a general sense of 
philosophical scrutiny. Those disciplines are linguistics, philology, 
semiology, literary studies, anthropology, psychology, history, philosophy, 
archaeology and sociology. Since he regards religion as one of the most 
succinct expressions of human existence, the disciplines of researching this 
element of the complexity of humankind must be versatile. Arkoun takes up 
positively from adab two aspects which are worth being carried over into 
present academia: “Intellectualizing scientific disciplines (al-ulum) […]” and 
“liberalization of cognitive activities.” ([...] Intellektualisierung der 
wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen (al-ulum) [...] and “Liberalisierung der 
kognitiven Aktivitaeten.” Arkoun, “Auf den Spuren,” 148.) 
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7. Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam, 231. Kraemer refers 
to Miskawayh, Tahdhīb al-akhlāq, 49-50. See also how Walzer reflects on 
translations from philosophical works in Greek into Arabic, “Some Aspects 
of Miskawayh’s Tahdīb al-Akhlāq,” cited in Kraemer 232-3. 
8. Völker, Katharina (2015), ‘Two Accounts of Quranic Revelation – 
Fazlur Rahman and N.H. Abu Zayd on Muhammad’s Contribution’, in: 
Journal of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations. Eds. University of 
Birmingham (UK) and Monash University (Australia) (London: Routledge, 
2015), 271-286. 
9. Küng. A global Ethic, 47. Cf. Declaration toward a Global Ethic 
(http://www.urbandharma.org/pdf/ethic.pdf). Regarding the critique of 
instrumentalising religion for state-power interests interesting parallels exist 
between Küng and Arkoun. Küng believes that in the early 4th century, 
Catholocism was instrumentalized by the Roman Empire, which was best 
demostrated by symbolically attaching the Cross of Jesus Christ the bringer of 
peace, to the shields with which the Roman Empire set out to oppress other 
people to be conquered. Similarly, Arkoun contends that the merge of state 
and religion was a socio-political necessity at the time of the expansion of the 
Islamic Empire. 
10. Völker, Katharina (2013), ‘A Danger to Free Research and Teaching 
in German Universities? The Case of Muhammad Sven Kalisch, in: Paul 
Morris, William Shepard, Toni Tidswell, Paul Trebilco (eds.), The Teaching 
and Study of Islam in Western Universities (New York: Routledge, 2013), 
175-85. Proceedings to the conference: The Role of the Study of Islam in the 
Western University, CSIMCNZ (Centre for the Study of Islam and Muslim 
Cultures, New Zealand), University of Otago, 2009. See also my discussion 
in: Völker, Katharina (2014), ‘Parameters of Teaching Islam Freely’, in: Erich 
Kolig, Freedom of Speech and Islam (London: Ashgate, 2014), 209-224. 
11. Günther, Mohammad Arkoun, 109. Günther writes with reference to 
the Abu Zayd case: In most countries of the Near and Middle East the socio-
political circumstances do not allow for a development of innovative streams. 
The frame, in which discourses are enabled, are strictly deteremined. 
Intellectuals hence criticize that when they are resisting the dominant 
conventions, public opinions and official ideologies, they face isolation from 
the scientific community, in worst case scenarios they'll have to suffer a fate 
similar to that of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd […].“ (my translation) of: „In den 
meisten Ländern des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens sind die sozio-politischen 
Bedingungen nicht gegeben, die notwendig sind, damit sich innovative 
Strömungen entfalten und etablieren können. Der Rahmen, innerhalb dessen 
Diskurse stattfinden können, ist weitgehend vorgegeben. Darum kritisieren 
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Intellektuelle, die sich weigern, sich den herrschenden Konventionen 
anzupassen, d.h. der öffentlichen Meinung und der offiziellen Ideologie zu 
folgen, eine Isolierung as der jeweiligen wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft, 
schlimmstenfalls müssen sie ein vergleichbares Schicksal wie Nasr Hamid 
Abu Zaid in Kauf nehmen [...].” 
12. Arkoun finds that Western scholarship promotes the dominance of 
orthodoxy when it considers it to be the only representative of Islam being 
worth studied and taught. He explicitly refers to van Ess as an example. Even 
further he writes “certain renowned Orientalists have helped to enrich the 
apologetic literature on Islam.” (Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 102.) 
13. cf. Völker, Katharina (2014), ‘Mohammad Arkoun: The Quran 
Rethought - Genesis, Significance, and the Study of the Quran’, in: Edmund 
Weber et al. (eds.), Journal of Religious Culture. Goethe-University, 
Frankfurt am Main - Institute for Religious Peace Research. No. 189 (2014). 
(http://web.uni-frankfurt.de/irenik/relkultur189.pdf) 
Ghazali's critique of philosophy has been often studied towards its actual 
impact on the intellectual development of Islamic thought. However the 
scholars do not agree on the potenz of this impact. Ghazali's critique often 
serves as a practical marking point for the teaching of Islamic history in order 
to simplify a chronology of Islamic intellectual endeavour (in the fashion of 
Islamic thought 'pre-Ghazali' and 'post-Ghazali'). 
14. Hendrich (Islam und Aufklärung) writes with reference to Arkoun that 
democracy is “Voraussetzung einer neuen Kultur der Kreativität und des 
moralischen Konsensus.” See also Hendrich’s remarks on Arkoun’s 
assessment of develop democratic structures, 306. 
15. “Secularism with its juridical, philosophical underpinning continues to 
prevail in most Western, societies, but many churches, religious institutions, 
and civil organizations are making claims for articulating an encompassing 
theological-philosophical vision integrating the three concepts, person-
individual-citizen, which they regard as inseparable.” (Arkoun, “The State, 
the Individual, and Human Rights.”) 
16. Cf. Arkoun’s CV on the ‘Ibn Rushd Fund for Freedom of Thought’ 
webpage (www.ibn-rushd.org/English/CV-Arkoun.htm). 
17. Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 34. Arkoun's detection of liberating 
dynamics within revealed book-religions finds similarities in the liberation 
philosophies of Paolo Freire, Fazlur Rahman, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Hans 
Küng, Farid Esack, Amina Wadud, and Asma Barlas. 
18. “Revelation as collected in the sacred writings contains starting points, 
strong roots, and carrier concepts for the emergence of the person as a subject 
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equipped with rights and as an agent responsible for the observance of 
obligations toward God and peers in the political community. The idea of 
peers does not coincide, of course, with the modern idea of citizen [...].” 
(Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 55.) 
19. Völker, Katharina (2012), 'The Emergence of the Responsible Person', 
in: K. Völker, Quran and Reform: Rahman, Arkoun, Abu Zayd, p. 151-153. 
20. In sociological terms we can say that Arkoun speaks of the ‘myth of 
probation; (Bewährungsmythos) and the origin of the basic Muslim 
personality (this last expression is used by Arkoun numerous times). The 
sociologist Ulrich Oevermann uses the term Bewährungsmythos, to describe 
the myth of religion that claims the necessities for gaining salvation. 
21. Schönberger, p.11 comments on Arkoun, The Unthought in 
Contemporary Islamic Thought, 50. “Although the Qu’rān is the basis of the 
imaginaire, it is not a static concept; it is rather a dynamical one that is 
interdependent with the ethic of Islam. In doing so, Arkoun’s anthropological 
orientation is to unearth the ‘myth of origins’ and the ‘regimes of truth.’” 
22. Regarding the emerging of the consciousness of the self see Arkoun, 
Reform or Subvert, 279-80 (re. Qur'an verse 9:5). 
23. Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 89. As a remark: If one takes these criteria 
for the success of the Muslim person, it is understandable if researchers 
conclude a different image of early Islam, which then cannot serve anymore 
as this support for the constructed Muslim identity today. See studies on early 
Islam by the ‘Saarland School’, and research by Cook/Crone, and Kalisch. 
24. Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 90. Arkoun’s understanding of the Muslim 
person seems to resemble what he calls the ‘basic personality’. He explicitly 
refers in this context to neo-Freudian psychoanalyst and ethnologist Abram 
Kardiner, who formulated that every culture brings forth a concept of 
personality, which then finds variation and development: “[...] with the help 
of the Islamic example, one could revive the concept of basic personality 
launched not long ago by the psychiatrist Abram Kardiner but left behind by 
anthropologists.” Here a description by the sociologist Renner: “Die 
Basispersönlichkeit setzt sich zusammen aus denjenigen 
Persönlichkeitselementen, die die Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft aufgrund der 
gemeinsamen Erfahrungen in der frühen Kindheit miteinander teilen. Danach 
ist die Entstehung einer basalen Persönlichkeitsstruktur vor allem in den 
Sozialisierungspraktiken und –erfahrungen wie Stillen, Entwöhnen, 
Reinlichkeitstraining begründet... “Renner, Kulturtheoretische und 
kulturvergleichende Ansätze,” 182.  
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